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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the encounter between international religious agencies and 
ethnic minorities in China's south-western periphery. It critically assesses the idea of a 
Christian ‘civilizing mission' through a comparative analysis of Christian missionaries 
in the early twentieth century and international Christian NGOs in the contemporary 
era. Despite their obvious differences, both missionaries and Christian NGOs share a 
belief in universal or absolute values that they promote in communities with diverse 
traditions. The successful promotion of these beliefs requires international religious 
agencies to establish a dialogue with communities, especially through demonstrations of 
respect for different ethnic values and beliefs. This thesis traces these encounters.
This thesis has four objectives. First, it brings together historical and 
contemporary accounts of change and continuity in the Christian ‘civilizing mission’. 
Second, it explores the entangled relationship between the concept of a ‘civilizing 
mission’ and religion. Third, it develops a deeper understanding of the Christian 
‘civilizing mission’ from a local non-state perspective. Fourth, it assesses the impact of 
international religious agencies on ethnic community identity in the past and present. It 
does so by drawing, in part, from archival material and, for the contemporary setting, 
original fieldwork in Yunnan and Qinghai provinces. Through these four objectives, the 
thesis contributes to the work on religion in China in the late-nineteenth century, brings 
a much needed religious dimension to the literature on China’s contemporary 
international relations, and, finally, improves our understanding on the extent to which 
China has rejected or adopted ‘Western’ or ‘universal’ values.
In interpreting the encounter between international religious agencies and ethnic 
communities, the thesis posits three frames of interaction—‘conflict’, ‘adaptation’ and 
‘middle ground’. The conflict and adaptation frames refer to the extent to which 
members of an ethnic community consciously agree with the values, beliefs and 
activities of an international religious agency. The middle ground frame refers to a 
situation in which interaction results in unintended consequences for both the 
international religious agency and the ethnic community.
This thesis argues that the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’ as the imposition of 
values and beliefs is too simplistic, not the least because it tells us little about how 
ethnic communities respond to ‘Western’ or ‘universal’ values. To assume the 
imposition of values and beliefs overlooks the dialogue between international religious 
agencies and ethnic communities that allows us to understand the fine line between
conflict or adaptation. It also discounts the possibility of unintended consequences that 
may strengthen community identity. This thesis demonstrates that the introduction of 
external religious values and beliefs need not weaken ethnic community identity.
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‘Take up the White Man’s Burden -  
Send forth the best ye breed -  
Go bind your sons to exile 
To serve your captives’ need;
To wait in heavy harness 
On fluttered folk and wild -
Your new-caught, sullen people, half devil and half child’.
(Rudyard Kipling, ‘The White Man’s Burden’ 1899)
This verse, written by the British poet Rudyard Kipling, was published at the time of the 
Philippine-American war (1899-1913). ‘The White Man’s Burden’ justified an 
imperialist project, and supported the position that the United States should join forces 
with British imperialism and share the ‘white man’s burden' o f ‘extending civilization 
to peoples considered incapable of governing themselves’ (Zwick 1992: xviii). In other 
words, the United States should join in the ‘civilizing mission’. More than a century has 
passed since this poem was published, but it is still cited in many contemporary works 
to suggest the continuing relevance of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ over time 
(Bowden 2004a; Foster, Magdoff and McChesney 2004; Sines 2002).
Edward Said (1994: 130) writes that the rhetoric of the civilizing mission is ‘what 
has been called “a duty” to natives, the requirement in Africa and elsewhere to establish 
colonies for the “benefit” of the natives, or for the “prestige” of the mother country’. 
What is evident from both Kipling and Said's description is that the idea of the 
‘civilizing mission' has embedded within it two key presuppositions: an asymmetrical 
image of the relationship between so-called ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ people; and a 
self-proclaimed sense of duty of the ‘civilized’ to help the ‘uncivilized’.
According to many historians, in the nineteenth century the ‘civilizing mission’ 
was inextricably linked to imperialism through the work of (especially British and 
French) Christian missionaries (Wiest 1997; Dubois 2005; Fischer-Tine and Mann 
2004). For example, Wiest (1997: 668) states that the French government and French 
missionaries ‘collaborated in combining the two notions of Gesta Dei per Francos 
[‘The Deeds of God Through the Franks’] and Mission Civilisatrice [‘Civilizing 
Mission’]’. From a nineteenth century French perspective, Christian missionaries saw 
themselves as undertaking a ‘civilizing mission’ that aimed not only to evangelize but 
also to facilitate French colonial and economic expansion.
2 INTRODUCTION
Even though the nineteenth-century style of imperialism no longer prevails, the 
theme of the ‘civilizing mission' is still commonly referred to in the field of 
contemporary international relations. (Donnelly 1998; Gong 1984a, 1984b; Seabrooke 
and Bowden 2006; Wight 1991). A number of writings in the field of development 
studies has also suggested that a new form of ‘civilizing mission’ is emerging through 
the activities of development agencies (Biccum 2005; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Manji 
and O’Coill 2002; Marglin 2003; Mosse 2004). These studies have heavily criticized 
international NGOs, many of which are in fact religious, for their ‘civilizing’ agenda.1 
Very often the idea of the ‘civilizing mission' is implicit in the emphasis on the 
asymmetrical relationship between the ‘developer’ and local people. As champions of 
development, so the argument goes, NGOs tend to spread their values and beliefs, based 
on a view of their own superiority, juxtaposed with a view of the inferiority of those on 
the receiving end. What is implied in this view is that attempts by external agencies to 
impart their values and beliefs to local communities can be understood as essentially 
seeking to raise the ‘standard of civilization’ of the ‘uncivilized’ to that of the 
‘civilized’.
These bodies of literature inherently assume a unidirectional imposition of values 
and beliefs with less attention given to the actual interactions between the so-called 
‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ (Biccum 2005; Donnelly 1998; Gong 1984a, 1984b; Manji 
and O’Coill 2000). Such local interactions have been investigated in the literature on 
China studies, which particularly deals with Christian missionaries in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, from the perspective of historical anthropology (Bays 1996; 
Cheung 1995; Harrell 1995; Sweeten 2001; Dunch 2001). Some of these studies focus 
on ethnic communities as the targets of activity conducted by Christian missionaries 
(Cheung 1995; Harrell 1995). Few existing studies examine local interactions between 
international Christian NGOs and ethnic communities in China in the contemporary 
context, let alone undertake a comparative analysis of historical and contemporary 
encounters between international religious agencies and ethnic communities.2
Such studies are critical of the commonly held assumption that a high degree of ‘participation’ by 
local people inevitably leads to their ‘empowerment’ (Chambers 1983, 1994; Arnstein 1969, Pretty 
1995, Cornwall 1996).
A note of these terms, ‘international religious agencies’ and ‘ethnic communities’, is provided later 
in this introduction (see pp. 16-18). One of the reasons for the lack of historical comparison is the 
apparently significant changes in the way the Chinese government has dealt with Christianity over 
time. In particular, the PRC expelled Christian missionaries from the country in 1953. Since this time, 
foreign religious activity has been strictly controlled. However, despite these controls, since the late 
1980s, international aid and development NGOs have been working in China, and many of them are 
either explicitly Christian in their orientation or affiliated with Christianity in some way.
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This thesis accordingly provides an historically informed analysis of the 
interactions between international religious agencies and ethnic communities living in 
the south-western periphery of China. In comparing the work of Christian missionaries 
in the early twentieth century with that of international Christian NGOs in the 
contemporary era, it seeks to critically assess the idea of the Christian ‘civilizing 
mission’ over time. Although international Christian NGOs today and Christian 
missionaries in the historical period are in many ways very different, both groups have 
commonly believed in universal or absolute values, which they attempt to promote 
among communities with diverse traditions.
The lack of an historical comparative analysis hinders in-depth understanding of 
the relationship between the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ and religion in China. The 
meaning of the term ‘civilizing mission’ is not fixed nor does it conform to a single 
interpretation. The term’s connotations have fluctuated over time. In relation to the 
Christian missionaries of nineteenth century imperialism, the notion of a ‘civilizing 
mission’ often had a positive connotation, implicit in the image of Christian 
missionaries as ‘a special breed of heroic persons bringing Christ to foreign lands’ 
(Wiest 1997: 656). By contrast, describing today’s international Christian NGOs as 
undertaking a ‘civilizing mission’ is considered to be very offensive and overly 
deterministic. This is because the ‘civilizing mission' has been linked to the discredited 
concept of imperialism. Indeed, as will be explained later in this thesis, the extent to 
which international Christian NGOs today perceive their work in China as part of a 
‘civilizing mission’ varies from organization to organization. By critically assessing the 
idea of the Christian ‘civilizing mission’ over time, this thesis aims to offer an 
explanation of how the relationship between the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ and 
religion has transformed.
The thesis seeks to address two central research questions:
1. How have the interactions between international religious agencies and ethnic 
communities in China transformed from the nineteenth century to date?
2. What are the implications for our broader understanding of the changing nature of 
the Christian ‘civilizing mission’?
In order to render these central questions more capable of empirical investigation, the 
thesis will focus on the following sub-research questions.
1. How have international religious agencies put their values and beliefs into practice 
in the process of interacting with local ethnic communities on China’s periphery?
4 INTRODUCTION
2. How have ethnic communities responded to those externally generated values and 
beliefs?
3. What has been the impact on any pre-existing notions of community identity?
China’s Civilizational Encounter with the West: Conflict or Adaptation?
This thesis speaks to a broader theme of China’s civilizational encounter with the West. 
The general literature on the idea of a civilizational encounter discusses ways in which 
civilizations intersect with each other at a conceptual level (Weber [1922] 1964; 
Dürkheim and Mauss ([1930] 1971); Febvre ([1930] 1973); Nelson [1973] 1981; Elias 
([1939] 1989); Amason 2001; Rundell and Mennell 1998; Huntington 1993, 1996).* 3 A 
central debate revolves around the question of whether the civilizational encounter leads 
to a ‘clash’ or to an ‘adaptation’ (Huntington 1993, 1996; Nelson [1973] 1981). Those 
who concentrate on a ‘clash’, for example Huntington (1996), tend to emphasize 
civilizational differences, and argue that a contest for power is occurring in an 
intercivilizational context.4 In contrast, other scholars have emphasized civilizational 
exchange and the potential for adaptation.5 For example, Benjamin Nelson ([1973] 
1981) explores the critical borrowings of Western Christendom from the Muslim and 
Hebrew civilizations. Much sociological and international relations literature draws on 
Nelson’s idea of ‘civilizational borrowing’. Arjomond (2001; 455), for example, argues 
that the normative order of medieval Islam was based on pluralism ‘through the mutual 
accommodation of the shari'a and a political culture derived from Greek and Perso- 
Indian sources’.
The literature dealing with the civilizational encounter in a broader sense focuses 
on the importance of religion (Madsen and Strong 2002; Chambers and Kymlicka 2002; 
Anheim 1999; AnNa’im 2002; Keane 2002; Thomas 2004). Madsen and Strong’s 
(2002) edited book on ethical pluralism ‘juxtaposes modern secular philosophical
With regard to Nelson’s analysis on Max Weber’s ‘eivilizational-analytic perspective’, see Nelson
(1976, 1981). The majority of international relations writings on civilization in fact draw on the 
literature of sociology, and the study itself of civilization is inter-disciplinary today. Recent 
momentum for the revival of civilization in international relations and sociology stems in some part
from Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (1993, 1996). Recently, two journals have 
dedicated space to a discussion of civilization: Thesis Eleven, Vol. 62, No. 1 (August 2000) and 
International Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 2001). In the field of international relations, 
civilization has received increased attention since the 1990s. Representative studies are O'Hagan 
(2002), Neumann (1999) and Salter (2002).
4 With regard to the development of literature on the concept of civilizations after Huntington, see 
O’Hagan (2005).
Literature that deals with dialogue within and among civilizations is increasing; for example, see 
Khatami (2003) and Koechler (2003). For a review of traditional approaches to civilization in 
sociology, see Arnason (2001).
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traditions with older religious traditions’ (Madsen and Strong 2002: 1). Its concluding 
chapter identifies the possibility of dialogues across different traditions, by arguing that 
‘there are important areas of overlap, and important ways in which they are mutually 
compatible’ (Moon 2002: 357). It is important that this argument takes place because 
religion is often understood as having an exclusive nature (AnNa’im 2002). My thesis is 
motivated by Madsen and Strong’s discussion at the conceptual level, and explores the 
condition and the nature of dialogue in the encounter between international religious 
agencies and ethnic communities in China from an empirical point of view.
In a similar vein to that in the general literature, scholars studying civilizational 
encounters between nineteenth-century China and the West have also stressed that such 
encounters led to either a clash or an adaptation. Many studies have identified the 
political, economic and cultural differences between China and the West, and have 
discussed how conflicts between the two, which began with the 1840 Opium War, have 
transformed China since the nineteenth century (Fairbank 1968; Cohen 1984; Banno 
1964). Other scholars have stressed the importance of adaptation in their exploration of 
the process by which China attempted to adapt to a European standard of civilization 
during the nineteenth century (Gong 1984a, 1984b; Zhang 1991; Suzuki 2005).
In the contemporary era, normative tensions between China and the West remain 
an important focus of scholarly concern (Bell 1996, 2000; Foot 2000; Kent 1999; 
Nathan 2003; Shambaugh 2000; Zhang 1998). The term ‘civilizational encounter’ is not 
necessarily used in these studies, but the essence of the debate over the so-called 
‘international socialization’ of China lies in how China resists or adapts to externally 
originated values. For example, the issue of human rights clearly raises the subject of 
civilizational clash or adaptation. Some scholars focus on China’s disagreement with 
the so-called ‘standard of human rights’ set by the West (Bell 1996, 2000). Others 
emphasize China’s adaptation of international human rights regime (Foot 2000; Kent 
1999)/’ This thesis is situated in this very important debate by identifying a fine line by 
which externally originated values lead to conflict or adaptation in China’s local 
communities.
A common feature of the above-mentioned studies is that they take an elitist 
approach centring on the responses of governments and intellectuals, with far less 
attention given to the role of international non-state actors and the importance of
" In this regard. Foot (2000) and Kent (1999) provide representative studies from an international 
relations perspective. Foot (2000) explores the process of the diffusion of the international human 
rights norm in China and the importance of the notion of "global community’ to China. Kent (1999) 
investigates China's gradual socialization into the international human rights regime.
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interactions taking place at the local level. Christian missionaries, for example, were 
significant actors in the age of European imperialism, and had a major impact on 
relations between China and several European countries. Throughout history and into 
the present, the influences of international agencies have been felt at multiple levels of 
Chinese society. Here, leading studies on China’s international relations provide my 
study with useful approaches. Morton’s study (2005) of international aid and China’s 
environment is particularly valuable. It takes the important step of incorporating local 
dimensions into the study of China’s international relations. In addition, Foot (2000), 
Hamrin (2003a) and Zweig (2002) incorporate analysis of non-state actors such as 
NGOs. My thesis, benefiting from these approaches, examines the local dimension with 
an emphasis on the role of non-state actors interacting in a religious context.
It is also necessary to acknowledge that the literature on China's international 
relations in the nineteenth century often portrays the important misconception that 
Western values are ‘modern’ and Chinese values are ‘traditional’ (Fairbank 1968; 
Cohen 1984; Hsii 1960; Pye 1966). The work of Lucian Pye (1966) is particularly 
illustrative in this regard. He argues that China’s coastal areas, which have experienced 
greater foreign influence, have always been identified with ‘modernity’ by Chinese, 
while China’s inland remains ‘traditional’. However, the Western forces that tried to 
inculcate ‘civilization’ in China actually had a great deal to do with Christianity; and 
religion is usually associated with ‘tradition’, as opposed to ‘modernity’. Dismissing 
these religious forces in order to more comfortably equate Western civilization with 
‘modernity’ is highly problematic. In this thesis I seek to escape from the conventional, 
dichotomized paradigm that associates the West with ‘modernity’ and China with 
‘tradition’.
The idea of modifying this dichotomy is of particular relevance to an exploration 
of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ in the Chinese context. In focusing on the 
domestic realm, it is evident that neither the West nor some international regime is the 
sole entity from which a ‘civilizing mission’ has emanated. In fact, ‘civilizing missions’ 
have also originated in China. As Harrell (1995) reminds us, two types of ‘civilizing 
mission' have occurred at the same time in China: one emanated from the West directed 
towards China; the other originated from the Chinese centre directed towards its 
periphery. By addressing this interesting duality, this thesis firstly moves beyond the 
conventional paradigm of the West as a transmitter of ‘civilization’ and China as a
Also see Oakes’ (1995) discussion of ‘internal colonialism’ and Schein’s (1997) discussion of 
‘internal orientalism’ in a Chinese context.
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passive recipient of 'civilization’. It secondly provides useful insights into the extent to 
which China’s encounter with the West has affected the Chinese understanding of the 
concept o f ‘civilization’.
Central Objectives
This thesis has four main objectives. The first is to explore historical change and 
continuity in the Christian ‘civilizing mission’ aimed towards the Chinese periphery. As 
mentioned earlier, although the interactions between Christian missionaries and ethnic 
communities have been explored in the field of China studies (Harrell 1995; Chiao and 
Tapp 1989), very few studies have brought together historical and contemporary 
accounts. According to Harrell (1995), throughout history, ‘civilizing missions’ in 
China have been undertaken in a manner suggesting the ‘civilizers’ thought their own 
values and beliefs were superior to those of the ‘civilizees’, whose values and beliefs 
ipso facto were somehow inferior/ Since the nineteenth century, ethnic communities in 
China have been the common target of ‘civilizing’ activities undertaken not only by the 
West, by also by the Chinese centre (Harrell 1995). Although the thesis is primarily 
concerned with understanding the changing nature of the Christian ‘civilizing mission’ 
in China, it will also provide a contextual overview of the Chinese centre’s ‘civilizing 
mission’ from the nineteenth century onwards. In so doing, it will explain the way in 
which China’s encounter with the West affected the Chinese understanding of 
‘civilization’.
The second objective of this thesis is to incorporate a religious dimension into the 
literature on China’s international relations by exploring the entangled relationship 
between the ‘civilizing mission’ and religion. Despite the fact that religion has been 
very important in China’s encounter with the West, not only in the historical period but 
also in the contemporary period, it has been largely neglected in the literature. This is 
because the majority of the literature has focused on state actors. In this thesis a focus 
on religious non-state actors allows for a broader assessment of the extent to which the 
religious factor has affected China’s encounter with the West.
The third objective is to gain a more nuanced understanding of the Christian 
‘civilizing missions’ in China from a local perspective/ Such a perspective provides
s Harrell (1995) in fact uses the term ‘civilizing project’, rather than ‘civilizing mission’.
1 The main focus is on the interaction between international religious agencies and ethnic communities 
in China, although the study also takes into account the importance of the Chinese central and local 
governments when and where appropriate. During the Maoist era, the Chinese central and local 
governments were deeply enmeshed in ethnic communities, a fact that has left an indelible mark on
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deeper insights into the major debate over the extent to which 'Western values’ or so- 
called 'universal values’ have been rejected or adapted at various levels of Chinese 
society. In order to provide an in-depth account of the relationship between external 
agencies and the communities they affect, it is essential to bring in the responses of 
local people who are often less vocal than national elites. Focusing on local people is 
important because very often they are the so-called direct ‘recipients’ of externally 
driven values and beliefs.
The fourth objective is to assess the impact of international religious agencies on 
ethnic community identity. By 'ethnic community identity’, as Chapter One will discuss 
in further detail, I mean the social boundary of a community at which its people 
distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’. Such boundaries can be observed in forms of social 
hierarchy and social practices. In many ethnic communities, community members feel a 
sense of belonging to the community based on social hierarchies embedded in religious 
affiliation and traditional social relations (Madsen 1998; Harrell 1995: Gladney 1991). 
The impact of both Western ‘civilizing’ activities and those of the Chinese centre 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in relation to the ethnic identity of 
non-Han communities on the Chinese periphery, has been discussed in anthropological 
studies such as Harrell (1995), Cheung (1995) and Diamond (1995). These scholars 
argue that ‘civilizing projects’ undertaken by both Christian missionaries and the 
Chinese centre contributed to developing ‘ethnic consciousness’ among ethnic 
communities (Harrell 1995: 27-29). This thesis heavily draws on these insights, and 
brings into the discussion the impact of international religious NGOs in the 
contemporary period.
In pursuit of these four objectives, this thesis brings together four main areas of 
scholarship. First, it draws on the literature on the transformation of state-ethnic 
minority relations from the late nineteenth century to date (Blum 2001; Chiao and Tapp 
1989; Gladney 1991; Harrell 1995; Kaup 2000; Shi 2000).10 In particular, I draw on 
anthropological and sociological works that have investigated various interactions at the 
local level.
Second, it draws on the literature relating to religion in China (Bays 2001; Dean 
1998; Dunch 2001; Jing 1996; Madsen 1998, 2003a, 2003b; Yang 1973). Religion plays
the collective consciousness of the communities. In addition, the activities of NGOs are controlled 
and have to be approved by both the central and local governments.
Before these studies emerged, most literature on China’s state-ethnic minority relations offered a 
state-centric view, by looking at how the state has intervened in minority affairs, and how, by state
10
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a key role in ‘ethnic community identity’. For example, in his study on China’s 
Catholics, Richard Madsen (1998: 53-56) describes rural Catholicism as ‘ethnicity’." 
Drawing on Emile Dürkheim, Madsen writes that the Catholic faith is ‘vitally important 
as a sacred marker of the community's identity in relation to other communities’ (1998: 
136). In a similar vein, Yang (1973) analyzes the secular role of religion in Chinese 
society. He argues that the role of religion in China is deeply intertwined with informal 
social institution, such as lineage. These studies closely relate to the nature of China’s 
civil society and provide this thesis with a foundation for its exploration of religiously- 
oriented ethnic communities.
Third, the thesis draws on a variety of works from the field of development 
studies, especially the literature on community development (Cooke and Kothari 2001; 
Mosse 2004; Shore and Wright 1997; Ferguson 1994; Tsing 1993; Scott 1998; Williams 
2004; Gomm 1993; Kapoor 2002).12 These critical studies are particularly helpful in 
discussing the ‘civilizing’ aspect of community development in relation to the notion of 
‘participation’ as well as motivations and activities of international religious NGOs in 
the contemporary era.
Finally, this thesis draws on the literature on NGOs and civil society in China 
(Brook and Frolic 1997; Hamrin 2003b; Ma 2002a, 2002b; Madsen 1998; White, 
Howell and Shang 1996). An understanding of the constraints and characteristics of 
Chinese civil society is helpful in providing a backdrop against which one can assess 
the extent to which civil society organizations (both secular and religious) can play an 
autonomous role in representing social interests—autonomous in relation to the state, 
that is.13
intervention, the peoples on China’s border regions have been transformed from ‘barbarians’ into 
China’s ‘ethnic minorities’ (Dreyer 1976; Heberer 1989; Mackerras 1994).
11 Gladney (1991) also discusses the important close relationship between ethnicity and religion, by 
examining the Chinese categorization of the Hui (Muslim) community as an ethnic group.
12 These studies argue that development is the locus for developers to exercise Foucault’s notion of 
‘governmentality’, reproducing hierarchies of relationship in knowledge (scientific over indigenous), 
in development (developer over ‘to be developed’), in marginality (centre over margin) and in 
civilization (civilizer over civilizees). As Ferguson (1994) claims, such hierarchies are ‘depoliticized’ 
and seen as being quite natural. For the relationship between development and a ‘new form of 
imperialism’, see Biccum (2005).
13 The question of whether ‘civil society’ can exist in China at all has been discussed also from 
historical and cultural points of view. With regard to the discussion on ‘civil society’ with Chinese 
characteristics, see a special issue on China’s civil society in Modern China, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 
1993), Brook and Frolic (1997), Chamberlain (1998), Madsen (1998) and Pye (2001).
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Research Methodology
Dual Comparative Approach: Historical and Contemporary>
This study adopts a dual comparative approach to understanding the nature of the 
Christian ‘civilizing mission' in China. Firstly, it will compare today’s international 
religious NGOs with their historical counterparts, the Christian missionaries of the early 
twentieth century. The purpose of this historical comparison is to gain insights into 
changes and continuities in the interactions between international religious agencies and 
China’s ethnic communities over time. Exploring such interactions over time will yield 
a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the ‘civilizing mission’ than has hitherto 
appeared in the literature.
These interactions in both the historical and contemporary eras will be interpreted 
by means of an analytical framework consisting of three frames—conflict, adaptation, 
and middle ground. These frames represent the different kinds of responses by ethnic 
communities to the values, beliefs and activities of international religious agencies, and 
the different kinds of impact such values, beliefs and activities have on ethnic 
communities. The conflict frame refers to an interaction in which members of an ethnic 
community consciously disagree with the values, beliefs and activities of an 
international religious agency (Scott 1990), and the adaptation frame refers to an 
interaction in which the two parties reach a consensus that leads to the adaptation of 
external values, beliefs and activity by the ethnic community. The middle ground frame 
does not refer to something between the conflict and adaptation frames. Rather, it refers 
to an interaction which results in something new or something unexpected (White 
1995). Such interaction often leads to a strengthening of ethnic community identity 
(Harrell 1995; Cheung 1995; Diamond 1995; Tapp 1989). These three frames are not 
intended to be mutually exclusive. Instead, as will become clear throughout the thesis, 
each frame is complex, and the borders between the frames are porous rather than clear- 
cut. These frames will be used to distinguish three kinds of interaction, and to 
eventually analyze similarity in interactions that commonly reflect the features of a 
particular frame. Such similarity will help us to explore the conditions under which a 
particular frame of interaction occurs.
Secondly, in the contemporary era, this study compares three NGOs in separate 
case studies. The key variance across all three NGOs is the degree to which they are 
committed to evangelism. The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines evangelism as
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‘the preaching or promulgation of the Gospel; performance of the function of an 
evangelist’ (Brown 1993: 863). In practical terms, this definition seems problematic as 
far as China is concerned because the preaching of the gospel is prohibited in that 
country. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to measure the degree to which NGOs are 
committed to evangelism, and to do so requires in-depth investigation.14 The degree to 
which NGOs are committed to evangelism is assessed on the basis of the beliefs o f 
individual personnel working for the NGOs,15 As will be explored more fully in the 
empirical chapters, individual personnel in these NGOs have their own particular views 
on the importance of evangelism to their work, and these subjective interpretations are a 
critical aspect of any assessment of the nature of religious commitment.
On the basis of the above key variance, the Jian Hua Foundation (JHF) has been 
selected here as an example of an NGO working on the basis of a strong degree of 
evangelism. In contrast, The Salvation Army is posited as an example of a mid-range 
degree. All of the board members and ‘associates’ of the JHF, except those employed 
locally, strongly emphasize Christian evangelism. In contrast, individual personnel of 
The Salvation Army tend to take a more liberal view of cross-religious issues.
Oxfam Hong Kong has been selected as an example of an NGO having the lowest 
degree of evangelism. Oxfam Hong Kong was selected as the third case study from 
among many international secular NGOs working in China.16 Oxfam Hong Kong 
undertakes development activity based on a clear statement of the secular values, which 
it seeks to promote in China. This case study, therefore, provides a benchmark against 
which to gauge the extent to which religious NGOs secularize their values and beliefs 
within politically sensitive contexts such as China. The fact that Oxfam Hong Kong is 
committed to undertaking advocacy as well as developmental work is also highly 
relevant to this thesis, because advocacy is intricately linked to an NGO’s values and 
beliefs. The case study of a secular NGO was initially selected as a control case but the 
religious-secular perspective turned out to be very important. The inclusion of a secular 
NGO further provides an opportunity to highlight differences or similarities in the way
14 Berger (2003) also suggests that characteristics of religious NGOs can be determined by a complex 
set of analyses of such things as its self-identity, structure, financing and output, among others.
1 choose ‘individual’ belief, rather than an ‘organizational’ one. Individual values and organizational 
values, the latter presented particularly in the form of the organizational constitution for example, are 
sometimes different. Looking at organizational values can possibly cause misrepresentation of the 
essence of an organization. Some organizations, for example the JHF, secularize their constitution so 
that the organization is more acceptable in the current Chinese communist system.
16 Oxfam has Quaker origins, and as will be explored later, Quakerism and secularism are intricately 
connected. From this point of view, evangelism and secularism should not be completely 




in which religious and secular NGOs put their values and beliefs into practice, while 
avoiding the pitfall of making too sharp a distinction between the development work of 
religious and secular NGOs.
In the context of mainland China, all the case study NGOs are involved in 
community development projects among ethnic communities living on China’s 
periphery. In order to observe the impact of such projects, 1 selected NGOs that had just 
completed community development projects at the time of my fieldwork investigation 
in China in November 2004. This thesis will highlight the differences and similarities 
among the three case study NGOs with respect to three broad themes: (1) the origins 
and nature of their values and beliefs; (2) the reformulation of their identity in mainland 
China; and (3) their interaction with ethnic communities.17
Research Methods
To investigate both historical and the contemporary periods, I conducted archival 
research as well as fieldwork. For the historical period, I conducted archival research in 
Beijing, Kunming, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Canberra, collecting both primary and 
secondary source materials. The three main themes explored included the history of the 
relationship between China’s centre and ethnic communities, the activity of Christian 
missionaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the history of one 
of my case study NGOs, The Salvation Army, which was established in 1865.18 These 
historical materials were written in Chinese, English, and Japanese.
For the contemporary period, I conducted fieldwork in China for eight months in 
total during the period between September 2003 and December 2005. This involved 
visits to NGO offices in mainland China and Hong Kong as well as visits to NGO 
development project sites in Yunnan and Qinghai Provinces, specifically Lancang 
County in Yunnan Province (the site of an Oxfam project) in November 2003; Zhaotong 
City in Yunnan Province (the site of a Salvation Army project); and Xibusha County in 
Qinghai Province (the site of a Jian Hua Foundation project) in November 2004. 1 also
1 The introduction to Part Two will explain each of these three broad themes, but it is important to 
briefly touch on the second theme here. The author does not assume that the case study NGOs 
reformulate their identity in mainland China. Rather, the main enquiry in relation to this theme is 
whether, and if so how, they reformulate their identity in mainland China.
18 Other case study NGOs were established relatively recently, and written material on the process of  
the establishment of these NGOs is limited. Consequently, the history of these contemporary 
organizations was generated from the interviews.
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imade follow-up visits to representative offices of the Salvation Army and Oxfam in 
Australia in December 2005 and February 2006 respectively.19
Research into the case study NGOs and their projects was largely interview-based. 
II conducted a number of interviews with (1) NGO directors and staff members, both at 
ttheir Hong Kong headquarters, at the Australian offices (except for JHF), and at their 
llocal project implementation offices; (2) villagers, both project participants and non­
participants; and (3) local government officials.20 In addition to the interviews, I used 
(official and non-official documentary materials and project histories, as well as 
engaging in participant observation.
Interviews with NGO directors and staff members were semi-structured. Typical 
(questions related to the NGO’s view of a 'better world’, the importance of Christianity 
iin achieving such a world, the process involved in establishing an NGO in mainland 
China, the NGO’s relationship with the Chinese government, its funding sources, and 
its international networks. Interviews with local government officials primarily sought 
ttheir perception of international NGOs, and whether or not they, as government officials, 
had learnt anything from the approaches the NGOs were taking towards alleviating 
poverty among ethnic communities.
All the NGO projects I observed were in their final stages. I spent up to four days 
with NGO staff members at each project site, observing their interaction with the 
villagers and interviewing the villagers. I also engaged in participant observation, 
specifically in the villagers’ houses, sharing meals with people involved in the NGO 
projects.21 These included NGO staff members, local government officials, and ordinary 
villagers. This afforded me opportunities to observe typical activities on a day to day 
basis.
Interviews with the villagers were designed to gain an understanding of their 
perception of the projects undertaken by the international NGOs, of the values and 
beliefs espoused through the medium of project activity, and of the villagers’ 
perceptions of their own community identity. Typical questions addressed how they 
learnt about the projects; why they participated (or did not participate) in the projects; 
what they learnt from the projects’ training sessions; how they understood the nature of 
social relationships in their village; how they perceived other minorities living in the
19 JHF has liaison offices overseas, bul does not have main offices, where major administration work is 
conducted.
2,1 Unfortunately, at the time of my visit to one project site, the local government officials normally on­
site happened to be out of the village.
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same village; and how they perceived the religious and traditional leaders in their 
communities.
During my fieldwork visits to China and Hong Kong, the sensitivity of issues 
raised in researching material for the thesis became evident. The sensitivity mostly 
derived from anxiety over the precarious nature of their status in China. Such sensitivity 
hindered my research on church-based community development projects undertaken by 
international religious NGOs. In fact, some international religious NGOs working in 
China declined to allow me to carry out research into their projects because they were 
concerned about publicity ramifications.
My interviews with some government officials at the provincial level also 
revealed the sensitivity of the subject of NGOs. The Chinese term ‘NGO’, fei zhengfu 
zuzhi l£R), is still new to the Chinese language, having first appeared in the
1990s.22 In Chinese, as Ma notes, ‘the word “fei” means “not”, but also “wrong” or even 
“anti”’ (2003). Therefore, the term ‘NGO’ can be interpreted to mean ‘anti-government 
organization’ (Ma 2003; Saich 2000: 124).23 Some provincial government officials were 
highly suspicious of NGOs, believing that they supported the separatist movements of 
ethnic minority groups, particularly in Yunnan Province, where many ethnic minority 
groups exist.
Central Argument and Major Findings
By comparing the interactions at the turn of the twentieth century with those of the 
twenty-first century, this thesis reveals that international secular and religious agencies 
commonly believe in so-called ‘universal values’, which are supposed to help bring 
about something better. This view resonates with the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ 
presented by Kipling and Said at the beginning of this introduction—an asymmetrical
21 As these NGOs pay villagers for meals, these meals did not impose a financial burden on my local 
hosts.
22 In recent years, there has existed an official taxonomy of social organizations in China. Fei zhengfu 
zuzhi is not used by Chinese organizations; instead they use minjian zuzhi. Ma (2003) mentions that 
the term ‘NGO' started to become more widely known after the 1995 Fourth World Women’s 
Conference in Beijing. ‘To prepare Chinese women's organizations to understand the meaning and 
practice of fei zhengfu zuzhi, the All-China Women’s Federation launched a campaign to train 
women leaders at all levels’. As a result of the campaign, most of the 1,910.000 women leaders and 
activists learnt the term fei zhengfu zuzhi for the first time.
23 The Chinese government’s political restrictions in relation to, and nervousness about, foreign 
religious organizations may cause problems for religious NGOs. The problem in attaching a religious 
label to an NGO is by no means unique to China. Irrespective of whether it is in China or other parts 
of the world, from a practical point of view, many NGOs are reluctant ‘to use the term “religion” in 
describing themselves and their activities’ (Berger 2003: 17) because of ‘the potentially negative 
connotations associated with religious references as well as legal obstacles that arise when applying 
for public funding’ (Berger 2003: 17).
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relationship between outsiders and ethnic communities. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they impose their values devoid of any engagement. This thesis 
argues that a belief in universal values and a respect for difference through the process 
of a dialogue are not mutually exclusive.
When consideration is given to the response of ethnic communities to externally 
generated values, beliefs and activity, it becomes clear that the mode of interaction is 
critically important. As a means of assessing the ‘civilizing’ tendency, the extent to 
which international religious agencies are committed to evangelism through imposition 
of values and beliefs on ethnic communities is not sufficient. Rather, much depends on 
the extent to which both parties have engaged in an in-depth dialogue over values. 
Without such dialogue, the interaction between the two tends to fall into the conflict 
frame. It is in this frame that the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ becomes a problem.
One of the more important findings in this regard is that the line between conflict 
and adaptation in the interactions between international religious agencies and ethnic 
communities during both periods is a fine one. As will be explained later in this thesis, 
much has depended on the way in which international religious agencies have 
selectively engaged with particular ethnic communities while downplaying other ethnic 
communities within the same village.
An important finding in relation to the religious-secular comparison is that among 
the three contemporary NGOs it was, perhaps paradoxically, Oxfam Hong Kong, a 
secular case study NGO, that made more of an effort to engage with religiously-oriented 
ethnic communities, even though such engagement was inconsistent with their secular 
values and beliefs. By contrast, a relative lack of engagement often existed between 
religious NGOs and religiously-oriented ethnic communities. There are two main 
reasons for this: firstly there is a high degree of political sensitivity associated with 
international religious NGOs’ working with religiously-oriented ethnic communities in 
China, and secondly there are degrees of conflict between the different religious beliefs 
involved.
A major change between the historical and contemporary periods lies in the 
weakening of the religious impact on ethnic communities in China. This relates to the 
way in which today’s international religious agencies present their religious values and 
beliefs. In the past, Christian missionaries espoused their particular religious values and 
beliefs in a more direct fashion, whereas today’s Christian NGOs do so in more subtle 
ways. For example, they depend increasingly on the use of religious symbolism, on 
demonstration of the ‘love of God’ by way of helping ethnic communities, and on
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modelling themselves on the practices and philosophy of Jesus Christ, without 
necessarily saying others should do so as well. Christian missionaries did these things as 
well, but the dependence on such tactics as a means of promoting religious values and 
beliefs has increased over time. This finding is not particularly surprising given the 
strict control by China’s secular Communist government over the conduct of 
international religious NGOs. It is, however, important to acknowledge that these 
organizations still attempt to promote their religious values and beliefs among ethnic 
communities; but they do so in such a way that their activity conforms closely to 
Chinese government regulations.
These findings lead to the central argument of this thesis: the extent to which an 
international religious agency engages with ethnic communities is the key to gaining a 
more nuanced understanding of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ over time. Contrary 
to an underlying assumption in the literature, which argues for an understanding of the 
imposition of values as a way of assessing the nature of the ‘civilizing mission', this 
thesis argues that one needs to look at the other side of the coin. In other words, we 
need to assess the ‘civilizing mission' from the perspective o f ‘engagement’. Two issues 
are particularly important in this regard. First, even in the case where an international 
religious agency has ‘imposed’ its values and activities, these can be well received by 
ethnic communities. Second, and interrelated, a positive response from ethnic 
communities generated through a process of engagement can lead, in turn, to positive 
unintended consequences such as self-realization of the ethnic community. It is 
important to stress that the encounter with religion does not necessarily lead to a 
weakening of ethnic identity.
A Note on the Terms ‘International Religious Agency’ and ‘Ethnic Community’
There is no consensus on the definition of a religious NGO in the development and civil 
society literatures. Hamrin (2003b) distinguishes a ‘religious’ NGO from one that is 
‘faith-based’. According to Hamrin, a religious organization is defined as a group that 
promote[s] the traditional activities of worship and prayer, religious sacraments, the 
teaching of the laity and training of clergy, proselytizing and the publication of sacred 
texts and other religious materials’, whereas a faith-based organization is defined as a 
‘nonprofit [association] that [has] faith-based motivations, hiring policies, and funding 
sources, but that [does] not do “religious work” narrowly defined, but [offers] social 
services in other sectors such as education, health, or charitable work’ (Hamrin 2003b).
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This distinction between a religious NGO and a faith-based NGO is ambiguous 
because it is difficult to know exactly what constitutes ‘religious work narrowly 
defined’. This is particularly so in the context of China. For example, evangelism, such 
as spreading the message of the gospels, can be understood as ‘religious work narrowly 
defined’. However, as will become clear in the empirical chapters of this thesis, in 
actual practice, evangelism in China usually is undertaken in educational or health work. 
In fact, the key to discerning whether an organization is religious, faith-based or even 
secular is ‘self-identity rather than an independent measure’ (Berger 2003: 21). Even 
though a religious NGO has at its heart religious values and beliefs, the services it 
provides may vary from secular education to evangelization. How a religious NGO 
raises funds, and how it structures its relationship with church organizations and/or 
secular governments, varies from organization to organization. In short, it is extremely 
difficult to actually define ‘religious work narrowly defined’; therefore, this thesis does 
not distinguish between ‘faith-based’ NGOs and ‘religious’ NGOs. Rather, it simply 
uses the term ‘religious NGO’.
‘NGO’ is itself also a highly contested concept. Scholars concentrate on exploring 
the extent to which an NGO is, and should be, a tfott-govemmental organization -  an 
entity totally independent of a government or governments. In particular, the 
relationship between an authoritarian state and an NGO is a difficult one (Cleary 1997; 
Hawthorn 2001). In the Chinese context, Ma suggests that rather than analysing Chinese 
NGOs on the basis of Western concepts such as civil society and autonomy, we should 
take the more positive view of ‘how much progress they have made so far in becoming 
a dynamic force outside of the state system’ (2002a: 128).24 Even though it is important 
to acknowledge the complexity of the term ‘NGO’, this thesis employs the term based 
on the fact that many international organizations on mainland China describe 
themselves as ‘international NGOs’.25
24 China has a number of mass organizations (for example, the All-China Women’s Federation), and 
so-called GONGOs (Government-Organized NGOs) (for example, the China Family Planning 
Association). Some studies argue the extent to which the GONGOs can play an important role in 
China’s civil society (Ma 2002b; Wu 2003; Jackson, Chin and Huang 2005). For example, Wu 
(2003) argues that gradually GONGOs have become independent of the state from a funding point of 
view. Other scholars argue that ‘NGOs’ in general, are at risk of becoming mere service-utility 
providers; namely, sub-organizations of the government, because they lack sufficient autonomy to 
advocate for Chinese society, and to challenge the Chinese state (Unger and Chan 1995).
2> One of the case studies of this thesis. The Salvation Army, actually claims to be an ‘international 
movement’ in the context outside mainland China. An ‘international movement’ is quite distinct 
from NGOs in discussion within the literature on transnational civil society (Khagram, Riker and 
Sikkink 2002). However, within mainland China, The Salvation Army identifies itself as an 
‘international NGO’.
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In this study, the term ‘international religious agency’ refers both to Christian 
missionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and to international 
Christian NGOs today. I define an international religious agency as being primarily 
associated with religious values and beliefs, operating on a non-profit basis to seek to 
bring about a better world by promoting its religious and secular values and beliefs 
across international borders.2*' This definition is intentionally broad, reflecting the wide 
range of both religious and secular values, beliefs and activities that religious 
organizations provide. Consequently, religious values and beliefs need to be understood 
in relative rather than absolute terms.2" Furthermore, the term ‘international religious 
agency' also includes both an organization and an individual working for the 
organization. In an analysis of how an international agency interacts with an ethnic 
community, the individual values of the agency’s representatives working at the village 
level are just as important as, if not more so than, the values of the organization to 
which they belong.
Meanwhile, ‘ethnic community’ in this thesis refers to a community that includes 
so-called ‘minority nationality’ populations, rather than to the minority populations 
alone. In many cases, ‘minority nationalities’ and Han Chinese coexist at project sites. 
Ethnically distinct communities may coexist in distinct relationship to one another, 
rather than becoming hybrid communities. In other words, communities usually exist in 
the plural, in multi-layered, overlapping ways, as will be explained in Chapter One. The 
term ‘ethnic community’ is used throughout this study, even though I deal with different 
historical periods and the notion of ethnicity in China has changed significantly over 
time. 28 This is simply to avoid confusion by changing terms based on different periods.
Significance of the Research
My study contributes to the existing literature in three important ways. The significance 
of this thesis in the first instance lies in the bottom-up perspective on China's encounter 
with the West. The bottom up approach casts a different light on the debate in the 
literature over whether China has rejected or adopted so-called ‘universal values’. The 
debate is not very helpful to our understanding of the way a local community actually
2<’ This definition draws on Berger's (2003) definition of religious NGOs and Kilby’s (2006) focus on 
NGOs as value-based entities that desire a Tetter world'.
27 The mixture of the religious and secular values is pointed out in some literature dealing with 
Christian missionaries. See, for example, Comaroff and Comaroff (1991) and Comaroff (1993).
2S Some anthropological and historical studies use ‘peripheral people’ for the study of the period before 
the Communist era (Harrell 1995). The term ‘minority nationality’ has been used since the 
Communist state created the category in the 1950s (Gladney 1991; Kaup 2000).
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perceives 'universal values’. Focusing on non-state actors—actual people rather than 
institutions—makes it possible to observe the situation in which China’s local 
communities reject or adapt to 'universal values’. Put differently, this thesis provides a 
practical perspective on the theoretical discussion related to universalism and relativism 
in China’s international relations. The bottom up approach also enables this study to 
emphasize the role of religion in the idea of the 'civilizing mission’. In the study of 
China’s encounter with the West, the role of religion has been downplayed in the 
literature despite its importance.
Second, this study provides a more nuanced understanding of the ‘civilizing 
mission’. As mentioned above, the literature assessing the idea of the ‘civilizing 
mission’ emphasizes the unidirectional imposition of the values of the ‘civilized’ on the 
‘uncivilized’. Less attention is given to the responses of those on the receiving end. 
Ethnic communities respond differently to various ‘universal values’ and the differences 
in response must be properly understood if one is to gain a fuller understanding of the 
idea of the relevance of the ‘civilizing mission’.
Third, this thesis also makes an empirical contribution to the literature on China 
studies in two ways. First, it provides insight into change and continuity in ethnic 
communities in the process of modernization. In particular, even though international 
religious agencies can be seen as modernizing forces, the fact that interactions at the 
community level do not necessarily lead to a weakening of ethnic and/or religious 
identity provides important insights into the nature of the transformation of ethnic 
communities. This leads to the second contribution of this thesis in relation to the 
literature on China studies; that is, to bring the historical and contemporary periods 
together. Change and continuity in the transformation of China since its encounter with 
the West in the nineteenth century have been among the more important themes in this 
literature. However, research into such a broad theme is extremely difficult and very 
complex. By examining the interaction between international religious agencies and 
ethnic communities in both the historical and contemporary periods, this thesis is able to 
identify the broader changes and continuities in the context of the Christian ‘civilizing 
mission’ in China.
Thesis Overview
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One examines the relevant theory and history. 
Part Two is a comparative analysis of three contemporary international NGOs in China.
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Both parts are organized around the central theme of the interaction between 
international religious agencies and ethnic communities. The concluding remarks in 
each part will relate directly to the conclusion of this thesis, which compares both 
historical and contemporary eras and reflects on the changing nature of the ‘civilizing 
mission’ over time.
Part One consists of three chapters. Chapter One reviews the theoretical literature 
related to the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’ and discusses the concept of ethnic 
community. It also provides an analytical framework for interpreting the interactions 
between international religious agencies and ethnic communities in China.
Chapter Two provides an account of centre-ethnic community relations in late 
nineteenth and twentieth century China, with special attention given to the role of the 
Chinese centre as a civilizer of the periphery. This chapter examines how Western 
civilization, to which Christianity is intrinsic, has affected the Chinese understanding of 
civilization. It also looks at the way in which religion has been understood and 
interpreted in particular in relation to ethnic communities.
Chapter Three provides an historical account of Christian missionaries working 
among ethnic communities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
chapter discusses the international political background of the Christian missions in 
China, as well as the diversity in the values and beliefs that the British missionaries 
attempted to promote. It presents a case study of a single missionary working in a 
village called Stone Gateway in Southwest China as a way of exploring the impact of 
‘mission activity’ on ethnic community identity.
Part Two of this thesis, comprising Chapters Four, Five and Six, focuses on the 
‘civilizing mission’ in the contemporary period. It provides an in-depth comparative 
analysis of the values, beliefs and activities of two international religious NGOs—the 
Jian Hua Foundation and The Salvation Army, and of an international secular NGO— 
Oxfam Hong Kong. Each case study is organized around the three broad themes of the 
origins and nature o f values and beliefs, the reformulation o f identity in China, and 
interactions with ethnic communities.
The conclusion of the thesis, reflecting on the empirical investigations, firstly 
provides an historical-contemporary comparison of the interaction between international 
religious agencies and ethnic communities and the impact of those interactions on 
ethnic community identity. To do so requires refining the frames of interaction 
presented in Chapter One. Secondly, it discusses the implications of the arguments for a 
broader understanding of the nature of the Christian civilizing mission in China.
CHAPTER ONE
CIVILIZING MISSIONS’ AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES 
IN CHINA: FRAMES OF INTERACTION
This chapter explores the two central concepts of this thesis, namely the ‘civilizing 
mission’ and ‘ethnic community’, and proposes an analytical framework for 
understanding the complex interaction between international religious agencies and 
ethnic communities in both the historical and contemporary periods.
The idea of a ‘civilizing mission’ has been used to describe the hierarchical nature 
of civilizational encounters across time. As Western imperialism heightened the level 
and scope of interaction between the West and non-Westem countries in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’ rose to prominence. Today, 
the idea is still commonly referred to in the field of international relations (Donnelly 
1998; Gong 1984a, 1984b; Seabrooke and Bowden 2006; Wight 1991). The idea of the 
‘civilizing mission’ has also travelled across space. Works that have discussed the idea 
of a ‘civilizing mission’, for example Edward Said’s Culture and Imperialism (1994), 
have tended to suggest that such a mission is essentially derived from the West, and has 
been aimed at non-Westem people. However, ‘civilizing missions’ are not uniquely a 
product of the West. They have also occurred within China, deriving from China’s 
centre and aimed at its periphery (Harrell 1995).
‘Ethnic community’ on China’s periphery, as a second part of my focus, has often 
been the designated target of civilizing missions across time and space. This concept of 
‘ethnic community’, however, is also a complex concept that requires unpacking. Much 
of the development literature tends to assume ‘community’ to be a pure and 
fundamental unit in which ‘tradition’ still remains (Walker 2001). However, most 
communities are not static and by no means immune to modernizing forces. It cannot be 
assumed that a community is a fixed entity. Instead, a community is a process of 
forming a social boundary as a result of interaction with others.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first draws on the broader literature 
on civilization, and discusses the Chinese notion of civilization in the context of China’s 
early encounter with the West in the nineteenth century. This section then moves onto a 
discussion of what constitutes a ‘civilizing mission’. The second section reviews the 
literature that deals with the concept of ‘ethnic community’, and defines it as the 
process of forming a social boundary within which the constituents of a community
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imagine their identity and their sharing of social practices. Following on from the 
discussion in the first and second sections, the third section presents the analytical 
framework for the thesis, which provides a means of interpreting the responses of the 
members of ‘ethnic communities’ to the values and activity of international religious 
agencies.
Civilization and Its Meaning in the Chinese Context
What Is Civilization?
To begin exploring the concept of civilization, the fundamental distinction between 
unitary and pluralist conceptions of civilization provides a useful departure point 
(Fabvre [1930] 1973: 220; Arnason 2001; O’Hagan 2005).' The unitary conception of 
‘Civilization’ (with a capital ‘C’) denotes progress in relation to the political, economic 
and social institutions and practices of a society. According to this interpretation, 
Civilization is a single and universal concept used to describe a teleological process 
through which individuals and groups became civilized (Bowden 2004b: 30).
The idea of a ‘standard of civilization’ is embedded in the unitary conception of 
‘Civilization’, in which civilization is seen as having core values, namely the 
‘ingredients of [the] civilization’, which all societies should aim to obtain in order to 
progress (Mill [1836] 1962: 52). In the idea of the ‘standard of civilization’ that 
dominated European discourse in the nineteenth century (Duara 2001; Gong 1984a, 
1984b; Suzuki 2005), European civilization, as the universal form of civilization, had 
definitive characteristics such as (1) guaranteed basic rights, i.e. life, dignity, and 
property, rooted in the mores of Christendom; (2) an organised political bureaucracy; 
(3) adherence to generally accepted international law; (4) fulfilment of obligations 
under the international system by maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for 
diplomatic interchange and communication; and (5) conformity to accepted norms and 
practices, and the rejection o f ‘barbaric’ practices such as suttee, polygamy, and slavery 
(Gong 1984a: 14-21). These characteristics were used to evaluate the degree to which a 
non-European society had progressed relative to the standard of European Civilization. 
If a non-European society did not contain these particular ingredients, it was regarded as 
‘uncivilized’. The idea of the ‘standard of civilization’ is not unheard of in the
I The distinction between the unitary and pluralist conceptions of civilization relates to the etymology 
of civilization in French and German languages. Bowden’s (2004b) study traces the etymological 
origins of civilization in the French, English and German languages.
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contemporary period; universal human rights, for example, can be thought of as part of 
the ‘standard of civilization’ today (Donnelly 1998).
In contrast, the pluralist conception of ‘civilizations’ refers to distinct cultural 
entities (Huntington 1993, 1996), and therefore is used to define and differentiate the 
characteristics of societies.2 Benjamin Nelson’s study on the civilizational encounter 
([1973] 1981) is a representative example of this. In relation to this conception, 
Huntington and Nelson have focused respectively on the ‘clash’ or ‘adaptation’ of 
civilizations.
Although the pluralist concept is based on the understanding of civilizations as 
entities that have some degree of social closure, current studies taking the pluralist 
approach go beyond such an understanding to discuss the processes in which such 
entities are created, or the relationships between such entities (Starobinski 1993; 
Dabashi 2001; Jackson and Hall forthcoming 2007). For example, Dabashi (2001) takes 
the view that civilization does not exist by itself, but it is socially constructed as a result 
of interaction with others. Thus, it is important to explore how civilizational encounters 
affect the characteristics of a civilization.
Jackson and Hall’s account of civilizational identity is helpful for conceptualizing 
civilizations in a balanced way. They argue that civilizational identity has to be 
foregrounded ‘not because civilizations have some kind of cultural essence, but 
precisely because they don 7 actually have any such determinate essence but sometimes 
appear as though they [do]’ (forthcoming 2007: 8). Drawing on this understanding, 
civilization should not be understood as a fixed entity, but rather as a self-proclaimed 
identity, which may change according to its context and circumstances (Starobinski 
1993: 5), or as a result of interaction with others (Dabashi 2001).
Understanding civilization in this way is entirely relevant to the Chinese context. 
The Chinese interpretation of civilization changed significantly as a result of China's 
encounter with the West. The change is amply demonstrated in a concomitant change in 
the Chinese words used to describe ‘civilization’. The next section focuses on the 
Chinese understanding of civilization and its ideology, and examines how the concept 
of China's civilization has changed over time.
Huntington defines a civilization as ‘a culture writ large’, or as ‘the broadest cultural entity’ (1996: 
41, 43). A number of studies which also take the pluralist conception of ‘civilization’ criticize 
Huntington as essentialist, however, because he describes civilization as a ‘billiard-ball’-type entity 
that contains a fixed set of values (Cox 2002; Delanty 2003; Mandalios 2003; Melleuish 2003). 
These critical studies instead regard civilization as an essentially porous and fluid entity—that is, a 
set o f ‘symbolic frontiers, not iron curtains’ (Mandalios 2003: 74).
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Jiaohua, Wenming and Civilization: The Origin o f the Term in China
Nowadays, ‘civilization' is usually rendered in Mandarin Chinese as wenming (5C1ÜJ), 
the literal meaning of which is ‘enlightened by culture’. The term wenming began to 
appear in Chinese discourse as a neologism in the nineteenth century, when China 
encountered European imperialism. Before wenming was recognized as a term 
equivalent to the English word ‘civilization’ in the late nineteenth century, a variety of 
writings show that there existed at least a couple of Chinese words that represented the 
concept o f ‘civilization’.
One example is found in the writings of Guo Songtao (fßS jfl) (1818-1891), who 
was the Chinese ambassador to Britain from 1876 to 1878. His diary, kept during his 
time spent in London and Paris, records his observations on the Western political 
system, society, and culture. From his writings it is possible to identify significant 
differences between many English and Chinese terms. He tended to write phonetic 
transcriptions of English words in Chinese characters in the absence of suitable words 
with equivalent Chinese meanings (Fang 1999; Sasaki 2000). For ‘civilization’ he used 
read as ‘se wei lai yi si de’, the phonetic transcription o f ‘civilized’.3 He 
explains the term ‘civilized’ in a diary entry dated 5 March 1878, as follows:
The West calls the countries that have learnt and understood politics and culture 
‘civilized’, and all countries in Europe are recognized as this. China, Turkey and 
Iran arc called ‘half-civilized’. This means they are partly cultured, and partly not 
African and Muslim countries are called ‘barbarians’, the way China uses the term 
yidi [author: yidi means barbarians: a derogatory name for so-called minority 
nationalities], and the West considers them as lacking culture. Before the three 
dynasties o f Xia, Shang and Zhou, only China had culture (jiaohua). Therefore 
[others] must accept this. Like those capitals o f  Yaofu and Huangfu, everyone from 
afar has been called yidi by China. Since the Han period, Chinese culture (jiaohua) 
has been waning day by day; and all European countries have reached the stage 
that they are all in command o f the heights o f culture, customs and manners. They 
sec China as barbarians, just as the three dynasties o f Xia, Shang and Zhou at their 
peak saw yidi. There are no Chinese gentry who know the significance o f this. How 
terrible! (Guo; cited in Fang 1999).
-*mz. Ä45w#fijta9g®HsEi»Ltfi$, , w#®
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This form of phonetic use of Chinese pictographs has no meaning beyond the representation of a 
sequence of sounds as they occur in the Chinese mind.
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He clearly states that ‘countries that learnt and understood politics and culture’ are 
called ‘civilized’. Instead of the term wenming, he uses jiaohua (l&fb,) (transformed by 
education) to explain civilization. An English-Chinese Dictionary published
in 1866 also shows that jiaohua was in common use (Lobscheid 1866). Table 1.1 is a 
chart adapted from the dictionary, with an additional literal English translation of each 
Chinese character. This table shows that before the term wenming appeared in Chinese 
writing, Chinese words such as jiaohua and shit were used to explain the meaning of the 
English term ‘civilization’.
Table 1.1: Civilization and Jiaohua
English Chinese Translation of Chinese words
Civilization, the act of 
civilizing
jiaohua zhe (^ litZi) person who is transformed by education
kaihua zhe (IrH L #) person who develops culture
The state of being civilized
liwen zhe (}JI3t#) person who knows ritual and customs
tongwuli zhe ( M ^ S # ) person who is familiar with laws of science
guanli zhe (Hf^J # ) engineer; person who understands the laws of science
Civilize, to reclaim from a 
savage state
jiaohua (KTL) transformed by education
jiaoyi liyi (t^L U af^) teach with ritual principles
huayi liyi (ffcL(If! fit) transform with ritual principles
Civilize him:
jiaohua ju (%*l\t%(\tli)) transform him by education
huazhi (it^ L) transform
Civilized, reclaim from 
savage life and manners
jiaohua guo ($(fki!^) has been transformed by education
shu (S ) cooked; transformed by culture
Civilizer, one who civilizes
jiaohua zhe (fftfblH')
person who transforms by 
education
kaihua zhe (ü tlfk # ) person who develops culture
qihua zhe (£ftffc#) person who enlightens
jiaoli yizhe (#£!*{«#) person who educates in ritual principles
huaren zhe ( f t  Kft) person who transforms people
Source: Adopted from Lobscheid (1866); modified by author.
All of these meanings in the 1866 dictionary link ‘civilization’ to the idea of 
progress in learning cultural rituals, customs and laws of science through education. 
This can be interpreted as the unitary conception of ‘Civilization’, rather than the 
pluralist conception. Thus, as Chapter Two will further detail, jiaohua is used to 
evaluate different degrees of progress according to the Chinese understanding of 
civilization in the mid nineteenth century. This understanding was related to Confucian 
thought, which held that the emperor had superior morality, and that his task was to
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‘educate’ people and lead them to righteousness and morality. One can argue that the 
Chinese understood the moral nature of authority as one of the components of 
civilization (Sasaki 2000: 122-23).
In short, it is wrong to assume that the Chinese language did not contain the 
concept of civilization before the nineteenth century simply because the term wenming 
did not exist. The terms jiaohua and shu were based on historical Sino-centric thought.
So how did the term wenming come into being? Some scholars (Ishikawa 1994) 
suggest that wenming was one of many Chinese neologisms ‘imported’ from the West? 
Ishikawa (1994) claims that the direct origin of the term wenming lies in the Japanese 
term, bunmei (3C0J1), made up of the same Chinese characters as the Chinese term 
wenming. According to Ishikawa (1994), Liang Qichao (^ cAq^ n) was influenced by the 
Japanese philosopher Fukuzawa Yukichi’s (feipliu llf) work An Outline o f Civilization 
(Bunmeiron no Gaiiyaku (1931)?
Chinese governmental and opinion leaders, such as Liang Qichao at the turn of 
the century, conceptualized the concept of wenming in regard to the West as the centre 
of civilization. This concept is apparent, for example, in Shiwubao ( B^f ), a 
periodical publication established by a group of reformists including Wang Kangnian 
(fE^^C) and Liang Qichao, and may be seen in comments such as:
When I see London I sec not just apples on a branch, but also a capital city of 
contemporary civilization (wenming) with a history of over two thousand years. On 
the one hand, there are lots of wonderful scenes in London. On the other, London 
has established underground railways. These arc the amazing views of the
4 Many neologisms were introduced into China at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning 
of the twentieth century, for example sovereignty, nation, ethnic, and mediation (Chiu 1970; Katö 
and Maruyama 1991; Liu 1995, 1999; Maruyama and Katö 1998). Although some of these terms 
appear in classics of a few thousand years ago, their meanings were ‘new’ at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries when China was increasingly exposed to 
Western political and social thought.
The term bunmei can be identified in the literature of seventeenth century Japan. In his writing, ‘The 
True Facts concerning the Middle Kingdom' (Chüchö Jijitsu Yamaga Sokö (lllJSl^ftT)
implies a Japan-centric worldview (antecedent to a Sino-centric worldview). In so doing, he uses the 
term bunmei. For example, ‘(Japan) has flourished with civilization, and the imperial line has never 
ended, and will never end’ ( hj] ^  o  "C[>Ie;L T , X.'T) (Yamaga 1939: 37-39)
Another interesting example is his use of the term Chiika bunmei (T’IjÜ'hJ]). In Japanese, Chiika 
usually means China, but Yamaga, in his attempt to spread the Japan-centric worldview in his 
seventeenth century work, used Chiika bunmei to refer to a Japan-centric civilization (Yamaga 1939: 
21) .
Fukuzawa understood civilization as the result of progress through stages ‘from barbarianism 
through semi-openness to civilization' (3!P J £ ( T T - f ) B i T , 4^H^(ÜR/1 (diifi?*), and understood 
the West to be the world’s most civilized zone (1931). His formulation leaves no room for the 
coexistence of different civilization, but holds Western civilization up as the ultimate civilization 
(Yamamuro 2001). In exploring the Japanese understanding of civilization, an interesting translation 
of Henry Wheaton’s Elements o f international Law’ ([1866] 1936) reveals ‘all civilized nations’ 
translated as ‘Christian countries’ (Yaso clöshü no Kuni /  [1 1 ). Maruyama and Katö (1998:
135) claim that Wheaton himself understood civilized nations as Christian nations.
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Russia has about ten thousand people mainly engaged in agriculture, five hundred 
thousand people in fisheries: in other words, there are many Russians who do not 
know what civilization (wenming) is (1 December 1896, p. 1083).
s + i a » ^zmkT-^icm^
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Min Yonghuan, the fonner Korean ambassador to Russia, has been to Europe and 
America.... The other day someone visited him. Min told his visitor that he had 
heard what people who visited Europe and America said, that he had thought it was 
not true, and that he believed only half of it. However, when Min himself visited 
those countries he realized he had been wrong, and regretted that he was like a frog 
in a well, which cannot be spoken to about the ocean. Foreign civilization 
(wenming), technology and art flourish, such as undeveloped countries cannot even 
dream of (1 December 1896, p. 1090).
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The Japanese are engaged in adopting weapons of civilization (wenming), which 
amazes Europe and America. Their speed of reform also makes Europe and 
America feel a sense of awe. Now there arc quite a lot of people who make 
everything from ships to arms to a legal system, and understand the principles 
involved. What they have completed for the last twenty years is that they have 
dispatched competent people to go together to Europe to enter schools there; they 
study languages and translate books; in some cases employ foreigners as teachers; 
and compile collections of regulations. The only thing they bothered about is 
difficulty in realising civilization, and for that reason, they have arrived at their 
present state of flourishing (11 December 1896, p. 1152).
z&&o m&wum, t o i i .
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It is clear from the above quotes that the term wenming in these examples refers to 
‘Western civilization’ with emphasis on Western culture, technology and a western 
legal system. As the term jiaohua transformed into the more recent wenming, it is clear 
that the Chinese notion of civilization had shifted towards that o f ‘Western civilization’, 
with emphasis on Western culture and technology. In other words, the interpretation of 
what it meant to be ‘civilized’ also changed from possessing an understanding of the 
ritual, customs and laws of science to possessing an understanding of Western culture
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and technology. To understand this shift, it is helpful to think of civilization as a process 
in which a self-proclaimed identity is constructed through social interaction.
However, jiaohua and wenming were similar to the extent that both terms denoted 
a universal and unitary sense of ‘Civilization’, and the progress of an inferior through 
education. Before its encounter with the West, and just as surprisingly after the 
encounter, the Chinese understood the term civilization in the singular sense that as a 
result of the shift of civilizing centre from China to the West, the West was the only 
‘Civilization’. Accordingly, in the eyes of Chinese elites, China seemed to have 
changed from the superior civilizing centre of the Confucian civilization to become an 
inferior actor in a world dominated by Western civilization.
Despite understanding universal and unitary civilization inherent in the 
expressions jiaohua and wenming, there were in fact two civilizational trajectories 
taking place at the same time; one from the West to China (to both China’s centre and 
periphery), and the other from the Chinese centre to the periphery. The next section 
elaborates on the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ that signified both trajectories.
The ‘Civilizing Mission '
In unpacking the idea of the ‘civilizing mission', the theoretical literature suggests two 
fundamental points that need to be taken into account. The first point is that the above 
discussion of the unitary and pluralist conceptions of civilization is useful in 
understanding the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ at the theoretical level. The idea of the 
‘civilizing mission’ is embedded in the unitary and universal conception of 
‘Civilization’. As Said (1994) suggests, this concept forms the basis of an asymmetrical 
understanding of the relationship between the ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’. ‘Civilizing’ 
is about a process involving the transfer of superior political, material, or social culture 
from the civilized to the uncivilized. Put differently, the ‘civilizing mission’ aims to 
bring a local community closer to universal ‘Civilization’ and to bring about the 
associated social practices embedded in such Civilization.
By way of an example, the core of the civilizational identity of Christian 
missionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is Christian morality. 
However, as Harrell (1995: 20) explains in referring to Christian missionaries, ‘the 
mission enterprise sought to bring not only the Gospel, but the modem life of Christian 
nations -  with all its advantages in health, technology, and science -  to the peoples of 
China’. Medicine, technology, and science actually helped to establish the Christian
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missionaries at a higher level of superiority (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). As chapter 
three details, various Christian missionaries sought to get involved with the mission of 
'modernity'' to varying degrees. The Christian missionaries used the religious variable 
to evaluate groups, and in their minds, the ethnic communities fared rather better than 
the Han in the rankings, especially in the moral ranking (Harrell 1995: 22). The 
honesty, simplicity, and hard work of the ethnic communities contrasted with a 
perception of the clever but sly, sneaky, and untrustworthy trading mentality of the Han.
The civilizational identity of the Chinese centre’s ‘civilizing mission’ in the Qing 
period (1644-1911) was humanist and moral, and the centre of the civilizational identity 
was the Chinese emperor, as Chapter Two will describe in detail (Fairbank 1968; 
Hamashita 1997; Harrell 1995). In the Communist period (1949 to date) the 
civilizational identity has been modem and scientific. The Communist Party has been 
regarded as the centre of the civilizational identity, and its goal in relation to ethnic 
communities has been ‘to bring them to a universal standard of progress of modernity’ 
(Harrell 1995: 23).
The ‘civilizing mission’ is also clearly related to the pluralist conception of 
civilization in the sense that both the self-proclaimed identities of those who undertake 
the ‘civilizing mission’ as well as those on the receiving end are in part constructed 
through the process of interaction. The importance of interaction in constructing the 
self-proclaimed identities of those who undertake the ‘civilizing mission' needs to be 
stressed, because it provides a theoretical backdrop against which to analyze the change 
in the way the Chinese centre’s and Christian ‘civilizing missions’ have perceived their 
civilizational identity.
One thing that the Christian and Chinese ‘civilizing missions’ have shared in 
common is the goal of transforming ‘ethnic communities’, especially those on periphery. 
The perceived success of these missions largely relates to how the identity of these 
communities is understood. To arrive at a clearer conceptualization, the next section 
explores the theoretical literature relating to ethnic community identity.
The ‘Community'’ Problematique
Community is a much favoured term, not only in academic discussion but also in the 
broader discourse on development aid. In academic discussion, ‘the concept of 
community is seen as providing a conceptual and strategic counterpoint to statecraft and 
modernity’ (Walker 2001). While the state provides only ‘thin, formulaic,
30 CHAPTER ONi;
simplifications’ of the people within its territory (Scott 1998), the concept of 
community is often seen as something romantic, rich, traditional, honest, and humane. 
As noted by Rapport (1996: 117), it usually results in a 'positive evaluation and 
evocation’. There exist a variety of definitions of community that have changed over 
time. The term is often used to mean 'a bounded group of people, culturally 
homogeneous and resident in one locality’ (Rapport 1996: 115). It has also been used to 
represent a togetherness with a past (Tönnies 1955), a contemporary behavioural 
commonality, political solidarity (ethnic, local, religious), or a utopian future (a rural 
idyll, a world order)’ (Rapport 1996: 117). All of these various definitions emphasize 
some kind of value system.
Within development aid circles, 'community' is regarded as an essential target for 
development projects, based on the belief that by engaging with a community, aid can 
reach people in need in a more effective way, and thus circumvent the problem of 
'corrupt states’ (Larmour 1998). Even the World Bank, which has been heavily 
criticized by many commentators for its top-down neo-liberal approach to development, 
is now a keen promoter of community-driven development projects (World Bank 1996). 
However, the assumption underpinning much development aid that a village is or 
should he a community is questionable. In general, global development discourse tends 
to use the term ‘community’ uncritically, with the suggestion that community is a pure 
and fundamental unit, which has to be protected from government intervention.
In the Chinese context, the question of whether 'community’ actually exists is a 
persistent one. We cannot assume from the outset that villagers have a shared sense of 
community. In fact, strong state control over every aspect of social life has had a huge 
impact upon the construction of community in China. During the Maoist era, the 
Communist government aimed to develop a communitarian system along Leninist- 
Marxist lines, in which difference in the value systems of different communities would 
eventually cease to exist, in accordance with Marxist theory (Connor 1984). Particularly 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the Party attempted to destroy the ideology 
and traditions of ethnic communities. In essence, the communities were incorporated 
into the state. The commune, rather than community, was the basic unit of 
administration, production and social relations until the decollectivization of agriculture 
in the 1970s. Since the late 1980s, administrative and natural villages have been the 
basic units. Within this context, whether a community as a bounded group of people 
exists, and if so, how it does, become critical areas of inquiry.
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However, the term ‘community’ is retained in this study for two reasons. First, 
exploring the concept of ‘community’ leads to consideration of some of the 
complexities in the value system/social relations of China’s ethnic communities, which 
is the focal point of my analysis. It also leads me to locate my study in the broader 
debate within social theory on the transformation of traditional ethnic communities 
during the process of modernization. One might argue that ‘village’ is a more neutral 
concept than the term ‘community’, and that it might be better used to describe groups 
of people. However, village is a geographical concept, and is of less normative interest 
than community. The second reason is more practical. The projects conducted by 
international religious agencies target ‘community building’. An important task for my 
study therefore is to examine what these international religious NGOs mean by their use 
of ‘community’.
My following discussion of community is divided into three parts. The first part 
deals with the concept o f community in social theory, mainly in regard to Tönnies’ 
argument about Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (community and society), and 
Durkheim’s argument about mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. The second 
part looks at the question of ‘ethnic’ community from an anthropological perspective. 
Drawing on these theories and taking some examples from Chinese case studies, I argue 
that an ethnic community is not a fixed entity, but a process. Clearly, culture, language, 
tradition, gender and race are important to any consideration of community identity, but 
identity should be understood as a belief shared by the constituents of a community, 




In his seminal study, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft ([1886] 1955), Ferdinand Tönnies 
argued that the evolution of Western civilization was a transformation from 
Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (society). Gemeinschaft is a social entity 
that is based on affection and homogeneity. The main examples in his work on 
Gemeinschaft include the family, village, nation, and church. These are areas where 
emotion, custom, tradition and faith matter, and self-interest is not a primary focus. He 
describes emotion as ‘essential will’, which human beings are bom with, prior to
32 CHAPTER ONE
developing rationality. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, is characterized by self-interest, 
competition and negotiated accommodation. Tönnies takes the Hobbesian view (in fact 
he quotes Hobbes’ Leviathan in his book) that the state is a product of rational contracts. 
Tönnies argues that Gesellschaft is a contractual social entity based on a variety of self- 
interests, and that people make institutions and laws as the products of social contracts. 
The essential nature of Gesellschaft is based on infidelity (lack of trust) among people, 
on rationality, and on calculation. Tönnies states that ‘in the Gemeinschaft they remain 
essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are 
essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors’ (Tönnies [1866] 1955). What unites 
people in the Gesellschaft is ‘arbitrary will’ or the ‘rational will’ of individuals.
Emile Dürkheim ([1893] 1972) constructs the ideal type of society hypothetically, 
and characterizes it as ‘mechanical solidarity', cohesion within which is exclusively the 
result of resemblance. In other words, a society is ‘an absolutely homogeneous mass, 
whose parts [are] not distinguished from one another, and which consequently [has] no 
structure’ (Dürkheim [1893] 1972: 141). In particular, religion is vitally important to 
creating such homogeneity (Dürkheim 1972: 222, 224). Although this is merely a 
hypothetical construction, he mentions that ‘lower societies, those which are closest 
to... [the] primitive stage, are formed by a simple repetition of aggregates of this 
[mechanical solidarity] kind’ ([1893] 1972: 141)—as, for example, in the case of the 
Iroquois people of North America. In contrast, societies based on ‘organic solidarity’ 
‘are formed, not by the repetition of similar, homogeneous segments, but by a system of 
different organs each of which has a special role, and which are themselves formed of 
differentiated parts’ ([1893] 1972: 143).
One of the differentiators of ‘mechanical solidarity’ from ‘organic solidarity’ is 
what Dürkheim calls the ‘conscience collective’. In his analysis, the conscience 
collective and the individual mind are opposite concepts. When specialized activities 
have developed, it is ‘probable that, in each individual mind, the personal sphere has 
grown more than the conscience collective’ ([1893] 1972: 145). To paraphrase, when 
the conscience collective becomes weaker, weakening of mechanical solidarity also 
occurs, and a society tends towards organic solidarity.
The arguments of Tönnies and Dürkheim provide this thesis with a lens to identify 
a variety of communities in a village on China’s periphery. Although Deng Xiaoping’s 
‘socialist market economy’ enmeshed rural ethnic communities in ‘a network of market 
relations centered on cities and towns’, China’s rural communities, particularly those 
with their own religion, reflect homogenous characteristics of Gemeinschaft or
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‘mechanical solidarity’ (Madsen 1998: 137). However, the question of how the 
interaction between any particular community and outsiders changes the fundamental 
characteristics of the community remains unanswered in the arguments of Tönnies and 
Dürkheim. For a possible answer we need to turn our attention to the work of 
anthropologists.
A nthropological Perspectives
Simply put, in anthropology (including ethnic studies), the debate over ethnicity reflects 
three different theoretical perspectives: primordialism, instrumentalism and
constructivism.6 Primordialists focus on the cultural symbols of communities, such as 
blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom. Clifford Geertz argues that 
primordial attachments are given, a priori, ineffable and affective, and ‘some 
attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural -  some would say spiritual -  
affinity than from social interaction' (Geertz 1963: 110). Even in a modernizing society, 
individuals are born into a particular community, within which such an affinity grows.
Anthropological instrumentalists criticize primordialists harshly for their having 
‘no awareness of the genesis, of the ‘sociology’, of bonding or identity-formation’ 
(Eller and Coughlan 1993). Instrumentalists treat ethnicity as a social, political, and 
cultural resource for different interest-groups and status-groups (Hutchinson and Smith 
1996). One idea central to the thinking of the instrumentalists is the socially constructed 
nature of ethnicity, and the ability of individuals to ‘cut and mix' from a variety of 
ethnic heritages and cultures to forge their own individual or group identities 
(Hutchinson and Smith 1996). However, instrumentalists, such as Brass (1996) and 
Hechter (1986), are criticized on a number of levels too: for ‘neglecting the wider 
cultural environment in which elite competition and rational preference maximization 
take place’ (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 9); for defining interests largely in material 
terms; for failing to take seriously participants’ sense of the permanence of the ethnies; 
and for underplaying the affective dimensions of ethnicity (Hutchinson and Smith 
1996).
Meanwhile, constructivists working in the field of ethnic studies attempt to offer a 
compromise on the positions taken by the primordialists and the instrumentalists. 
Fredrik Barth (1969) is regarded as being the most important intellectual founder of a 
constructivist theory of ethnicity. He claims that ‘the critical focus of investigation
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becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it 
encloses’ (p. 79). Interaction with outsiders thus marks the boundary of an ethnic group. 
He questions the image of each group developing its cultural and social form in relative 
isolation, and of ethnic groups as culture-bearing ‘units’, and claims to focus on the 
social boundaries of ethnic community.
However, the question ought to be whether the claim in Barth’s argument is 
substantial (Rex 1986: 86-91). While emphasis on interaction is important, and identity 
may be constructed by boundary making, the question is by what means'? Barth argues 
that ethnicity arises from competition for scarce resources. However, he does not give 
particular attention to the value system that creates and maintains the boundary. The 
question of substantial claim is related to the fact that Barth wrote his thesis to critique 
the politics of assimilation. Insofar as it does not look at the value system of ethnicity, 
his argument seems very similar to that of the instrumentalists.
Alternative Approach—Ethnic Community as a Process o f Boundary Making
Following on from this discussion, it is necessary to recall the two aspects of 
community discussed above. The first of these is belief of the constituents of a 
community in something shared; namely ethnic identity, as highlighted by Geertz 
(1963). The second is interaction with outsiders, as highlighted by Barth (1969). It is by 
focusing on these two aspects that one can obtain a more nuanced understanding of 
community. Anthony Cohen’s study The Symbolic Construction o f Community (1985) 
provides a useful reference to this sort of two-pronged approach to understanding 
‘community’. Cohen explains community as follows:
[Community] is the arena in which people acquire their most fundamental and most 
substantial experience of social life outside the confines of the home. In it they 
leam the meaning of kinship through being able to perceive its boundaries -  that is, 
by juxtaposing it to non-kinship (1985: 15).
Cohen’s point is that people experience a distinction between kinship and non-kinship, 
friendship and non-friendship, ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the process of doing so amounts to 
community boundary-making. Cohen elaborates on Barth’s view of boundaries, and 
argues that ‘boundaries are marked because communities interact in some way or other 
with entities from which they are, or wish to be, distinguished (1985: 12). There are 
many kinds of boundaries, from national or administrative to physical, expressed
For a detailed discussion of the differences and similarities among the theories, see, Hutchinson and 
Smith (1996) and Mount (2001).
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perhaps by a mountain range or a sea, and even to racial, linguistic or religious, even to 
‘imaginary’ boundaries that ‘may be thought of ... as existing in the minds of their 
beholders’ (1985: 12).7 In other words, community is a process of boundary making, 
affected by interaction with ‘outsiders’. What constitutes the social boundary of a 
‘community’, at which its people distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’, is the understanding 
among the constituents of the community that they share some kind of ‘cultural 
symbols’. This understanding amounts to a community identity. Social hierarchy and 
social practices provide useful and specific contexts in which to observe community 
identity.
In Cohen's approach, interaction with outsiders is important to the process of 
constructing boundaries. The worlds of meaning in the minds of community members 
are transformed and crystallized through interaction. This view fits nicely with one of 
the purposes of my study, which is to investigate the impact of international religious 
agencies on ethnic community identities. However, what is not articulated in Cohen’s 
study is the overlapping nature of community boundaries. It seems that in Cohen’s 
understanding, the ‘boundary’ is what constructs a community, what differentiates the 
margin of a community from an ‘other’, creating the ‘us’. His understanding of 
community leads to the conceptualizing of not-fixed but mutually exclusive 
communities. However, the conceptualizing of inclusive and overlapping communities 
is critical as far as this thesis is concerned. Put differently, there can be a number of 
smaller communities in a given area, and the boundaries of smaller communities may 
divide the bigger community. This conceptualization of inclusive and overlapping 
communities is a critical point in the analysis of community structure in an area where a 
Christian international agency undertakes its activity. I take Cohen’s approach one step 
further, and conceptualize a community boundary as overlapping, rather than as 
mutually exclusive.
When a Christian international agency undertakes an activity in an ethnic 
community in China, its civilization, which originates in the West, is not necessarily 
compatible with the identity of the ethnic community. For example, many Christian and 
secular international NGOs try to promote gender equality within and among the 
communities they engage with, but gender equality may conflict with an ethnic 
community’s pre-existing hierarchy. Here, providing an analytical framework is 
important because it helps us interpret and analyse the interactions between
This point coincides with Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), in dealing with
nationalism as a mode of political imagination.
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international religious agencies and ethnic communities. It is only by interpreting and 
analyzing actual interactions that we can arrive at a deeper understanding of the nature 
and scope of the ‘civilizing mission’.
Frames of Interaction
The three frames of interaction are conflict, adaptation and the middle ground. These 
frames are built around the responses of members of ‘ethnic communities' to the 
‘civilizing mission’. The conflict frame refers to a situation in which members of an 
ethnic community consciously disagree with the ideology of a ‘civilizing mission’, or 
with the very existence of such a mission. The adaptation frame, on the other hand, 
refers to a situation in which the members of an ethnic community reach consensus over 
the ideology of a ‘civilizing mission’ in the course o f their interaction, leading to 
adaptation of that ideology by the ethnic community. The middle ground frame does not 
refer to something between the conflict and adaptation frames. It refers to a more 
mature and deeper relationship between the two parties, which eventually leads to 
unexpected consequences at the beginning of the interaction. This can, in turn, lead to a 
heightened level of self-realization within the ethnic community.
For the conflict frame and adaptation frame, Jamas Scott’s book Domination and 
the Art o f  Resistance (1990) is an important reference for use in seeking to explain the 
conscious resistance of ethnic communities to domination.8 Scott attempts to explore 
the ‘hidden transcript’ of resistance to powerholders, which is defined as a subordinate 
discourse that takes place ‘offstage’, beyond direct powerholder observation. In other 
words, he explores ‘something of the imaginative capacity of subordinate groups to 
reverse or negate dominant ideologies’ (1990: 91). He continues:
It is plausible to consider [something of the imaginative capacity of subordinate 
groups) part and parcel of the rcligiopolitical equipment of historically 
disadvantaged groups. Other things equal, it is therefore more accurate to consider 
subordinate classes less constrained at the level of thought and ideology, since they 
can in secluded settings speak with comparative safety, and more constrained at the 
level of political action and struggle, where the daily exercise of power sharply 
limits the options available to them. To put it crudely, it would ordinarily be 
suicide for serfs to set about to murder their lords and abolish the seigneurial 
regime; it is, however, plausible for them to imagine and talk about such 
aspirations providing they arc discreet about it (1990: 91).
The conflict frame and adaptation frame draw on the notion of resistance at the level of 
consciousness in its investigation of the response of ethnic communities to international
For other explanation on the conscious resistance, see Scott (1983) and Colburn (1989).
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religious agency.9 What follows is an explanation of each of the three frames, and of the 
various expected responses of members of ethnic communities in relation to each frame.
The Conflict Frame
In the conflict frame, members of an ethnic community consciously disagree with the 
civilizational ideology of an international religious agency, either in public or discreetly 
(Scott 1990). This may occur for any variety of reasons. Community identity is not 
likely to change in this frame because the ‘civilizing mission’ does not attain legitimacy 
in the eyes of the members of the ethnic community.10
‘Resistance’ is an important characteristic of expected ethnic community 
responses within the conflict frame.1 An important example of resistance is the Boxer 
Uprising of 1900, in which intensely anti-Western sentiments led to widespread attacks 
on foreign missionaries and their converts (Purcell 1963). In another example, the 
members of an ethnic community, confronted by Christian civilizing projects, declined 
to become Christians, and in some cases declined even to permit the missionaries to stay 
in their community. Some set fire to church buildings, and even killed some of the 
missionaries themselves.
Resistance includes not only violent resistance but also manipulation. Members of 
the ethnic community, for example, take advantage of the material benefits, while 
pretending to subscribe to the values that the international religious agency is 
attempting to spread. On occasion, community members have attended Christian 
churches, and even joined in some church activities, irrespective of whether they have 
been converted or not. This was done simply because there were material benefits to be 
had by joining in such activity such as access to education in Christian schools, and to
9 In discussing a people’s consent to a superior ideology, Antonio Gramsci’s ‘hegemony’ is important, 
but this thesis takes an approach different from his. In his Prison Notebooks he contends that 
‘hegemony’ is produced as a result of ‘the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this 
consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant 
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production’ ([1930s] 1971; 12). 
However, Gramsci concentrates on the particular situation in which local communities give 
‘spontaneous consent’ to the dominant group, which if such consent is not forthcoming resorts to 
coercive force. He does not discuss the situation in which a local community gives non-spontaneous 
consent; in other words, the local community is able to give its consent after due consideration of the 
civilisational ideology of the dominant group.
10 David Beetham’s (1991) definition of legitimacy provides a useful reference here. In defining 
legitimacy as not only a ‘top-down’ construction generated by dominant groups, but also a ‘bottom- 
up’ construction generated by subordinate groups, his emphasis is on the interaction between the two 
groups and particularly the extent to which subordinate groups give their consent to the dominant 
group's projects; i.e., the ideologies implicit in any particular development project.
11 A number of China studies also use ‘resistance’ in the context of state-society relations. As a 
representative example, see Perry and Seiden (2003).
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health care in Christian hospitals. An ethnic community can pretend to go along with an 
international religious agency while not actually agreeing with it (Thongyu 1986). After 
the international agency leaves the community, the community members can choose to 
embrace only the material advantages provided, and revert to their own identity (visible 
in the pre-existing social hierarchy and social practice).
In many cases, it is difficult to ascertain whether conversions to Christianity are 
motivated purely by faith or material gain. This manipulation is what James Scott calls 
the ‘hidden transcript’ that characterizes ‘discourse that takes place “offstage,” beyond 
the direct observation of the powerholders’, as opposed to the term ‘public transcript’, 
which is ‘subordinate discourse in the presence of the dominant’ (1990: 4). It is, 
therefore, important to observe the resistance and consent of community members at the 
level of consciousness.
The Adaptation Frame
In contrast, within the adaptation frame, members of an ethnic community reach a 
consensus over the ideology of the ‘civilizing mission', which in turn leads to a degree 
of adaptation. For example, a participatory approach to decision-making may be 
adapted to sit more easily with a pre-existing social hierarchy. One consequence of this 
adaptation could be a change in community identity, which is specifically the 
relationship between community elders and their followers, the men, women and 
children.
The conflict and adaptation frames overlap. Even in circumstances whereby, 
community members appear willing to accommodate the civilizing ideology and related 
activity they may resist in the longer term. For example, in the case of community 
members consenting to the principle of gender equality, the breakdown of entrenched 
traditions will not occur overnight, and the actual relationship between men and women 
may not change for some time—and then maybe only partially. In such cases, the 
interaction of an international agency and an ethnic community is understood as taking 
place within the zone of overlap between the conflict and adaptation frames. The third 
frame is the middle ground frame, and it operates in a way different from the 
overlapping zone. It requires a much deeper relationship between both parties.
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The Middle Ground Frame
The middle ground frame draws on the work of Richard White, entitled The Middle 
Ground (1995). In his analysis of the relationship between whites and 'American 
Indians’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, White proposed the notion of the 
middle ground as a way of moving beyond the simple dichotomy of ‘cultural 
persistence' versus ‘conquest and assimilation’ (1995: ix). A similar dichotomy exists in 
my analytical frame—that of conflict and adaptation. They are named differently from 
White's two because the focus of the framework is on the responses of the members of 
an ethnic community to external ideologies. Nevertheless, my thesis builds on White’s 
main argument that a dichotomous understanding of the relationship between two 
parties is not appropriate if one’s intention is to gain a better understanding of the depth 
of a relationship. As he aptly expresses it (1995: ix):
The history of Indian-white relations has not usually produced complex stories. 
Indians arc the rock, European peoples arc the sea, and history seems a constant 
storm. There have been but two outcomes: The sea wears down and dissolves the 
rock; or the sea erodes the rock but cannot finally absorb its battered remnant, 
which endures. The first outcome produces stories of conquest and assimilation; 
the second produces stories of cultural persistence.... But the tellers of such stories 
miss a larger process and a larger truth. The meeting of sea and continent, like the 
meeting of whites and Indians, creates as well as destroys. Contact was not a battle 
of primal forces in which only one could survive. Something new could appear.
The central feature of the middle ground frame is that as a result of interaction 
‘something new’ is created. It is not a simple ‘baptism’ of an ethnic community in the 
ways of Christianity and Western civilizational ideology and their activity nor is it a 
simple adherence to the status quo through a process of incremental adaptation. 
Interaction may lead to something altogether new, to unexpected consequences. The 
level of the legitimation of an international agency that occurs on the basis of the 
middle ground frame of interaction is likely to be very high because there is potential 
for interaction more as equals than as two parties in a dominant-subordinate power 
relationship such as exists in the two frames of interaction mentioned above. Interaction 
interpreted within this frame occurs only after the relationship develops and matures.
Self-realization is the feature of the responses of the members of an ethnic 
community in the middle ground frame. According to Harrell (1995: 27):
[Ethnic] consciousness may already exist, but it will be sharpened, focused, 
perhaps intensified by the interaction with the center. Or in some cases, a 
peripheral people that has no ethnic consciousness may develop one in response to 
the pressures of the civilizing project.
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A good example of the self-realization of an ethnic community is offered by Tapp 
(1989) in relation to the Hmong communities living in Thailand. According to him, 
Christianity offers its converts an alternative to The possibilities of the continuation of 
pantheistic Hmong shamanism or the adoption of the state religion of Thailand’ (1989: 
85). The alternative is the strengthening of the ethnic identity of the Hmong. This is the 
observable ‘something new’ created by the interaction between Christian missionaries 
and ethnic communities. In the middle ground frame, community identity is likely to be 
changed or reinforced significantly as a result of self-realization.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a theoretical discussion of the concept of civilization and its 
meaning in the Chinese context. In so doing, it has revealed that the concept of 
civilization is by no means simply a product of the West. The Chinese had their own 
conception of civilization before the encounter with the West. However, as the 
encounter proceeded, the original concept of civilization jiaohua became wenming, 
which resonates more with the Western notion of civilization, understood as advanced 
technology.
It is important to reiterate that civilization should be understood as a self- 
proclaimed identity, which may change according to its context and circumstances, or 
as a result of interaction with others. This understanding of civilization provides a 
theoretical background against which to locate perceptions of international religious 
agencies in later chapters.
It is also important to take into account the fact that both the Chinese centre and 
Western missionaries undertook their civilizing missions in relation to ethnic 
communities in China. The ‘civilizing mission’ undertaken by the Chinese centre 
predated that undertaken by missionaries. To improve our understanding of the nature 
of the ‘civilizing mission’ over time, it is thus essential to move beyond the dichotomy 
of the West as the centre of the civilizing mission, and China as a recipient of such a 
mission.
This chapter has also provided a theoretical discussion of ethnic community 
identity, identifying it as something created as a result of interaction with others. 
Consequently, the three frames of interaction are differentiated by to the extent to which 
the interaction affects pre-existing notions of ethnic community identity.
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The next chapter explores the ‘civilizing mission’ undertaken by China’s centre 
and provides the necessary historical and contextual background for my empirical 
chapters that follow. It analyzes the Chinese centre’s view of the relationship between 
itself and its peripheral ethnic communities over time. The Qing Dynasty period (1644 
to 1911), the Republican period (1911 to 1949), and the Communist period (1949 to 
date) will be examined. The chapter will also focus on the Chinese centre’s religious 
policy and its concept of civilization.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CHINESE CENTRE AS A CIVILIZER 
OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES:
CIVILIZATION AND RELIGION IN CHINESE HISTORY
‘In the early instance, Christianity was criticized for not being Confucian; this was 
a criticism proper to Chinese civilization. In the later instance, Christianity was 
criticized for not being scientific; and this was a criticism from western civilization.
Thus the changing character of Chinese opposition to Christianity reflected the 
progressive disintegration of traditional Chinese civilization’.
(Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate 1958: 123)
This chapter aims to understand the relationship between the Chinese centre and ethnic 
communities in China from an historical perspective. From the centre’s viewpoint, it 
focuses on the concept of civilization as one of the determinants of the nature of the 
centre-ethnic community relationship. While the central purpose of this thesis is to 
understand the interaction between international religious agencies and ethnic 
communities, the impact of the centre on any such interaction cannot be neglected. The 
centre’s policies on ethnic communities over time have invoked the term ‘civilization’, 
suggesting that the centre has intended to raise the standard of living of ethnic 
communities, a role attributable to civilizers. However, the precise nature of the 
civilizational ideology exercised by the centre is related to the period in which it has 
been exercised.
The study of the Chinese centre-ethnic community relationship is limited in three 
important ways. First, while scholars have concentrated on analyzing the historical 
development of China’s policies on ethnic communities, they have overlooked a more 
fundamental, ideational perspective that determines the nature of the centre-ethnic 
community relationship. June Teufel Dreyer's China ’s Forty Millions (1976), one of the 
better known books on the study of China’s ethnic communities, analyzes Communist 
state policy in relation to ethnic communities, and the political process of the integration 
of ‘the life patterns and institutions o f these groups with those of China, both Han and 
Communist’ (1976: 262). Her book, however, neither discusses what civilization is, nor 
how the idea of civilization determines the centre-ethnic community relationship. Other 
literature deals with the more material aspects; typically the political, geo-strategic and 
economic, rather than ideational aspects (Heberer 1989; Mackerras 1994, 2003).
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Anthropological studies pay more attention to ideational concerns and usually 
deal with the views and perspectives of a particular group of ethnic communities, and 
the ways in which the centre’s policies have affected their identities and cultures. 
However, anthropologists tend to take a bottom-up approach. Hence, macro-level 
research on the centre’s changing perception of civilization is often overlooked.
Studies on China’s traditional tributary system also have discussed the 
relationship between the centre and so-called ‘barbarians’ (in this case referring not 
only to today’s so-called minority nationalities, but also to people in the more remote 
countries of Europe), but very few studies exist that examine the meaning of Chinese 
civilization and its transformation in depth. The term ‘civilization’ is often taken for 
granted, but remains ambiguous. For instance, John Fairbank, one of the more 
prominent scholars of Chinese history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
provides examples of Chinese civilization in ancient times, such as ‘the Chinese 
ideographic writing system, Confucian classical teachings about family and social 
order, the official examination system, and the imperial Chinese monarchy and 
bureaucracy’ (1968: 1). However, he does not seriously attempt to explore the Chinese 
centre’s perception of civilization further. In general, a lack of attention to the Chinese 
centre’s perception of civilization is more or less common in the literature on Chinese 
history, and scholars rarely if at all examine it in detail.
Second, the historical transformation of the Chinese concept of civilization is 
downplayed in the literature of China studies. In his edited book, Harrell (1995) deals 
with the Confucian state, the Communist state, and Christian missionaries as ‘civilizers’ 
of ethnic communities, but his introductory chapter scarcely touches on the Republican 
state. Furthermore, the book does not inquire into whether the Chinese centre’s 
perception of civilization has changed in keeping with the changing nature of the 
centre-ethnic community relationship.
Third, scholars pay scant attention to the impact of Western intervention on the 
Chinese concept of civilization. Some scholars discuss the impact of international 
relations on the Chinese centre-ethnic community relationship, and vice versa. 
However, the term ‘international relations’ in these discussions refers mainly and more 
narrowly to China’s geo-strategic and diplomatic relations. Some studies have looked at 
Western influences in relation to human rights in China (Mackerras 1994, 2003), and 
the impact of Marxism-Leninism on the Chinese centre’s policy on ethnic communities 
(Dreyer 1976; Heberer 1989; Mackerras 1994). However, the literature overlooks the 
broader question of the extent to which Western intervention has directly affected the
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Chinese centre’s civilizational ideology. When the so-called ‘West’ intervened in China 
in the nineteenth century it attempted to ‘civilize’ China on the basis of its own Western 
model of civilization. It is surprising how little research has been done on these Western 
influences on the actual concept of Chinese civilization.
This chapter has two aims. The first is to discuss the historical transformation of 
the relationship between the centre and ethnic communities from the Chinese centre’s 
perspective. Specifically, this chapter interprets the centre’s views and policies on 
ethnic communities since the Qing period in order to understand the transformation of 
the Chinese concept of civilization.
The second aim is to examine the extent to which Chinese perceptions of 
civilization has converged over time with ‘Western civilization’, especially in relation 
to the latter’s emphasis on modernization and religion. China experienced increased 
exposure to Western ideas in the late nineteenth century. In particular, Christianity and 
modem technology each had a significant impact on the Chinese interpretation of 
civilization. This chapter will look at the Chinese centre’s religious policies in relation 
to ethnic communities, and examine how these policies were a reflection of the broader 
Chinese understanding of civilization, either explicitly or implicitly. An exploration of 
the Chinese centre’s religious policy also serves to lay the foundation for subsequent 
chapters, which focus on international religious agencies that have undertaken 
evangelizing and development activity on mainland China.
This chapter deals with a long period of history, so it is divided into three time 
periods: the Qing Dynasty period (1644 to 1911), the Republican period (1911 to 1949), 
and the Communist period (1949 to date). Political transformation had a significant 
impact on the Chinese understanding of civilization upon which the centre-ethnic 
community relationship was based, as well as on religious policies. Therefore, the 
division of this chapter into three time periods provides a useful basis on which to 
examine the impact of any transformation in the relationship between the Chinese 
centre and ethnic communities. However, it is important to note that this periodization 
does not represent major change in the meanings of civilization or religion. It is 
impossible to assign the history of the transformation of these two concepts to precise 
periods, because civilization and religion are interwoven in very complex ways,.and 
have themselves transformed over time.
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The Confucian Perception of Civilization during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
In examining Qing views and policies on ethnic communities, we first need to 
determine what characterized the Manchu Qing centre. This necessarily leads to a 
discussion about the ethnic relationship of the Manchu to the Han they ruled. The Qing 
was a Manchurian dynasty, and the political power balance between the Manchu and 
the Han was a serious issue impacting on the stability of the Empire from the very 
beginning of Qing rule.1 Furthermore, even though the emperor was a Manchu, 
maintaining a Manchurian ethnic identity was a significant issue, given the fact that the 
majority of the population of the Qing Empire was Han.2 The Manchu, who shared the 
centre with the Han during the Qing period, had been regarded as an ethnic community 
in the earlier Ming period (1368-1644). The way the Manchu transformed their status 
ideationally from ‘ethnic community’ to ‘centre’ is fundamentally important in an 
exploration of the centre-ethnic community relationship in the Qing period.
Scholars are divided over the ethnic identity of the Qing centre. The historian, 
Mary Wright (1957: 51), claims that the Manchu were fully ‘sinicized’, and that 
‘between 1860 and 1890, the Manchu-Chinese dividing line tended to disappear’.3 In 
contrast, other scholars have argued that the sense of Manchu ethnic identity remained 
strong (Crossley 1990a; Rigger 1995; Rawski 1998; Rhoads 2000). The latter argument 
is supported by a consideration of the way in which the Manchu were able to adapt the 
Confucian worldview to suit their own identity. According to Wittfogel and Feng, the 
following four points precluded the ‘complete amalgamation’ of the Han and the 
Manchu:
1 In 1611, Nurhaci (1559-1626), a Manchu, established the Jin Dynasty, the antecedent of the Qing 
Dynasty, by unifying thirteen different tribes. These various tribes were not connected by blood 
relations or ethnic links. In other words, as Ishibashi (2000: 66-67) points out, the Jin Dynasty was 
the first step in establishing a multi-ethnic Qing Dynasty. This story in fact highlights the complexity 
of ethnic relations. The Qing Dynasty is often described as a Manchurian dynasty, but it was Nurhaci 
who created the category ‘Manchu’. After Nurhaci died, his eighth son, Hong Taiji (1592-1643), 
succeeded him and decided to rename the dynasty ‘Qing’. In 1644, the Qing army rallied its troops 
and conquered Beijing, the capital of the Ming Dynasty. See Crossley (1997).
2 The concept of ethnicity and race were introduced to Chinese audiences in the late nineteenth 
century. Therefore, it is questionable whether the ‘Manchu’ identity, as an ‘ethnic’ identity, existed 
in the early Qing period. Crossley (1990a: 225) states that ‘applying the term to earlier periods is 
anachronistic and distorts the historical reality’. But she argues that this does not mean that the Qing 
rulers did not have their own identities, but that the concept of ‘Manchuness’ is important. Elliott 
(2001) claims that the ‘ethnic sovereignty’ of the Manchu was increasingly evident by the end of the 
eighteenth century. For discussion on ‘ethnic labelling' of the Manchu, see Rigger (1995).
The term ‘sinicization’, the translation of Chinese term ‘hanhud' (‘Ä ff )  or ‘to become Han’, is also 
problematic. It fails to ‘make much distinction between assimilation and acculturation... 
“sinicization” is silent on the self-identification that is so fundamental to a sense of ethnicity in China 
or anywhere else’ (Crossley 1990a: 223). Also, see Crossley ( 1990c).
46 CHAPTER TWO
(1) the persistence of the earlier military organisation known as the Eight Banners, 
membership in which placed most Manchus outside normal Chinese jurisdiction, (2) 
the absence of primogeniture in the Manchu dynastic succession laws, (3) the 
Manchu dominance of the bureaucracy, especially the top posts, and (4) the general 
ban on intermarriage, which was not revoked until 1904 (1949: 51-52).
The Confucian worldview was Sino-centric, having as its central image a ‘graded 
and concentric hierarchy’, at the centre of which the Son of Heaven (Tianzi ) 
existed (Fairbank 1968). The Mandarin word for China, Zhongguo, literally means the 
Middle Kingdom, and the world was constructed as illustrated in Illustration 2.1. 
According to this worldview, the dividing line between the Chinese and the barbarians, 
or the civilized and the uncivilized, was mainly determined by their respective levels of 
competence in relation to moral and cultural education: for example, by understanding 
Chinese written characters, rituals and customs represented by ceremony (// f L ) , 4 and 
agrarian ways of life, as opposed to traditional herding (Fairbank 1942; Lattimore 1951; 
Walker 1971; Möri 1998)7
Based on their achievements in terms measured against Chinese civilization, the 
Qing distinguished inner barbarians from outer barbarians. When ‘uncivilized 
barbarians’ (shengfan more closely approximated the civilization of the Han, they
could become ‘civilized barbarians’ (shufan (Yang 1968). This ability to re­
categorize is important in any civilizational ideology. The degree of civilization, from 
civilizer to uncivilized barbarian, was based on modes of livelihood and levels of 
cultural sophistication; ethnic communities were permitted to participate in the 
bureaucracy and in the official examination system if they had acquired at least some of 
the features of civilization, such as a knowledge of literature and of ceremony (Wang 
2001). The fact that the Qing centre set up Confucian schools in some peripheral areas 
is also evidence of a flexible categorization of civilized and uncivilized (Rowe 1994; 
Shin 1998). In sum, the Qing centre did not necessarily specify an immutable duality in 
its concept of civilization. There was always civilization by degrees. When ethnic 
communities more closely approximated the civilizers, they came to be called the 
civilized. Ethnic communities were ‘others’ from the Qing point of view, but it is 
important to note that there was a variety of types of ‘other’.
4 A study by Pamela Crossley reveals that kMing “ethnologists” were concerned not with race or 
language as determinants of civilized peoples, but with modes of livelihood; agriculturalists were 
deemed more civilized than herders of the steppes' (cited in Harrell 1995: 19).
The ceremony included the ritual of kowtowing, which provoked some opposition among 
Europeans, most famously Lord Macartney, in the late eighteenth century.
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Source: Kataoka (1991: 26) and Mori (1998: 2); modified by author with the help o f Cartography 
Section, Research School o f Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University.
Before the Manchu established the Qing Dynasty, the Han-Chinese Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644) employed a Confucian Sino-centric worldview as the ideological basis o f
6 According to Kataoka (1991), the Qing Dynasty conceptualized its ruling system in five areas: (1) 
inner land (lAlilli); (2) tusi governing area (4 ^1 ); (3) fanbu (Ünß) or vassals; (4) tributary states (# j 
H ); and (5) hushi (Z if f  ) or markets trading with minority nationalities or foreign countries. The 
inner land zone was the area where the Qing Dynasty directly governed by dispatching its own 
officials. The tusi governing area was where the Qing indirectly governed by using local people. The 
fanbu was the area where Qing Dynasty felt military threat, whereas the tributary states and hushi 
were, at least in the earlier Qing period, perceived as having less military threat (Kataoka 1991: 25- 
26). Despite the fact that many call the Confucian worldview as forming ‘concentric circles’ (for 
example Fairbank 1968), more accurately concentric circles can not be applied to China’s east, 
specifically, Japan, Korea and Liuqiu Dynasty (today’s Okinawa). The Qing in fact recognized 
Korea and Ryukyu Dynasty as tributary states (Fairbank 1941, 1968) while in this map Korea is 
located in the inner land zone and Liuqiu Dynasty in the Tusi zone. Furthermore, in the perception o f 
the Qing, Japan existed outside the tributary state zone (Fairbank 1968; Hamashita 1999), but in this 
map Japan lies somewhere in between the inner land and Tusi zones. The author has shown a larger 
region here to include countries in Southeast Asia
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its foreign policy. The Qing persisted with the Ming worldview, which raised a serious 
problem because Confucian ideology interpreted the Manchu as foreign barbarians. To 
solve this problem, the Manchu needed to make certain modifications to the Confucian 
worldview. According to Abe (1971: 39), the political power of the Qing was 
predicated on their adopting the view of the Chinese Confucian philosopher Hanyü (Ü  
IS) (768-824), who said, ‘having the features of the (civilized) Middle Kingdom makes 
one part of the (civilized) Middle Kingdom’ ( j i l t k C l  L  X  ‘f ' S / ' - f U d C  2. fri d 3 H I t~t).  
In other words, if there were enough features of the Middle Kingdom in the barbarian, 
then the barbarian would be considered part of the Middle Kingdom. In terms of 
Confucian civilizational ideology, the Qing justified their status as civilizers on the 
basis of Hanyti’s view, and on their claim to having features of the Middle Kingdom 
even though they had been barbarians in a former period of history.
In line with this way of thinking, one of the first things the Qing did was redefine 
the features of Confucian civilizational ideology. They did so not directly by destroying 
the Han superiority but indirectly by assimilating the Han in terms of blood, culture and 
governmental institutions into their multi-ethnic empire (Wright 1957). One of the 
examples is the pigtail decree which Dorgon (1612-1650), a regent for the boy emperor 
Shunzhi (1638-1661), issued in 1645. The pigtail decree required all Chinese men to 
shave their foreheads and have their hair braided back in the Manchu-style queue. The 
Han Chinese resented the decree, but those who did not obey it were executed. This was 
summarized in popular parlance: ‘Keep your hair and lose your head, or lose your hair 
and keep your head’ (Ishibashi 2000: 119-20).7 The hairstyle was not only a matter of 
fashion, but also, according to Ishibashi (2000: 118-19), a matter of ‘Chinese’ culture 
and civilization. The Book of Filial Piety (Xiaojing ^  ), a classic that defines
Confucian civilization, claims ‘body, hair and skin are given by parents. Having them 
undamaged is the beginning of filial piety’ (Ishibashi 2000: 118-19). Hence, from the 
Han point of view, the decree was seen as a barbarian order to force the Han Chinese to 
abandon their civilization.8
Moreover, Dorgon issued another decree to adopt the Manchu style of dress—now called the ‘China 
dress’—and to stop wearing the loosely hanging robes of the Ming. 
s This decree also played a role in ensuring the surrender and submission of the Han to the Manchu. 
After the Qing fought against the Ming, the Qing forced hostages and those who surrendered to wear 
the Manchu-style queue as a token of submission. After the Qing Dynasty overthrew the Ming 
Dynasty, the former forced the Han to do the same. Nevertheless, as time passed, the mandated 
pigtail gradually became the norm among the Han, and interestingly, the pigtail became a symbol of 
‘Chinese’ civilization by the middle of the eighteenth century. This is supported by the fact that the 
Qing attempted to ban the wearing of pigtails by Chinese Muslims and barbarians, to distinguish 
them from the civilized Han (Abe 1971: 41).
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Having successfully transformed the features of Confucian civilizational ideology, 
the Yongzheng Emperor went a step further and redefined the concept of the yi 
(barbarian). Acknowledging the difference between Han and Manchu, he admitted on 
the one hand that ‘Manchu blood differs from Han blood, in the same way as Mongol 
and Tibetan blood too differs from Han blood’ (Abe 1971: 41). On the other hand, he 
commented that ‘we too, as equally as the Han, have been the culturally ‘civilized 
centre’ (zhonghua) in sophisticated morality and religion’ (Abe 1971: 41).9 In other 
words, the Yongzheng Emperor thought that if yi meant barbarian, then the Manchu 
were hua (civilized); but if yi meant different ethnic group, the Manchu were happy to 
remain yi (Abe 1971: 41). This distinction in the interpretation of yi is very important in 
examining the ideational change in interpretation made by the Qing civilization. While 
the civilization of zhonghua was still important, the differences in the meanings of yi, 
from barbarian to ethnicity, meant the Manchu could retain their ethnic identity as long 
as the centre was zhonghua (civilized).
The Manchu were content to be different from the Han. The Manchu identity as a 
different group was not new, but the Qing, it is worth noting, realized that to become 
zhonghua, the Manchu and the Han did not necessarily need to be the same; rather, the 
level of civilization was the essential determinant of the centre. Based on this, both the 
Manchu and the Han, both of whom acquired the same level of civilization, namely 
zhonghua, were legitimately the ‘centre’.
Realization of and satisfaction with the idea of dual ethnicity affected the way the 
Qing centre managed its relationship with peripheral areas. In the initial stages of the 
Qing period, the centre implemented a policy of the separation of ethnic communities in 
the Northwest (Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet) and the Southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou, 
and Sichuan) from China proper. These two regions are historically different. While the 
former did not have much interaction with the Han, and had quite distinctive cultures 
and religions, the latter was relatively closer to the Han, with which it had more 
interaction. The former was governed by the Office of Border Affairs (Lifanyuan 
ßrc); the latter by six ministries, which also had responsibility for domestic affairs. 
Reflecting the degree of difference with which the northwest crescent was regarded, the 
Qing centre prohibited the Han residing in China proper from going beyond the 
mountain ranges of northern Tianshan in 1683 (Möri 1998). This is interesting from a
The translation of zhonghua requires a cultural understanding of the term. Zhonghua is usually 
translated as Chinese, but literally, zhong means The centre’ and Inia means ‘civilized’.
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civilizational perspective, because even though civilization should be spread throughout 
the entire ‘world’, the Qing centre was first and foremost concerned with political 
stability among the ethnic communities. In other words, the separation of the Han from 
the ethnic communities in the northwest crescent was a realistic option as far as the 
Qing centre was concerned. In fact, the Qing after its peak in the eighteenth century 
lacked unilateral military power. Fairbank raises an interesting and salient point:
Their chief political problem was how to maintain Chinese superiority in situations 
of military weakness. Solutions included cessation of contact; indoctrinating the 
foreigner in the Chinese view by cultural-ideological means; buying him off by 
honors or material inducements or both; using one barbarian against another 
through diplomatic maneuvers (1968:12).
In practice, the Qing did not have the capacity to civilize ethnic communities 
coercively, in particular in the northwest crescent (Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia). 
In the Chinese record, nevertheless, the terminology of tribute would be applied to them, 
even if the ethnic communities did not actually comply with the forms of tribute 
(Fairbank 1968). To understand the actual military power balance between civilizers 
and civilizees is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless it is important to keep in 
mind the discrepancies between civilizational ideology and its coercive application by 
the military power of the Qing.10
For the purpose of managing the separation policy and yet still maintaining 
control over the dangerous northwest crescent, the Qing centre established Lifanyuan in 
1638, (Di Cosmo 1998). Specifically, its role was to bestow privileges and to preserve 
the title of Mongolian kings and the Tibetan Lama, and to indirectly control the 
northwest crescent. In contrast, southwest China was governed by a system called the 
Tusi system ( i  ffj M  J® ), which involved indirect governance by means of 
administration by native chiefs (Herman 1997; Shin 1998).
In the nineteenth century, the centre’s policy on ethnic communities saw a 
fundamental change from separation to assimilation. This was particularly apparent in 
the northwest crescent, and it is best exemplified by the building of the province of 
Xinjiang in 1884. Scholars note that the motivation for the assimilation of Xinjiang was 
largely geo-strategic, with an eye on Russia, together with the need to obtain taxes from 
the locals to maintain a strong military influence as a part of the process of modem state 
building (Kataoka 1991; Motegi 1993). These are certainly important motivations.
10 In the Republican period, the inability of the government to bring its military power to bear in 
controlling ethnic communities was a more significant issue, and the distance between the ideal of 
civilizational ideology and its realization was considerable.
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However, it cannot be denied that the transformation of the concept of yi in Confucian 
civilizational ideology, from barbarian, which has a negative connotation, to ethnicity or 
constituent member of the multi-ethnic empire, which has a positive connotation, was 
also an important factor in the centre’s decision to assimilate Xinjiang into the empire 
(Motegi 1993). When ethnic communities were identified as yi it was possible for they/ 
to become like the civilizer by learning the ways of the civilizer, thereby moving closer 
to the civilizer’s level. However, when ethnic communities were identified as a different 
ethnic group, there was no reason to unite them with the Qing in an empire. 
Assimilation becomes very meaningful at this point, from the centre’s point of view, 
because it gives the centre its legitimacy as the centre of culture, and as the unifier of 
the empire.
The assimilation of Xinjiang into the empire also had a significant impact on the 
everyday lives of the people of Xinjiang. The Qing cancelled their policy of preventing 
the Han from going to Xinjiang, and actively encouraged increasing numbers of Han 
Chinese to move there. The policy of assimilation aimed to change ‘Uighur customs to 
the Chinese way (huafeng - ^ H ) ' by establishing schools and teaching Mandarin 
Chinese (Zuo Zongtang; cited in Kataoka 1991: 202). The policy on internal’ migration 
from China proper to peripheral areas is called 4yimin shibian’ (f^bc '^Ü ), literally 
meaning sending migrants forcefully to frontiers. For example, in Inner Mongolia, 
‘from about 1 million Han at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the figure rose to 
1.55 million by 1912’ (Mackerras 1994: 121). It was put into effect partly because of 
population pressure in China proper, and partly because of an attempt by the Chinese 
government to control ethnic communities by sending its military into them and by 
assimilating their people through intermarriage (Menzies 1992; Cheng 1994; Tsukada, 
Segawa and Yokoyama 2001).
In Southwest China, the policy of assimilation began earlier than in the northwest 
crescent. In the mid eighteenth century, the centre attempted more direct control in 
Southwest China by changing the Tusi system to the Gaitu Guilin (u^ilid'/m) system, 
which involved direct governance by the appointment of Chinese magistrates (Ma 1994: 
386-95). One example of assimilation was the order to change Miao surnames to Han- 
Chinese ones (Wang 2001). In addition, the literature describes Confucian schools that 
aimed for the ‘moral transformation’ of ethnic communities (Rowe 1994)."
Furthermore, assimilation was due not only to an imposition by the centre, but also to the willingness 
of ethnic communities to be assimilated by the centre (Kikuchi 1994). The ethnic communities
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Motegi (1993) argues that the change of policy towards assimilation constituted a 
shift away from the voluntary reception of civilization by ethnic communities, to the 
imposition of civilization on ethnic communities. In other words, ethnic community 
receptiveness to civilization was, at least at the theoretical level, based on free will. The 
Qing could not force ethnic communities to accept civilization. However, after the 
policy change, civilization was imposed on ethnic communities. It is then that the ethnic 
communities were reduced to the status of so-called ‘minority nationalities’, compared 
with the overwhelming Han who had a background in the inner areas. This coincides 
with the shift from an ‘open and loose, hierarchical' empire, to the modem nation state 
(Motegi 1993).
Confucianism and Peripheral Religions
If Confucianism sanctified and legitimized the centre’s power, how did the centre deal 
with peripheral religions, that is, the religions of the ethnic communities, such as 
Tibetan Buddhism and Islam? Did the Qing centre attempt to spread the idea of 
Confucianism to the ethnic communities in the process of civilization?
To begin with, whether Confucianism is a religion needs to be questioned. 
Scholars have argued that Confucianism is not a religion because it poses ‘no god or 
supernatural dogma’, and instead focuses mainly on ancestor worship (Yang 1961: 244; 
Kaji 1990: 24). Lu Xun (H iL ), one of the more famous intellectuals of the late Qing 
and Republican periods, did not recognize Confucianism as a religion, and criticized it 
as nothing more than a theory of the imperial systems of China’s historical dynasties.12 
However, Kaji (1990: 24) argues that such criticism is a one-sided view. He suggests 
that it is important to recognize two aspects of religion, which are (1) the top-down 
aspect—that is, that ethics and morality were institutionalized in the imperial dynasties 
(reik\>ö sei ^Li&tÜ:), and (2) the bottom-up aspect—that is, that religious belief of the 
masses ultimately plays a role in providing people with an explanation of death (,shükyö 
sei 5k IM :). Criticism of Confucianism, such as that provided by Lu Xun, examines 
only the first of these two aspects, in terms of religion’s being an ideology of the 
imperial dynasties; but this does not deal with the fact that Confucianism had been 
supported by the masses for more than two thousand years (Kaji 1990: 24-26). Both
followed Confueian civilization and realized that they were able to obtain some degree of material 
gain by becoming government officials by means of the centre’s official examination system.
For example, his novels. Diary o f  A Madman (Kuangren Riji LEA 0 id) ([1918] 1990) and The True 
Story o f  Ah 0  (A O Zhengzhuan IWQ iHfC) ([1921] 1933) criticize Confueian feudal society in China.
12
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aspects have in common the teaching of filial piety (xiao # ) ,  which refers to a worship 
of ancestors, as well as love and respect for parents, and the giving of birth to 
descendants.
To be sure, Confucianism is not a state religion in the same sense that the Church 
of England is the state religion of Great Britain, in which the religious practices of the 
King or Queen are the same as those of the masses. The religious practices of the 
Chinese emperors were very different from those of the masses, even though both were 
based on Confucianism. The Emperors worshiped Heaven, which gave them their 
mandate. Even though the idea of the Mandate of Heaven was claimed by every 
dynastic power and widely accepted by the common people (Yang 1961: 127), 
worshipping Heaven was not common practice among the people.13 Rather, ancestor 
worshipping was central to their beliefs. In short, although Confucianism was not a state 
religion in the European sense, it had a religious aspect that was rooted in the practices 
of the common people.
The centre attempted to spread the idea of Confucianism to ethnic communities.14 
Although the centre did not attempt to force people both in China proper and at the 
periphery to believe in Confucianism, it did define Confucianism as being superior to 
other forms of religion. For example, the Qing centre claimed to be a ‘protector of the 
Buddhist world’ (Song [1795] 1982: 347). It encouraged the spread of Lama Buddhism, 
and supported it by building many temples and monasteries and giving their occupants 
economic privileges, such as exemption from all taxes and dues (Dabringhaus 1997). At 
the same time, however, the Lifanyuan was responsible for sending an amban, the 
centre’s representative, to Lhasa, in Tibet, in order to control the monks there. It even 
intervened in the process of identifying reincarnations of the Dalai Lama. Under 
Confucian civilizational ideology, it was believed that a living official, who was guided 
by the Emperor, had superior power over the gods and spirits of a rank lower than his 
own. Moreover, ‘whenever the people or the officials believed that the miracle of a god 
had helped in a major public crisis, the emperor would bestow a title upon the deity as a 
reward' (Yang 1961: 181). 15 Thus, one can argue that there was a hierarchical
13 Furthermore, the centre monopolized the performance of rituals in the worship of Heaven. The laws 
of the Qing Dynasty clearly mention that ‘those who make private appeal to Heaven and worship the 
Seven Mansions, burning incense at night, lighting the Heavenly Lamp and the Seven-Star Lamp, 
shall be punished with eighty strokes of the stick' (Yang 1961: 183).
14 For studies on Confucian culturalism, see Ebrey (1996), Bol (1987), Langlois (1980), Crossley 
(1990b) and Duara(1993).
|s Peripheral religions often held political and military power. If the centre thought it could not control 
them, or that its own security was under threat, it did not hesitate to fight wars against ethnic
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relationship between civilization and religions. Confucian civilization, which defined 
emperors as the greatest existence in the universe, was superior to peripheral religions, 
from the centre’s point of view.
Christianity, however, as a religion with Western imperial power underpinnings, 
did not fit into this hierarchical order. Christian missionaries, originally supervised by 
the imperial household, were prohibited from evangelizing. Some missionaries worked 
secretly inside China, and, when the authorities discovered them, faced serious 
punishment. The situation changed after the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, in which the 
open preaching of Christianity was protected (Wang 1982: 88, 95, 97 and, 107; Yao and 
Luo 2000: 21). After 1858, because of foreign pressure to admit missionaries, the centre 
could not control Christian missionaries by means of its civilizational ideology. One can 
argue that the presence of Christian missionaries in China, who had their own Christian 
civilizational ideology, brought about a ‘clash of civilizations’ at least at the central 
level.
Han-Centric Perception of Civilization during the Republic of China (1911-1949)
During the Republican era, the centre’s ideal was to assimilate ethnic communities as a 
means of strengthening the historical formation of the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu 
After the Manchu were completely expelled from the centre following the 
1911 revolution, the Han regained authority at the centre.16 The assimilation of ethnic 
communities was encouraged in a variety of ways throughout the Republic period. This 
section will examine the ideas of two major actors, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, 
as representatives of the centre’s views and policies, and explore the ways in which they 
understood civilization.
The Republic of Five Nationalities (wuzu gonghe Ti Me Ä  f l l ) formed the 
constitutional basis of the Republic of China.17 Sun Yat-sen stated in his inaugural 
declaration of provisional presidency on 1 January 1912 that ‘the essence of nation lies 
in people. To make the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan one is called the
communities to retain control (Waley-Cohen 1998). The centre’s attempt to retain its control over 
religion was due to a need to not only control ethnic communities, but also to control heretical sects, 
the potential of which to become rebellious sects was considered very high—as in the case, for 
example, of the While Lotus Buddhists of the 1770s. For the relationship between heretical sects and 
rebellions, see Suzuki (1974) and Yang (1973: 657-60).
16 For the anti-Manchurian sentiment at the end of the Qing period, see Rhoads (2000).
1 This chapter has used the term ‘ethnic communities’, but because Sun Yat-sen used the term 
‘nationalities’ to refer to the Han, Manchu, Mongol. Hui and Tibet, this section sometimes follow his 
usage of the term ‘nationalities’. However, this does not mean that this thesis follows Sun’s 
understanding of the centre-ethnic community relationship.
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unification of nationalities’ (BliCAA> i tA A I^ o  o"/X> i!> ®> MlZthfcZj
— Ao ÜE] —) (Sun 1982a: 2). This declaration is very famous and is often
quoted in a number of pieces of literature. Nevertheless, it is unclear from the literature 
what the idea of the Republic of Five Nationalities actually meant for the centre-ethnic 
community relationship: whether the emphasis lay on an equal relationship among the 
five nationalities, or on the unification of nationalities, with the hidden assumption that 
the Han population was the cultural centre and the other four nationalities should be 
assimilated into the Han. In fact, Sun Yat-sen’s various speeches were not consistent in 
terms of these two different interpretations. For example, in his speech delivered to the 
Association for the Promotion of the Republic of Five Nationalities in Beijing and the 
Association of Northwest Cooperation on 3 September 1912, he emphasized the 
equality of the five nationalities, comparing it to the inequality of the Qing period.
Of the five nationalities, Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan, the Manchu held 
superior status, grabbed ultimate power and authority, and controlled the other four 
nationalities. Regarding the Manchu as the master, and the other four as slaves, 
inequality among the nationalities reached its bounds.... Now five nationalities are 
like one family. They stand on equal status, the problems of inequality among the 
nationalities are solved, and coincidcntly, the problems of inequality in politics are 
also solved. Conflicts will never happen again. Our hope is that the five big 
nationalities will cooperate from their hearts, make state policy together, and allow 
China to advance to become a first class civilized power in the world. This is the 
big responsibility that we five nationalities take together (Sun 1982d: 438-39).
Us ms I ,  mtm&vtMiZim,
ummMo mm.?a a , mimrnw&M,
(+■&> m^z^fmzw
föAAfHiÜlo
The idea of an equal relationship among the five nationalities under the new Republican 
government was symbolized in the flag of the Republic, which had five equal stripes 
(Dreyer 1976: 17; Kataoka 1984: 279).18
However, a number of scholars point out that Sun Yat-sen did not intend to 
actually establish equal relationship among the five nationalities. They argue that wuzu 
gonghe merely meant assimilation into the Han (Dreyer 1976; Kataoka 1991; 
Matsumoto 1999; Wang 2001). The clearest example is in Article 3 of the Constitution
ls The five equal stripes of the colours, red. yellow, blue, while and black, stood for the Han, Manchu, 
Mongol, Hui and Tibetan peoples respectively. This flag was used until 1928, when Ihe current flag 
of the Republic of China (Taiwan), the White Sun Banner (Qingtian Bairi Qi FfTxf I 0  Jilt-), became 
its national flag. See, Harrison (2000).
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o f the Chinese Alliance Society ( rjJ HI lb] Hä *? ,& $ ) issued on 3 March 1912, which 
states: ‘This association has the following political ideas.... to implement racial 
assimilation’ b : ttScIbH-fc) (Sun 1982b:
160). By way o f another example, Sun proclaimed in a speech at the inauguration o f the 
Association for the Promotion o f the People o f Five Nationalities pbiäz?)
that ‘our five nationalities originally have the same ancestors, we are the father and sons, 
the older brothers and younger brothers, who have the same bloodline and are o f the 
same branch’ (Sun 1986: 400).
Two contradictory arguments about the equal status of, and relationship among, 
the five nationalities, and about the assimilation o f ethnic communities into one 
category, raise questions about motivation. Matsumoto (1999: 87) claims that Sun 
changed the nuances o f the Republic o f Five Nationalities formulation depending on 
who his interlocutor was. In other words, although Sun emphasized racial assimilation 
to Han Chinese to stimulate their feelings o f superiority, he appealed to Mongolian 
kings and Islamic clerics by extolling the virtues o f the idea o f equality among 
nationalities and the advantages o f jo ining the Republic o f China.
I f  the discourse does not clearly highlight what the centre sought to do, actual 
practice by the centre in relation to ethnic communities provides the scholar with a 
clearer idea. The centre attempted to maintain stability and the unification of the state, 
and to assimilate ethnic communities into the centre. For these reasons, the centre 
needed to reach a degree o f compromise with ethnic communities (Kishi 1989; 
Matsumoto 1999: 92). For example, in the north, the centre experienced a threat from 
Russia under the latter’s moving-south policy, and needed to foster and maintain a good 
relationship with the Mongolians to shore up its northern security. In the southwest, the 
conflict between China and Tibet (the latter enjoying the support o f the British Empire), 
reached a peak in tension around 1917 (Hirono 2001). It was very difficult for China to 
defend its international border regions against external imperial power without 
cooperating with local powers in peripheral areas.
The relationship between the centre and Mongolia at the beginning o f the 
Republican period provides us with an interesting example o f both compromise and the 
centre’s intention to push its assimilation policy as far as it could (Kishi 1989). At the 
beginning o f the Republican period, Mongolian kings and nobles claimed independence. 
In order to pacify ethnic communities in the north, the centre appealed to them, assuring 
them it would preserve the status o f those nationalities as equals o f the Han, maintain
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their patents of nobility and property and provide freedom of religious belief. However, 
Yuan Shi-kai, the president who succeeded Sun in 1912, was looking for every 
opportunity to rule Mongolia. In 1913, when Bogdo Khan occupied Mongolia, Russia 
recognized Mongolian sovereignty. Yuan deployed his military force to Inner Mongolia, 
and on the back of the influence of the military presence, he established the Office of 
Mongol and Tibetan Affairs (Mengzang Yuan with a direct organizational link
to himself as the President. This meant that presidential power was strengthened, 
entitling him to use it directly against Mongolia. In addition, the centre decided to build 
three provinces in Inner Mongolia. The Mongolian kings sought to protect their 
interests and prestige and strongly protested the decision, but their protests were ignored. 
The centre created ‘special administrative areas’, ruled by governors (doudu l i f® )  
despatched from the centre. To a great extent this process limited the Mongolian kings 
militarily and diplomatically, and in terms of administrative and legal rights, as well as 
limiting their economic prestige. The ideal of the Republic of Five Nationalities thus 
simply paid lip service to the rights of ethnic communities.
The term ‘Chinese nation’ (zhonghua minzu 4 1 that started to appear in 
Sun’s policy statements in the 1920s implied a unified nation consisting of five 
nationalities united as a result of assimilation. In his speech, delivered on 6 March 1921, 
at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Guomindang at Canton, the ‘dying out' 
of nationalities was emphasized, and the different nationalities were brought together 
under the new glue of a Chinese nation {zhonghua minzu).
The name “Republic of Five Nationalities’’ exists only because there exists a 
certain racial distinction which distorts the meaning of a single Republic. We must 
facilitate the dying out of all names of individual peoples inhabiting China, i.e. 
Manchus, Tibetans, etc. In this respect we must follow the example of the United 
States of America, i.e. satisfy the demands and requirements of all races and unite 
them in a single cultural and political whole, to constitute a single nation with such 
a name, for example, as “Chunhua” [China -  in the widest application of the name]. 
Organise the nation, the State (Sun 1927: 229).|y
In his policy on the Chinese nation, Sun did not forget to emphasize that the Han were 
the most important nationality capable of helping and defending the ethnic communities 
from external imperial power.
|y Furthermore, the ‘dying out’ of nationalities is emphasized in the face of the threat of imperialism. 
According to Sun Yat-sen, the assimilation of all five nationalities was necessary because they (four 
nationalities) did not have the ability to defend themselves, and the Han Chinese had a duty to help 
them’; otherwise, the result would have been the ‘shame of the Han Chinese’ (TellT/X/AIIW/l£3xi|ll.) 
(Sun 1982f: 473).
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Manchuria is attached to Japan, Mongolia to the USSR, and Tibet to Britain -  this 
is a sign that they are unable to defend themselves. To free themselves, they only 
have to rely on us, the Han. Now, I think of a means to harmony, and you will find 
that it is to make the Han the centre. Let other nationalities assimilate to the Han, 
and also, let the other nationalities join in our institutions and give them an 
opportunity to build the nation. Like the scale of American nationality, we will 
change the Han into a Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu), compose one complete 
nation-state, and make ourselves one of the two biggest nationalist states in the 
eastern and western hemispheres together with the US (Sun 1982f: 474).
fäffimzmu, muzmm, mmzim, zmüiMtnrnfto fmmm
i M i ,  immmmo
Sun Yat-sen's priority was to unify the Chinese nation-state in the face of a threat 
from western imperial powers. The way he used the concepts of self-determination and 
autonomy in the mid 1920s is evidence of this. The Manifesto of the Chinese 
Guomindang’s First National Congress in January
1924 stated:
The Kuomintang solemnly proclaims: (it) recognizes the right to self-determination 
of all the nationalities within China. After the victory of revolution against 
imperialism and warlords, (it) will organize a free and united Republic of China 
formed by the free association of all the nationalities (The Manifesto of the 
Chinese Guomindang’s First National Congress: 17; translated by Mackerras 1994:
57) .
mx*mm\H&mkz&
z^wm m ix^, HL
The actual means o f ‘self-determination’ as expressed in the manifesto is unclear. One 
interpretation (Ikeda 1983) is that it refers to the right to separate from the state, and in 
this regard, China was influenced by the USSR's position, which permitted the right to 
separate from the state. A second interpretation (Dreyer 1976; Connor 1984; Hirano 
1988; Mackerras 1994) is that Sun’s argument is contradictory. Dreyer, for example, 
argues that ‘Sun, more orator than logician, never bothered to reconcile’ the 
contradiction between self-determination and unified nation state (1976: 17).20 A third 
interpretation (Duara 1995; Fizgerald 1996; Matsumoto 1999) is that self-determination 
was the same as assimilation. Matsumoto (1999: 112) interprets Sun’s understanding of 
autonomy in China as the support of a unified central authoritarian state by local
20 Hirano (1988: 58) argues that because China’s priority was to build a strong nation-stale. Sun took 
an anti-imperialist view of outsiders and a ‘Republic of Five Nationalities’ view of insiders, and his 
views acknowledged the right to self-determination but not the right to separation.
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authorities. In fact, Sun Yat-sen used the example of the relationship between the 
United States and its colonial outpost, the Philippines, and stated that ‘America nurtured 
the independence of the Philippines, and reformed it by setting up a foundation for local 
autonomy. Within twenty years, the Philippines had transformed extensively from a 
barbaric race to a civilized nation as a result’ A K ; Jb
Z  M W I X^ A 3t tyj iS Z  Z  K; tfe ) (Sun 1982g: 211). In other words, self- 
determination and autonomy were tools of the nation state.
Sun acknowledged tacitly that the Chinese nation had not yet been civilized as a 
whole, and that his ideal was to do so. He stated that ‘the Chinese nation was the oldest, 
largest, most civilized and strongest nation with the greatest assimilative power in the
world tmmzzmk, tmmzz^m,
(Sun 1982e: 186). Conceptualising a Chinese nation in this way, Sun 
made it clear that assimilating ethnic communities and creating a Chinese nation would 
lead to the unification of a country able to defend itself against external imperial powers. 
Rather than obtaining legitimacy of rule by defining the centre-ethnic community 
relationship as one between civilizer-civilizee, unification of the state was the source of 
the centre’s legitimacy, and therefore the centre attempted to ignore the ethnic or 
civilizational differences among its ethnic communities.
It is important to note the Confucian origin of the Chinese nation in Sun’s 
thinking. In Sun’s speech of The Three Principles of People (sanmi n zhuvi H K iJJC ), 
one can observe a Confucian understanding of civilization.
We must retrieve our nation’s status. Other than everyone’s getting together to 
make a group of national citizenry, we need to retrieve our own old morality. Once 
we have our own morality, it is then that our own national status can be retrieved. 
Speaking of China’s own morality, what the Chinese cannot forget even now is, 
first, loyalty and filial piety; second, philanthropy; third, trust, and fourth, peace.... 
Nowadays, the most civilized nation in the world can speak of filial piety, but they 
are not as perfect as China. Therefore, filial piety cannot be unnecessary. The 
nations in the Republic of China need to raise loyalty and filial piety to the highest 
level, then naturally the nation will become strong and flourish (Sun 1982h: 244).
W i t t »  mwmmG&mm, rx&
t i ' i ,  %rx&inx, (4dnft)
i s * mxz-^x
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In sum, civilization was defined not only in the context of governing ability, but also 
still in the context of Confucian morality—an interesting parallel to the Qing period.
The Nanjing government established by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928 attempted to 
further strengthen control of the periphery, but the period from 1928 to 1949 saw 
unrelenting political and military power struggles between the centre and ethnic 
communities. The government’s first attempt to control the periphery was to establish 
the Committee of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (Mengzang Weiyuanhui 
The Committee's task was to deal with administrative affairs relating to the periphery, 
and with a variety of projects in Inner Mongolia and Tibet. However, the Committee 
failed to function because the centre was militarily and administratively too weak 
relative to local power holders. The actual administration of Inner Mongolia and Tibet 
was conducted by local governments in those respective places (Möri 2000; Hirono 
2001).
Chiang Kai-shek continued this policy by drawing on Sun Yat-sen’s idea of 
assimilation. His book China’s Destiny ([1943] 1947) is a compilation of the ideas of a 
national citizenry (guozu 0 $ ^ ). He explains the evolution of a Chinese nation as 
follows:
The Chinese [note: Chunghua in original] nation, as may be seen from its history, 
has grown by a gradual amalgamation of various stocks into a harmonious and 
organic whole. These various stocks, originally of one race and lineage, were 
scattered east of the Pamirs, along the valleys of the Yellow River, Huai River, 
Yangtze River, Amur River and Pearl River. Due to their different geographical 
environments, they had developed different cultures, and this in turn accounted for 
their different characteristics. However, during the last five thousand years a 
continuous process of amalgamation has been going on through frequent contacts 
and constant migrations so that they have now become integral parts of one nation.
In this process, culture and not military might has been the actuating force; and the 
method of assimilation has been by a stretching forth of a helping hand, not by 
conquest (Chiang [1943] 1947: 4).
The entire Chunghua nation, so solid in its make-up, is destined to live gloriously 
or perish ignominiously as a whole. The fact that it comprises five stocks is due not 
to diversity in race or blood but to dissimilarity in creed and geographical 
environment. In a word, the distinction between the five stocks is territorial as well 
as religious, but not ethnological (ibid: 13).
The Guomindang’s Third National Congress in March 1929 clearly stated that the 
‘peripheral provinces of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang ... [are] originally a part of the 
Chinese nation (zhonghna minzn) in history, geography and national economy’ (S  i*i\
t  (4>« ) £ m*±nkn ±ra ih]* ivaa.
and ‘the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetans should form a strong national
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citizenry’ (guoze) M ,  'i< > Uh W A  A S  tic)
(Rong 1985: 646). With regard to peripheral politics, the resolution at the Congress of 
1929 contained the following:
Our party solemnly declares that we will use an example in the past as a negative 
one, and correct evil policies of both the Manchurian Qing and warlord periods, 
which tricked Mongolia and Tibet, and neglected the interests of the Xinjiang 
people. We will, with sincere heart, support development of economy, politics and 
the education of each of these people, and confidently hope that they will all 
advance together along the road of civilizational progress, and to create free and 
united Chinese Republic In this way we hope that we may maintain eternal peace 




The Guomindang’s Central Political Congress endorsed a decision that Inner Mongolia, 
Qinghai and Ningxia would become provinces in 1928. However, the creation of 
provinces was only a nominal change because of the weakness of the central 
government.
The responsibility of the centre to pull the four nations up to the level of Han is very 
similar to the Confucian civilizational ideology of the Qing period. The main difference 
between the Republican and the Qing periods lies in the stronger articulation by the 
Republicans of the assimilation of the five nationalities under the category of a Chinese 
nation and national citizenry. Accordingly, the concept of civilization also moved from 
being located in a Confucianism context to being located in an international context, 
while retaining remnant Confucian thought. The Chinese nation was understood to be 
unified by assimilating ethnic communities into the Han, so that China would become a 
first class civilized nation.
It is also important to acknowledge that neither Sun nor Chiang took into account 
the diversity of ethnic communities in the south, in places such as Yunnan, Sichuan and 
Guizhou. In their discourse, ‘nationalities’ referred only to Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui 
and Tibetan nationality. June Teufel Dreyer (1976: 16) writes that ‘Sun either did not 
know about them or felt they were so close to ‘dying out’ as to be unworthy of 
attention’. In addition to this observation, the lack of attention to the issue of the centre- 
ethnic community relationship in general was not unrelated to their ignorance of the 
issue of ethnic communities in the south. Compared to other urgent issues, such as the 
wars and conflicts between the nationalist and communist parties, China’s semi-
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colonization by external imperial powers, and the Sino-Japan war from 1937, the 
centre-ethnic community relationship did not attract too much attention.
Religious Policy on Ethnic Communities
With regard to religious policies in the Republican period, the centre did not attempt to 
assimilate religions. Chiang Kai-shek mentioned in China’s Destiny that ‘the distinction 
among the five nationalities in China depends on regions and religions, not on race and 
bloodline’ (Chiang [1943] 1947: 119-21). It is in fact not an easy task to trace the 
centre’s religious policies. Very little literature deals with religious policies dealing 
with ethnic communities in the Republic period. In addition, there are very few 
documents of the Guomindang National Congress that discuss religious matters in 
‘main issue’ terms. Some documents deal with peripheral problems but do not mention 
religious aspects.
One possible reason for this lack of sources is that religious matters tended to be 
dealt with in local contexts in this period, owing to the weakness of the centre’s material 
power and its control of the periphery. For example, Tibet maintained de facto 
independence during the Republic period, and religion was totally maintained and dealt 
with by local religious leaders (Lamb 1986; Goldstein 1989: 30-36; Smith 1996). In 
contrast, Xinjiang did not have de facto independence because it became a province in 
1887, and a governor was sent from the centre. However, the distance between the 
centre and Xinjiang was too large for the centre to control it tightly. In other words, 
Xinjiang retained a degree of natural autonomy, not because the centre intended that be 
the case, but because the centre did not have enough resources to prevent Xinjiang from 
exercising such natural autonomy. Because of its ability to exercise a degree of such 
autonomy, the religious policy adopted by Yang Zengxin who was sent by
Yuan Shi-kai in 1912 to become Xinjiang’s governor, was locally defined. He 
understood the importance of religious issues, having worked in Gansu where many 
Muslims resided. He allowed for the maintenance of the traditional religious system in 
such manifestations as the existence of a religious court and religious schools (Zu 1991: 
250; Kinoshita 1998: 133). In contrast, Sheng Shicai (fuLtttTT), the most powerful 
warlord in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s, sponsored a vigorous campaign in favour 
of atheism (Forbes 1986; Mackerras 1995: 20). One can argue that the features of 
religious policy as it related to ethnic communities varied depending on the area, and on 
the skill and prowess of the middle man in the local area.
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To understand the degree of general hostility to Christian missionaries working in 
peripheral areas at the time, it is important to discuss the anti-religion campaigns of the 
1920s, even though they are not directly related to the centre’s religious policy on 
ethnic communities. These campaigns targeted religions and superstitions in general, 
but the attack on Christianity was particularly serious. The campaigns originated in the 
anti-Christian movement of 1922, when the Peking Anti-Religious Federation (Beijing 
Feizongjiao Da Tongmeng \ k h ( 1k t h >J iVii.) came into being in China. Its manifesto 
makes the following claim:
We swear ourselves to sweep away the poison and harm of religion on behalf of 
human society. We profoundly deplore the fact that in human society religion has 
spread a poison which is, ten times, a hundred times, a thousand times worse than 
floods or ferocious animals.... Religion and mankind cannot both exist.... In the 
beginning men were free and equal; but this is distorted by religious explanation 
(Zhang 1927: 193-94).
Yamamoto and Yamamoto (1953) argue that there were three main factors that became 
the basis of the anti-Christian movement in China during 1922-1927: the New Thought 
movement, nationalism and Communism.
The first factor was the New Thought movement, the basis of which lay in science 
and democracy. The New Thought movement was influential among young intellectuals 
including Chen Duxiu after 1915. It insisted that religion oppose science and
hinder its development (Yamamoto and Yamamoto 1953: 137), thus rendering religion 
useless (Kiang 1948: 58). Accompanying the great fervour for science at that time, an 
overwhelming majority of modem educated Chinese intellectuals thought that religion 
was ‘a relic of man’s primitive ignorance of the physical laws of the universe’ (Yang 
1961: 364-65).
The second factor was nationalism. It was natural that the anti-Christian 
movement was associated with nationalism because Christianity in China originated in 
the attentions of the Western imperial powers. The view of the majority of Chinese 
intellectuals was, as Bertrand Russell put it in 1922, that ‘white men have gone to China 
with three motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our religion’ 
(Russell 1922: 198ff; Yang 1961: 364). The government also attacked mission schools, 
and insisted that education should be completely free from all sectarian churches and 
political parties, and advocated ‘restoration of educational rights’ (Yamamoto and
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Yamamoto 1953: 140). In November 1925, the Ministry of Education promulgated 
stringent regulations governing schools established by foreigners.21
The third factor was a combination of communism and anti-feudalism, together 
with the Republican government’s political and economic strategies at the local level. 
Yamamoto and Yamamoto (1953: 144) emphasize that basically the anti-Christian 
movement was associated with anti-capitalism. It was argued by Chinese intellectuals of 
the day that Christianity and the Christian churches were devils, who supported and 
helped the property-holding class ‘which eats without working’ and looted and 
oppressed the proletariat ‘which works but is unable to eat’ (Yamamoto and Yamamoto 
1953: 144).
In summary, in the Republican period the centre’s religious policy was not clear, 
and religious matters were left to the local level. However, there is no doubt that anti­
religion campaigns heightened anti-Christian sentiment. It is difficult to conclude 
exactly what the relationship between civilization and religion was in this period, due to 
the paucity of the centre’s religious policy. Nevertheless, the fact that anti-religion 
campaigns derived from Chinese nationalism highlights the fact that religion was 
understood as a force countering national independence and the unification of the nation, 
a force potentially destructive of the very concept of civilization.
Communist Perception of Civilization during the PRC (1949 -  Today)
The relationship between the centre and ethnic communities in the Communist period 
appears to be very different from that of the Qing and Republican periods. The greatest 
difference between the Communist centre and its predecessors lies in the notion of 
equality. Article 50 of the interim constitution, the ‘Common Program’, adopted on 29 
September 1949, clearly states that ‘all nationalities (minzu) within the boundaries of 
the People’s Republic of China are equal’. However, as will be examined later, the 
extent to which they were equal in practice is questionable. The following section will 
firstly provide an historical perspective on the Communist centre's policy in relation to 
ethnic communities, and secondly examine the realities of the claim to ‘equal 
relationship' between the centre and ethnic communities.22
21 Yamamoto and Yamamoto (1953: 142-43) argue that in the late 1920s anti-Christians and Christians 
cooperated under the banner of nationalism.
22 The ‘centre’ in the Communist period in this chapter means the Han Chinese and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), the majority of whose members were Han. Little literature on China's 
centre-ethnic community relationship questions the category o f ‘Han’ (Blum 2002: 1297). Although
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The Communist Policy on Ethnic Communities
In the 1950s the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policy towards ‘minority 
nationalities’ (shaoshu minzu 'PWifäM) had two distinct factors. The first was the 
national regional autonomy system (minzu qiiyii zizhi zhidu [=1 that
came into being after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949. The Communist centre demarcated areas in which ethnic communities were 
concentrated, created autonomous regions, prefectures and counties, and provided these 
areas with autonomous rights. These included the right to use minority language, the 
right to control their own financial affairs, and the right to issue local regulations, all 
‘under the unified leadership of the state’.23 An important point to note here is that this 
system was established to help ‘minority nationalities’ become a part of the PRC, rather 
than to facilitate the self-determination of ethnic groups, in the sense of an ethnic group 
having the ‘right to have a separate and distinct identity, to govern itself and to 
determine the political and legal status of the territory it occupies’ (Evans and Newham 
1998: 497). This purpose recalls Sun Yat-sen’s idea of self-determination, which was 
understood as having as one of its ultimate aims the unification of the state.24
The second factor in CCP policy on ‘minority nationalities’ was the concept of a 
united front. This idea aimed at creating a united front of cooperation among ‘the upper 
strata of patriotic bourgeois nationalities’, including the political, social and religious 
leaders of peripheral areas (Dreyer 1976: 94). The government established the United 
Front Work Department (UFWD) (Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Bu of
the Party Central Committee in 1944 (Dreyer 1976: 95). Li Weihan (^^#!'Ä), an 
appointed head of the UFWD, and leader on the issues of minority nationality 
throughout the 1950s, commented on the role of the upper strata of minority 
nationalities and religious leaders.
it is important to take into account the question of whether the Han are a homogeneous nationality, 
this thesis deals with the Han as one nationality, because it takes a centre’s policy perspective.
23 The Law of The People’s Republic of China on the Autonomy of Minority Nationality Regions, 
Beijing Xinhua in English, FB1S Transcribed Text, 16 May 2002.
24 The CCP did not endorse the right to self-determination out of a fear of the threat of imperialism.
Zhou Enlai discussed this issue in 1949 as follows: ‘Any nationality has the right to self- 
determination. There is no doubt about that. Today, however, imperialists are attempting to separate 
Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang [from China], and 1 hope each nationality will not rise to the bail offered 
by the imperialists’ provocation. For this reason, the name of our country is the People’s Republic of 
China, and not Federation’ iZ Y'Y AaTH  fl\l fU fü Y A"Tot/IS T  Xtmmwr, xr<
ffjJM o  % 7  i£  -Ä , l 'T M F A K Ä fllin , llij T  l|ll 1$ Jf . ) (Zhou 1984:
140).
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Within each minority nationality, there are a few members of the upper strata. They 
are from pre-capitalism and capitalism exploiters, and that bunch of intellectuals of 
the exploiting class. The contradiction between them and us, working peoples, can 
be only resolved by social reform (including democratic reform and socialist 
transformation). On the other hand, the majority of these people from the upper 
strata take a patriotic stand. They have certain link with working peoples in ethnic 
matters, and for some of them also in religious matters, and have become public 
leaders of minority nationalities. In some minority nationalities, this kind of public 
leader has great influence (over working people). From early on, our Party 
accurately assessed these two situations in relation to public leaders of minority 
nationalities, and adopted a policy of both struggle and unity with them.... After 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, a united front in this direction 
was further enlarged and strengthened. Relying on this course of the united front 
(in this policy), we went through the process of peace and liberating Tibet. We 
develop links with many minority nationality masses to whom in the past we had 
few link or none, and developed our work among them. This was something that 
contributes to the role in the alliance with working peoples (Li 1981: 156-57 (25 
September 1956)).
x m mn mL mm $ m°  (*■&>
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In this manner, the government indirectly controlled peripheral areas by cooperating 
with these public leaders.
In the two decades that followed, the minority issue was ultimately understood as 
an issue of class struggle. The centre’s policy at that time aimed at ‘economic 
integration, the assimilation of minority nationalities, the destruction of religions, 
making compulsory the ideology of the Cultural Revolution, and militarising the 
periphery’ (Mackerras 1994: 152; Möri 1998: 102, 107).25
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four, 
China’s policy on ethnic communities began to be retrieved. At the beginning of the 
new era under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, an article in the People's Daily (16 
November 1978) emphasized that there was political, economic and cultural inequality 
in practice among minority nationalities, and that future policy must resolve this issue 
(Möri 2000: 1 18). Although it did not refer to any specific political inequality, it was
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significant that the Party actually admitted to there being inequality among minority 
nationalities. The Communist government has made efforts to solve economic and 
cultural inequality among minority nationalities since the 1980s. In 1986, the State 
Ethnic Affairs Committee of the PRC (guojia minzu shiwn weiyuanhui 
64 z?) confirmed that:
the main issue in minority nationality projects is that many minority nationality 
areas are both economically and culturally lagging behind; their economic 
efficiency is low, and their poverty is increasing. Among all the minority 
nationalities, the starvation of fifteen million Chinese has not been overcome, 
which still impacts on stability and the unification of minority nationality 
relationships (Quanguo Rcnda Changweihui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1994:
1027).
Therefore, economic undertakings and poverty alleviation became the highest priorities 
in peripheral areas. In 2000, the state announced its Great West Development Program 
{xibu dakaifa in an attempt to begin to develop Western China and to
alleviate the poverty of ethnic communities.26
At an economic level, the Communist centre publicly acknowledged the existence 
of inequality between the Han and ethnic communities. However, the centre still turned 
and continues to turn its back on inequality at a more fundamental, ideational level. One 
can discern this inequality in some important theories on which the centre’s policy is 
based. Two of these theories are highlighted here. The first is Fei Xiaotong’s, Plurality’ 
and Unity Within the Configuration of the Chinese Nation (Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan 
Yiti Gejii This most influential theoretical work supporting
this policy on ethnic communities was published in 1988. Fei argues:
During a long period of mutual contact many groups were mixed, aligned, or 
integrated, while others were divided and became extinct. In time the groups 
unified into one group which consisted of a number of subunits that kept emerging, 
vanishing, and remerging, so that parts of some subunits became a part of others, 
yet each retained its individual characteristics. Together they formed a national 
entity which was at once pluralistic and unified (Fei 1988: 167-68).
- For studies on the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Inner Mongolia, see Sneath (1994) and 
Woody (1993).
26 There is extensive literature on the Program. The China Quarterly June 2004 (Issue 178) has a 
discussion on the Program in each province and autonomous region. The Xibu Dakaifa is variously 
translated as the ‘Western Great Development' Program (Sines 2002; Yeung and Li 2004), ‘Open Up 
The West’ (Goodman 2004) etc. The ‘West' refers to the six provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, Shangxi, all five autonomous regions of Tibet, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guangxi and 
Inner Mongolia, and the Chongqing municipality. With regard to problems with the term ‘west,’ 
particularly in relation to the diversity of the west and the centre’s intention to homogenise issues in 
the ‘west’, see Goodman (2004) and Sines (2002). For the history of development in Tibet, see 
Dreyer (2003a). For the impact of development on traditional cultures of peripheral people, see 
Lemoine (1989).
6 8 CHAPTER TWO
The formation o f the ethnic entity of Han was an important step by which the entire 
Chinese nation came into existence as a national entity, as the Han were a nucleus 
for what I have described as the Chinese people’s pluralistic and unified 
configuration (ibid: 178).27
Fei’s theory has two contradictory aspects. One is the superiority of the Han centre. The 
other is the homogeneity of all minority nationalities. This theory currently lies in the 
mainstream of Chinese scholarship and is reflected in much of the literature. Moreover, 
Fei’s theory of a ‘pluralistic and unified configuration' encouraged patriotism and 
rallied support against separatist movements. For example, Xinjiang is a part of an 
inseparable unified motherland, and minority nationalities in Xinjiang are an organic 
part of the plural and unified Chinese nation (Möri 1998: 78).
The second theory is Stalin’s idea of universal historical progress, which suggests 
scales on which to measure the political and economic stages of each minzu (minority 
nationality), namely, the primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of 
production. The Chinese Communist government undertook an ethnic identification 
project (minzu shibie gongzuo in the 1950s, and classified each minzu
according to Stalin’s scale.28 Harrell argues:
This [determination of minzu on the scale] was important in order to plan the 
political struggles and developmental campaigns that would raise the civilizational 
levels of the various minzu. For example, people judged to be at the late-feudal 
stage of the landlord economy (which is where most of the Han peasantry was 
judged to be also) were to undergo the violent class struggles o f the Land Reform 
program, while those who were still at the slave stage, or even showed vestiges of 
the primitive commune, were subjected to the much milder process, involving 
cooptation of leaders to the state project, and known as Democratic Rcfonn (1995:
24).
The scaling of minzu based on Stalin’s idea of universal historical progress describes 
curious aspect of ‘equality’ between the Han and ethnic communities. Ethnic 
communities who are now backward (luohuo '^/Ti) will develop over time according to 
the scale. Civilization by the centre leads all minzu to ‘march together on the road to 
historical progress, that is, to socialism’ (Harrell 1995: 24). Hence, the hidden 
assumption is that the degree of civilization of the Han differs from that of ethnic 
communities. In other words, equality is not something that existed from the beginning. 
The condition of ethnic communities was regarded as backward, and unequal to that of
27 In the original, ‘Chinese nation' is written as ‘Zhonghua minzu' , and the English translation of this is 
rendered as ‘people’. However, I ehanged it to ‘nation’ because I have adopted the translation 
‘Chinese nation’ in my discussion of the discourse on the Chinese nation in the Republican period.
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the Han. Equality is something for all nationalities to achieve, the desired result of 
efforts by the centre to civilize ethnic communities.
Preferential policies (youhui zhengce were introduced in the 1980s to
assist "backward’ minority nationalities to become as civilized as the Han. These 
included quotas for higher education, preferential treatment for certain kinds of 
employment, economic investments in minority nationality areas, special measures 
taken to alleviate poverty, and the right to bear two (or three in rural areas) children, in 
spite of the One Child Policy (Mackerras 2003: 27).
Help from the Han is an important aspect of Chinese Communist civilizational 
ideology. This is highlighted in the rhetorical description of the Han as big brother, and 
of "minority nationalities’ as younger brother. Li Weihan (^ f i f 'Ä )  presented the 
relationship among nationalities as follows:
The relationship among nationalities in our country is equal, friendly and 
cooperative.... It is a must that the Han help minority nationalities. Is it the duty of 
the Han to help minority nationalities? Is it to repay the Han’s debts? I think the 
Han’s help of minority nationalities is the Han’s honourable duty. This is because 
the Han economy and culture are relatively superior (to those of minority 
nationalities), and domestically the Han is in a leader’s position, as if in a 
household, a big brother helps younger brothers lcam and become adult. Isn’t this a 
duty by any means? (Li [1957] 1981: 200)
(ft£
Li Yu focuses on the same rhetoric to describe the relationship between the Han and 
minority nationalities. In her examination of Communist propaganda posters, she claims 
that "minority nationalities’ are represented as "children’ or "childlike’, while the Han 
are depicted as "big brother’ or ‘educational father’ (Yu 2000). This relationship is 
called ‘internal orientalism’ or ‘internal colonialism’ in some literature (Hechter 1975; 
Schein 2000; Oakes 1995). These efforts to differentiate the Han (us) from ethnic 
communities (others) in such asymmetrical way were intended to create homogeneity 
among the Han ‘at the expense of the exoticized minority’ (Gladney 1994: 95).
In sum, the preferential policies and accompanying argument that minority 
nationalities are economically and culturally ‘backward’ clearly highlight the
2X Many works discuss the problems with the ethnic identification project and its impact on identities of 
ethnic communities. For example, see Wellens (1998), Diamond (1995), Gladney ( 1991), Harrell 
( l990) and McKhann (1995).
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civilizational ideology of Communist China: that ‘big brother’ Han is the more civilized, 
and that the ‘big brother’ must help the backward little (minority) brother. Even though 
discriminatory terms such as barbarian (yi) are banned in Communist China, ethnic 
communities are still considered backward, while the Han are regarded as more 
advanced. During the Republican period, the civilizational centre shifted toward the 
West, but in the Communist period, the Han retrieved their status as the civilizational 
centre.
Restrictions on ‘Freedom o f Religious Belief and ‘Superstition '
The centre’s religious policy on ethnic communities in the Communist period is based 
on the freedom of religious belief guaranteed under the 1982 Constitution.29 However, 
the extent to which this ‘freedom’ has been realized in practice is highly questionable. 
This is because the Communist centre’s view on religion is underpinned by Marxism- 
Leninism. Marx (1970) defined religion as ‘the sign of the oppressed creature, the 
sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions’. He argues that ‘it is 
the opium of the people’ and hence the abolition of religion, as the illusory happiness of 
men, is a demand for their real happiness’. He envisaged that religion would eventually 
disappear. This view underpins the Chinese centre’s views on religion and influences its 
religious policy. This section will first examine the current religious policies and 
administrative structure of religious organizations, and then discuss some issues in 
relation to the centre’s proclamation o f ‘freedom of religious belief.
Except during the turbulent period of twenty years from 1957 to 1976, the United 
Front Work Department (UFWD) controlled religious matters and issued religious 
policies and regulations throughout the Communist period.30 This was done in order to 
develop and maintain a cooperative relationship with religious leaders so that the centre 
could control ethnic communities. In addition to this organization, the Religious Affairs
Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution states that:
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to religious belief. No state organ, social 
organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in any religion or not believe and neither 
may they discriminate between citizens who are believers and those who are not. The State protects 
normal religious activities. No-one may use religion to destroy social order, damage the health of 
citizens or obstruct the activities of the state educational system. Religious organizations- and 
religious work must not be controlled by foreign forces (Constitution; translated by Dillon 2001: 4).
1 During the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), religion was seen as representative of the old ‘feudal’ order. Religious 
activities were totally banned; temples, churches, statues and properties were destroyed; and most 
clergy and religious practitioners were arrested and prosecuted. The turbulence ended with the death 
of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, and the CCP reconsidered its religious 
policy.
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Bureau (RAB) (Zongjiao Shiwu Jii of the State Council was established in
1954 as a subordinate organization to the UFWD. Its task was to implement religious 
policies and to supervise religious activities (The State Council 1995).31 As Table 2.1 
shows, the UFWD supervised and guided the RAB, which in turn, directed its local 
branches at county level. The local RABs controlled religious practices ‘so that they did 
not constitute a threat to the power of the CCP’ (Dillon 2001: 6).
Table 2.1: Administrative Structure of Religious Organizations in Communist China
I At the central level] |At the local level]
^  Policies’ guide 
■" Subordinate











Religious Affairs Bureau 
(RAB)
Provincial/Municipal/ 
Autonomous Regional United 
Front Work Department 
(UFWD)
Religious Affairs Bureau of the 
State Council (RAB)
United Front Work Department 
(UFWD) of the Central 
Committee of the CCP
Source: Diocese (2004: 7).
One of the main duties of the RAB is to ‘encourage religious personnel to 
promote patriotism and socialism, support education in safeguarding national unity and 
ethnic harmony, [and] strengthen and develop the patriotic United Front among all 
religious nationalities’ (The State Council 1995: 380). Based on this statement, the RAB 
educates religious professionals in order to guide them under socialism, because they 
should be ‘patriotic, law-abiding, and support the Socialist system’ (Document 19;
31 The RAB changed its name to the State Religious Affairs Bureau (SRAB) (Guojia Zongjiao Shiwu 
Jii I I i n  March 1998.
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translated by Maclnnis 1989).32 Patriotic religious organizations are established ‘to 
assist the Party and the government to implement the policy of freedom of religious 
belief, to help the broad mass of religious believers and persons in religious circles to 
continually raise their patriotic and socialist consciousness’ (Document 19; translated 
by Maclnnis 1989).
Five national religious associations were established under the direction of the 
RAB in 1957, and they still exist to implement the CCP’s religious policies. They 
include, the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, 
the Chinese Daoist Association, the Chinese Islamic Association, and the Chinese 
Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) (Yang 1961: 394; Dillon 2001: 7). In 
addition, in the 1980s, the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Chinese Catholic 
Religious Affairs Committee, and the China Christian Council were added to the above 
(Dillon 2001; 7; Diocese Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic: 
2004). Individual churches and temples must follow the directions of these associations. 
In other words, all religious organizations at the local level are located at the bottom of 
the state organizational structure.
It is important to briefly touch on the TSPM here, because it relates to one of the 
most important features of the Communist centre’s religious policy. ‘Three-self implies 
that China’s Protestants should get rid of any relationship with imperialism, by means 
of self-management (zizhi Ö ), self-support (ziyang ill # ) ,  and self-propagation 
(zichuan §  f t  )• In other words, Chinese Protestants should manage churches by 
themselves, become economically independence from imperialist countries and raise 
funds by themselves, and preach the Bible by themselves. Wu Yaozong (H)®Ih ), a 
member of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in Beijing in the 1920s, 
undertook the Three-Self Movement (sanzi yundong T i [ = 1 )  in the 1950s (Bush 
1970: 170-208; Wickeri 1988). In 1954, Wu Yaozong became the Chairman of the 
Protestant Three-Self Movement, and made explicit the proper posture of the church: 
Christians should show a new spirit on the basis o f ‘Love-country Love-church' (aiguo 
aijiao stressing patriotism, nation-building, anti-imperialism, self-support,
church unity, and purification of the church (Wu 1954; Maclnnis 1968: 96).33
32 Document 19 is entitled as ‘The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our 
Country’s Socialist Period’, promulgated in March 1982. For English translation of the text, see 
Maclnnis (1989: 10-26).
33 Chinese Catholics do not have a three-self movement as such; but they do subscribe to the ‘Three- 
Self policy.
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Although freedom of religious belief has been enshrined in laws and regulations, 
there remain some issues that prevent freedom of religious belief from being realized. 
Three points serve to demonstrate the restriction of freedom of religious belief. The first 
relates to the Three-Self movement and control over association with international 
religious groups. The Communist government is aware of an increase in contact 
between Chinese and foreigners since Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy was 
promulgated in 1978.34 Document 19, issued in March 1982, deals with international 
religious contacts as follows:
There are reactionary religious groups abroad, especially the imperialistic ones 
such as the Vatican and Protestant foreign-mission societies, who strive to use all 
possible occasions to carry on [sic] their efforts at infiltration “to return to the 
China mainland.” Our policy is to actively develop friendly international religious 
contacts, but also to firmly resist infiltration by hostile foreign religious forces....
All religious organizations and individuals must be educated not to make use of 
any means whatsoever to solicit funds from foreign church organizations... As for 
donations or offerings given in accordance with religious custom by foreign 
believers, overseas Chinese, or compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao to temples 
and churches within our territory, these may be accepted. But if it is a question of 
large contributions or offerings, permission must be sought from the provincial, 
urban, or autonomous-area governments or from the central government 
department responsible for these matters before any religious body can accept them 
on its own (translated by Maclnnis 1989).
As we shall see in the following chapters, this restriction on interaction with foreign 
religious organizations casts a shadow over the work of international Christian NGOs in 
China because they are on the borderline between foreign religious actors and 
development aid agencies.
The policy of prevention of interaction between Chinese Christians and foreign 
religious organizations is further reinforced in relation to Catholicism. China severed its 
relationship with the Vatican in 1951. Many Chinese bishops, priests and laymen who 
remained loyal to Rome did not recognize the Catholic Patriotic Association, which 
affirmed the Three-Self campaign and required members to renounce allegiance to the 
Vatican (Wickeri 1998). Such Catholics formed an underground Catholic Church, and 
many were arrested. The tension between the centre and the underground church 
reached its peak when the underground church published The Thirteen Points in 1988. 
This statement declared that sacraments by 'patriotic priests’ were invalid (Tang 1992:
.14 For regulations on contact with foreign religious actors, see Zhonggong Zhongycmg Wenxian 
Yanjiushi Zonghe Yanjiushi and Guowuvuan Zongjiao Shiwuju Zhengce Fagui Si [11 ' ' 11 'A iOflV'jf
(1995:213-141
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69; Yao 1993: 142-45).35 The centre’s policy, which prevents people from associating 
with international religious organizations, hinders the practising of Catholicism, at least 
from both the Vatican’s and underground Catholic church’s perspective.
The second factor that restricts freedom of religious belief lies in how the centre 
understands the nature of religious practice: whether some religious practice exists 
purely because people participate in it voluntarily, or because it is imposed on the 
people by their religious leaders. From the centre’s perspective, religion is often 
associated with feudal leaders of religious sects, who have exploited the masses, and 
with religious privilege. Document 19 argues that:
In old China ... all religions were manipulated and controlled by the ruling classes, 
with extremely negative results. Within China, the Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic 
leaderships were mainly controlled by the feudal landowners, feudal lords, and 
reactionary warlords, as well as the bureaucratic capitalistic class. The later foreign 
colonialist and imperialist forces mainly controlled the Roman Catholic and 
Protestant churches (translated by Maclnnis 1989).
Under the socialist system, ‘counter-revolutionaries and wicked elements who wore 
religious cloaks’ are the enemy of the masses, and must be destroyed. What is 
interesting about the policy documents is that they distinguish between ‘the systems of 
feudal oppression and exploitation in religion’ and ‘religious beliefs among the people’. 
For example, Chang Chieh, Vice-chairman, the Chinese Islamic Association, stated in 
1962:
The party’s policy on freedom of religious belief is a thorough and overall policy. 
The overwhelming majority of religious professionals have gained a clear 
understanding of it as a result of the mass democratic reform of the religious 
systems, however, a small number of them still entertain doubts about this policy; 
they think that to abolish the systems of feudal oppression and exploitation in 
religion is to “abolish religious beliefs among the people.” We should help people 
who entertain this notion to study the Party’s policy on freedom of religious belief 
further, and explain to them that freedom of religious belief is totally different from 
the use of religion for carrying out feudal oppression and exploitation. Freedom of
However, Dillon (2001: 15) claims that 'the simplistic division of the Catholic Church in China into 
the official and the underground, the ‘patriots’ and the ‘faithful’, masks a complex and changing 
reality’. Both churches often cooperate at the local level. In addition, the view, which is often 
emphasized in the media, that Communist China’s relationship with the Vatican has deteriorated 
since the beginning of the Communist regime, begs a more careful examination of the transformation 
of the relationship, although the Vatican supports the underground churches, and officially 
announced in March 2000 the canonization of the 120 martyrs of China, who were put to death in the 
nineteenth century. The conflict between the two has eased to some extent, and now two-thirds of 
Catholic ‘patriotic’ priests are also recognized by the Vatican (I thank Fr Jeremy Clarke SJ for this 
information). Significantly, the Pope also made an historic apology to China, admitting that 
followers of the Church had been responsible for faults and errors in their past dealings with China. 
See, Guardian (25 October 2001; 6 April 2005). Nevertheless, non-religious factors, such as the 
Vatican's dealings with Taiwan, sometimes aggravate the relationship between Communist China 
and the Vatican. For example, the Chinese government expressed ‘strong dissatisfaction’ at Taiwan 
President Chen Shuibian’s invitation to the funeral of Pope John Paul II. See, People’s Daily (8 April 
2005).
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religious belief eoncems the question of ideological belief among the people, and 
the Party and government will not interfere with, but will protect, the religious 
belief of the masses of the people and all their legitimate religious activities. The 
use of religion for carrying out feudal oppression and exploitation is a violation of 
State law. Therefore, the use of religion for carrying out illegal activities and 
practicing feudal oppression and exploitation must be resolutely checked 
(translated by Maclnnis 1967: 123-24).
This distinction is important when examining the restriction of religious freedom, 
because it is often hard to distinguish between The systems of feudal oppression and 
exploitation in religion’ and the voluntary devotions and donations by people for 
religious purposes. There are no clear criteria when distinguishing the one from the 
other, and this provides the government with a window through which to judge selected 
religious activity as the acts of counter-revolutionaries.
The third factor that restricts freedom of religious belief is the fact that the 
government has the right to distinguish between ‘normal’ religion and ‘superstition’ 
(see Gladney 1994). According to Ren Jiyti, ‘religion is a longstanding, complicated 
matter, concerning millions of people of various nationalities’, whereas feudal 
superstition brings ‘a heavy burden to peasant family life but also, with very serious 
damage’, affects ‘agricultural production, pollutes the social atmosphere, and disturbs 
social order’ and also adversely affects ‘the sick, even endangering lives’( 1983: 400, 
388-89). Tapp (1995: 214) argues that ‘the arbitrary distinction between religion and 
superstition also opens the door to local abuses and high-handedness’. Because of a ban 
on superstition, the shamanism of the Miao has been illegal since the beginning of the 
Communist period (Tapp 1995: 214). Article 99 of the Criminal Law of China sets a 
minimum punishment of five years’ imprisonment for those who ‘organize or make use 
of feudal superstitious sects, secret societies or heretical organizations, to conduct anti­
revolutionary activity (£{=LtR > M fflM$ t I ' d  i ä 'if Ötl * 5 fX
(Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1994: 925).
One reason for the distinguishing of superstition from religion by the state is that 
the latter needs to maintain a religious registration system in order to control it. 
Historically, religions have posed a threat to the Chinese state. There are numerous 
examples in which religious groups have turned out to be the main protagonists in 
revolts. For example, Hong Xiuquan who claimed to be the son of Jesus, led
the Taiping Rebellion from 1850 to 1864. The CCP believes it needs to control all 
religions and prevent any potential for dissidence.
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According to Gong (1983: 390), one of the main reasons that superstitious activity 
has rebounded is that ‘peasants lack possession of scientific cultural knowledge and are 
ignorant and backward’. In fact, not only is superstition dealt with as something to do 
with being ‘not-awakened’ (meiyou jHexing and ‘without culture’ (meiyou
wenhua '/ic W jtfb ) in the discourse; so, too, is religion in general. Some of the scholars 
and government officials I interviewed revealed that they thought people who believed 
in religion were usually backward, and were wasting their time in temples and churches; 
they argued that those who were religious were not as economically efficient as others, 
and that religion in this sense could be seen as a cause of poverty.
Lam (2004: 7) states that ‘the Chinese government formulated the policy of 
freedom of religious belief not to protect the religious freedom of its citizens, but out of 
expediency to achieve the goal of its political struggle’. Put differently, the freedom of 
religious belief is a practical consideration, and only a transitional policy until religion 
dies out.
Lam’s statement, in turn, leads to discussion of the relationship between religion 
and civilization. The civilizational ideology that endorses the centre-ethnic community 
relationship hinges on the perception that ethnic communities are culturally and 
economically backward. ‘Cultural backwardness’ is attributed to the fact that many of 
ethnic communities are religious. A textbook on religion states that ‘the goal of our 
Party during the present period of struggle is to build a modernized, high-level, civilized, 
democratic, and socialist nation’, and ‘it is contrary to the highest ideals of Marxism 
and our present struggle for a Party member to believe in religion’ (Maclnnis 1989: 81). 
Being religious amounts to being culturally backward. Here it is clear that the discourse 
of the centre espouses the view that the centre’s civilization needs to be spread to ethnic 
communities who are still backward and religious, and demonstrates that the concepts 
of civilization and religion have been regarded as contradictory in the Communist 
period.
Conclusions
The centre-ethnic community relationship has transformed significantly from the Qing 
period to the twenty-first century. The transformation of the relationship demonstrates 
changes in the understanding of who the centre of civilization is, and what the concept 
of civilization means in China. The locus of civilization migrated from the Han and 
Manchu, who were said to have a high standard of culture and ritual, to Western
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countries, and then back to the Han, who claim to have experienced class struggle and 
modernization in the early stages of the Communist period. Most importantly, however, 
even though these changes took place, the idea that ethnic communities are able to 
change their status from uncivilized to civilized by achieving greater proximity to the 
centre and therefore the prevailing civilizational ideology, did not change. In other 
words, the idea that the ethnic communities, who were recognized as civilizees, could 
change by education (jiaohua) was a consistent belief determining China’s centre-ethnic 
community relationship.
Modernization policy and religious policy also underwent great transformation. 
With regard to modernization policy, what was seen in the discourse before the 
Communist period was not xiandaihua (modernization) but xihua (westernization). This 
fact demonstrates the strong influence of the West on China. Particularly, from the late 
nineteenth century to the Republican period, it is no exaggeration to say that the term 
‘westernization’ {xihua) was used in the same sense as ‘acquiring civilization’. In the 
Communist period, the term xiandaihua was bom. This was not the same as xihua, 
because the imperialist and capitalist countries of the West were seen as an enemy until 
the inception of Deng Xiaoping's Open Door Policy of 1978. The centre’s view was 
that the Han, who were the centre of civilization, were ‘modernized’ to a much greater 
extent than minority nationalities and had a responsibility to help the latter modernize. 
This means that the concept of modernization was understood as having the same 
directional sense as civilization. This understanding has continued since the 
implementation of the Open Door Policy. Nevertheless, the question of how 
modernization differs from westernization in practice remains unanswered. In short, the 
concept of civilization and the concept of modernization/westemization have mutually 
complemented each other since the end of the Qing period.
In contrast, the transformation of religious policy over time has been more 
complicated. In the Qing period, religion in peripheral areas was accorded respect to 
some degree, but the Confucian civilizational ideology of the centre was defined as 
being superior to peripheral religion. Put differently, civilization of this period was 
flexible enough to include different religions as its subordinates, rather than to expel 
them. In the Republican period, there was no clear central religious policy on peripheral 
areas. Peripheral religion was dealt with at the local level in practice. However, the anti- 
religious campaign mentioned above demonstrates the atheist and anti-Christian 
features of the centre's religious views. Civilization was a Western-centred concept 
during this period, and the centre strongly opposed the religious aspect of Western
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civilization. It is at this point in history that the relationship between the concepts of 
civilization and religion undergo a strange contortion. The atheist position persisted in 
the Communist period, based on Marxism. Religion among ethnic communities was 
respected but only until religion ceased some time in the future. Here, the concept of 
civilization, which was backed by modernization, and the concept of religion, are 
diametrically opposite. Explicitly, civilization and modernization are advanced, while 
religion is backward.
To what extent have Western influences affected this transformation of Chinese 
perception of civilization? The anti-religious campaign was clearly a counter-reaction to 
Western civilizational ideology backed by Christianity. However, religious policy in the 
Communist period derived from a compromise between the atheist ideal, based on 
Marxism, and the domestic necessity to stabilize the centre-ethnic community 
relationship. Except for the fact that Marxism is a product of the West, Western 
civilizational ideology did not have a significant impact on religious policy in the 
Communist period.
In conclusion, the way in which the Chinese centre understood Western 
civilization is essential to gaining a broader understanding of the transformation of the 
Chinese civilizational ideology. As discussed above, Western influences had a 
significant impact on the Chinese interpretation of civilization and religion. However, 
over time, the Chinese understanding of Western civilizational ideology has also 
undergone significant transformation. Just what constitutes Western civilizational 
ideology in Chinese eyes is a very important and difficult question to answer, but there 
is no doubt that modernization and Christianity were fundamental factors in Chinese 
definitions of Western civilizational ideology. However, in the latter half of the 
Republican period, as Chinese nationalism burgeoned, Western civilizational ideology 
was understood as something two-horned: as westernization or modernization, which 
referred to something material, and as religion. The centre in China focused on the 
former, and embraced Western civilization while downplaying its religious aspects. 
This way of understanding Western civilization started in the Republican period, and 
reached its pinnacle in the Communist period, with a boost from Marxism.
This Chinese understanding of Western civilization is very important to following 
the thread of subsequent chapters, which analyze the impact of Christian missionaries 
and international Christian NGOs on ethnic communities. The majority of international 
religious agencies conducting their activities in China have their own version of 
‘civilization’ based on Christianity. When they intervene in China’s ethnic communities,
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how do local ethnic communities respond to their version of ‘civilization’? We will 
examine these questions in the following chapters.
CHAPTER THREE
EVANGELISM AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: 
CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES IN THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY
TWENTIETH CENTURIES
This chapter provides an historical account of Christian missionaries working in China 
during the period from the 1840s to the 1920s. This period witnessed great 
transformation and turmoil in China, reflected in the Chinese phrase, 'domestic strife, 
foreign aggression’ (neiyou w'ai huanft\\)C^hÜ)- Western imperialist aggression forced 
China to enter into an unequal treaty system in the aftermath of the First Opium War 
between China and Britain (1839-42), beginning with the Treaty of Nanjing 
in 1842. In the domestic realm, there occurred a number of rebellions, such as the 
Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Christian missionaries 
entered China during this period of turmoil and attempted to promote their values 
among the Chinese people in the country’s cities, in the inland and at the periphery.1
The literature on China’s Christian missionaries debates the theme of 'cultural 
imperialism’. Some scholars argue that missionaries amounted to nothing more than 
‘cultural imperialists’ because of the relationship they had with their imperial Western 
governments (Schoppa 2000). Other scholars argue that the sources of conflict in which 
missionaries featured were often local, and were not necessarily related to Western 
imperialism (Sweeten 2001). For the purpose of this thesis, which is to gain a more 
nuanced and deeper understanding of the ‘civilizing mission’, this chapter firstly draws 
on this debate by exploring the extent to which the unequal treaty system affected the 
interaction between missionaries and local communities in China. The unequal treaty 
system shaped inter-state relations between China and the Western states. Much
The presence of Christian missionaries in China dates back to the seventh century, when 
Nestorianism was introduced during the reign of Tai Tsung in the Tang Dynasty (Standaert 2001: 18- 
23; Latourette 1929: 53). Nestorianism takes its name from Nestorius (c. 382-451), Patriarch of 
Constantinople (appointed in 428), whom Rome and Constantinople condemned as a Christian 
heretic because of his belief Christ had distinct human and divine persons. The followers of 
Nestorius, known as Nestorians, established themselves in the Persian Empire, and spread their 
missionaries all over Central Asia, including the Tang capital Chang’an, today’s Xi’an (Standaert 
2001: 1). Roman Catholic missions to China began in the thirteenth century (Standaert 2001: 71-78). 
A very well-known Jesuit missionary, Matteo Ricci, contributed not only to an increase in the 
number of Christian converts in China but also to the introduction of the knowledge of Western 
mathematics and astronomy, and world geography to China (Standaert 2001: 309-13; Spence 1984: 
142-49). According to Standaert (2001), the Chinese Christian population swelled from less than 
1,000 in 1600 to 217,000 by 1815. With regard to the contribution of the Christian missionaries to 
the introduction of knowledge of Western science, including mathematics, geometry, trigonometric, 
and astronomy, see Needham’s seminal compilation of research on science and civilization in China 
(Needham 1971).
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literature dealing with Christian missionaries in China emphasizes this close association 
with their own imperial Western governments, and therefore assumes that the China- 
Western state inter-state relationship significantly affected the interaction between 
individual missionaries and China’s local communities (Cuthbertson 1987; Pyenson 
1985: 312-16; Nan 1971: 56-57). In order to properly understand the interaction 
between the Christian missionaries and the ethnic communities, it is important to 
investigate how the privileges arising from the unequal treaty system actually affected 
local interaction.
Second, this chapter highlights the complex nature of the Christian missionaries’ 
perception of civilization. Such perception had various layers relating to Christianity 
and Western civilization. It is important to unpack these ideologies because the way in 
which they became intertwined in practice affords us an important insight into the 
nature of the ‘civilizing mission’.
Third, this chapter investigates how a particular Christian missionary interacted 
with certain ethnic communities living on China’s periphery, using the three frames of 
interaction. It highlights the fact that the features of the interaction between the 
missionary and the ethnic communities do not wholly fit within any single one of the 
three frames; in fact, depending on which of the multiple communities within the 
village one focuses on, the features of the interaction between the missionary and the 
particular community reflect one or another of all three frames of interaction.
There are two reasons for focusing in this chapter on British Protestant 
missionaries. The first is that the British Protestant missions formed a large percentage 
of Protestant missions overall in the period in question.2 American missions also made 
up a substantial portion. However, Britain’s influence on China during this period was 
more significant than that of the United States. It forms the backdrop to the local site 
investigation. The second reason for focusing on Protestant missionaries, as opposed to 
Catholic missionaries, derives from my attempt to ensure historical consistency.3 Part 
Two of this thesis deals with three case-studies: the Jian Hua Foundation and The 
Salvation Army are Protestant entities, or at least are closely related to Protestantism,
2 In 1874, according to Latourette (1929: 406), 48 per cent of Protestant missions were American, and
44.5 per cent were British. Only 7.5 per cent were German. In 1889, 56.5 per cent were British, and
39.5 per cent were American. Only 4 per cent came from the Continent of Europe.
The literature is very much divided into research on French Catholics and research on British 
Protestants. There exists scant literature comparing the two. As noted by Lutz (1996: 99), this is 
‘partly because of difference in the locales of resource materials and differences in the native 
languages of the missionaries and their writings'. As a consequence, there is little sense of proportion 
and balance in analysis that aims to generate a broader understanding of missionary ideology.
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and the other, Oxfam, has Protestant (specifically Quaker) origins. In addition, The 
Salvation Army and Oxfam have their international headquarters in Britain.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section briefly provides an 
historical background to Christian missionary' operations in China. In the main, it aims 
to explain how the unequal treaty system supported missionary activity from the mid­
nineteenth century to the end of the treaty system in 1943. The second section examines 
the complex nature of the ideologies that the British missionaries sought to promote in 
China. The third section of this chapter uses a case-study approach to focus on the work 
of British Protestant missionary Samuel Pollard in Stone Gateway (Shimenkan 
in Western Guizhou.
This chapter argues that the assumption that Christian missionaries proselytized 
China’s local communities on the basis of strong ties to Western imperial governments 
and on the strength of their own religious ideologies is ‘distortingly simplistic’ 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 8). This simplistic assumption firstly ignores the quite 
limited extent to which the inter-state relationship affected the interaction between 
individual missionaries and local communities. This chapter identifies an interesting 
shift in missionaries’ perception of what values should be promoted in their activity, 
away from solely promoting Christianity and towards promoting ‘Western civilization’, 
with particular emphasis on advanced technology, mixed with Christianity.
This chapter also argues that the interaction that occurred in the three 
communities in the case study village reflects the features of one or other of all three of 
the frames of interaction. The three communities in question are those of the Han, the 
Nosu and the Hua Miao. The interaction between Pollard and the Han and Nosu 
communities, who were higher in the social hierarchy of the village in which he worked, 
reflected the features of the conflict frame, while his interaction with the Hua Miao 
community, in its position at the bottom of the hierarchy, initially reflected the features 
of the adaptation frame, and later evolved to reflect those of the middle ground frame. 
In demonstrating this, this chapter introduces the concept of ‘preferred’ and 
‘downplayed’ community.
Missionaries in the Unequal Treaty System from 1842 to 1943
This section briefly outlines the unequal treaty system and identifies how the system 
directly related to the activities of the Christian missionaries. The 1842 Treaty of 
Nanjing was the first in a series of unequal treaties negotiated by Britain and the Qing
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Dynasty.4 No provision in this treaty related particularly to Christian missionaries. 
However, because missionaries were foreigners, they naturally benefited from some of 
the treaty clauses (Cohen 1978: 550). For example, the opening of the five port cities 
(Canton, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai) to residence by British subjects and 
their families obviously enabled the British missionaries to reside there as well.5
The 1844 Treaty of Huangpu negotiated by France and the Qing
Dynasty (Morse 1910: 331), contained a number of important additions that affected the 
Christian missionaries, including the right to hire sites for the construction of hospitals, 
churches and cemeteries in the five treaty ports (Article 17) and the principle of 
extraterritoriality (Article 21). The latter Article, in particular, had a significant impact 
on missionary activity in the interior: ‘Missionary work in the interior, while still illegal, 
was rendered less dangerous by the stipulation that, if foreigners were found away from 
the treaty ports, they were simply to be conducted to the nearest consul1 (Cohen 1978: 
550). Importantly, Western imperial countries were able to obtain one-sided most­
favoured-nation (MFN) status under terms agreed in the treaty. This meant that if 
France gained some benefit, the same benefit was automatically gained by all other 
MFN participants under the terms of the treaty in question.
In the aftermath of the Arrow War in 1856 (also called the second Opium War), 
the Western powers and the Qing Dynasty negotiated the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin 
^ ^ J ) .6 Article 13 of the Treaty guaranteed that French missionaries could ‘travel 
anywhere inside China ... with valid passports, and within thirty miles of treaty ports 
without passports’ (Spence 1990: 180; Cohen 1978: 553). This clause afforded 
significant advantage to missionaries intending to conduct their activity in the Chinese 
interior, including the British missionaries because of the MFN status they enjoyed.
The unequal treaty system remained in effect until 1943, and there is no doubt that 
it provided Christian missionaries with significant opportunity to preach in the Chinese 
interior, something they took advantage of until the early 1950s. This does not 
necessarily suggest, however, that the missionaries were able to proselytize without
1 For the text of all articles in the treaties, see Wang (1957: 30-32).
Before the treaty system, the Qing Dynasty, which had its own civilizational ideology, was 
threatened by the existence of Christian missionaries, and therefore it banned Christian missionaries 
from entering the country freely and preaching Christianity to its people. However, the treaty system 
ensured the legal status of Christian missionaries in China, and led to significant growth in the 
number of missionaries. There were about 250 European Catholics priests by 1870, and the figure 
jumped to 886 by 1900 (Cohen 1978: 554). This period was a pioneering one for Protestants, and the 
increase in the number of Protestant missionaries (from 189 in 1860 to 3445 in 1905) was significant 
(Cohen 1978: 555).
Wang (1957: 104-112) has all articles of the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin.
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constraint and simply impose Christianity upon the ethnic communities living on 
China’s periphery. 1 will come back to the issue of the unequal treaty system, and 
discuss how it directly affected the local interaction between an individual missionary 
and several ethnic communities in the case-study section of this chapter. As a way of 
setting the scene, it is first important to investigate the kinds of civilizational ideology 
the Christian missionaries attempted to promote in China.
The Merging of Christianity into ‘Western Civilization’
In seeking to identify how the missionaries perceived what kind of values they should 
promote among China’s local communities, it is helpful to begin by reviewing the 
debate among missionaries that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The debate was about what kind of values and beliefs missionaries should 
attempt to promote in China. It began in the late nineteenth century, and it grew 
increasingly heated at the beginning of the twentieth century.
In the nineteenth century, the majority of the so-called evangelist Protestant 
missionaries in China conceptualized the term ‘civilization’ as referring exclusively to 
Western civilization, perceiving of it as something materialistic and separate from 
Christianity. In the view of the evangelists, their objective was simply to preach the 
Gospel to the heathens in China who had never heard of it.7 Griffith John, a 
representative of the London Missionary Society, revealed this understanding of 
‘civilization’ in outlining the objective of his mission activity:
Wc are here, not to develop the resources of the country, not for the advancement 
of commerce, not for the mere promotion of civilization; but to do battle with the 
powers of darkness, to save men from sin, and conquer China for Christ (John 
1877: 11; cited in Cohen 1978: 555).
This perception of ‘civilization’ as something separate from the missionary objective of 
conquering China for Christ was also shared by the China Inland Mission (CIM), 
founded by Hudson Taylor in 1865.8 According to Latourette (1929: 386), ‘the main 
purpose of the Mission was ... to diffuse as quickly as possible a knowledge of the 
Gospel throughout the (Chinese) Empire’. The CIM was significant among the 
Protestant missions in China, and had eight hundred and twenty-five member 
missionaries and associates by 1905 (Pollock 1962: 9).
In the nineteenth century there was a sense of urgency about the Protestant missions. The end of the 
world was to come soon, so the missionaries had to spread the message of the Gospel as quickly as 
possible.
s There are numerous biographies of Hudson Taylor. See Pollock (1962).
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By way of contrast, a small number of missionaries working in nineteenth century 
China emphasized the importance of what amounted to secular activity. This included 
such things as education, medical work and disaster relief. This kind of activity was not 
unrelated to the religious ideologies of these missionaries, but it could be recognized as 
‘the introduction of every wholesome feature of Western civilization1 (Latourette 1929: 
387), understood as a combination of material civilization and Christianity. For 
example, Timothy Richard, a British missionary from the Baptist Missionary Society 
(BMS), conducted famine relief activity in Zhili (J=L;i£) in North China in the 1880s 
(Bohr 1972; Gamier 1945; Soothill 1924). Richard’s approach can best be described as 
first-generation mission work relevant to the understanding of Western civilization as a 
combination of the material aspects of civilization (education, medical work and 
disaster relief etc), and Christianity. According to Bohr (1972: 118):
Richard’s vision of the “Kingdom of God in China” amounted to a theologically 
infonned programme of modernization, which called for the reform of Chinese 
thought and institutions through the adoption of the salient elements of Western 
civilization: science, technology and Christianity.
Importantly, one can recognize that from Richard’s 1880s perspective Christianity and 
the concept of Western civilization were already merging.
At the time, however, the merging of Christianity into the concept of Western 
civilization was not yet recognized as a legitimate way to approach mission activity, and 
the merged understanding proved much less popular than the evangelism practised by 
the Western church community. At China’s Protestant Conferences in 1877 and 1890, 
for example, differences in the approaches of Hudson Taylor and Timothy Richard led 
the former to strongly criticize the latter’s thinking ‘as unorthodox and a betrayal of the 
principles of Christianity’ (Rabe 1978: 177-78; Soothill 1924: 118). Furthermore, 
Richard’s home board, the BMS, withdrew from him its support (Whyte 1988: 136).
Although many church communities in the West criticized Richard’s approach to 
mission work, the twentieth century witnessed a rise in the popularity of his approach, 
understood as the preaching of the so-called Social Gospel. In the early twentieth 
century, the nature of British Protestant missions underwent a great transformation 
away from fundamentalism towards liberalism. The debate between fundamentalists and 
liberalists within Christian churches in the US and Britain grew increasingly 
significant,4 and divided many of them along fundamentalist and liberalist lines. 10
The majority of literature uses the term ‘fundamentalist,’ as opposed to ‘liberal’. ‘Liberalism’ and 
‘modernism’ have theologieally different meanings but they are often used interehangeably in the
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According to Hutchison (1974: 111), the debate started partly as a result of the 
experiences of the missionaries in encountering different cultures in non-Western areas, 
but mainly as a result of the dawn of the ‘scientific era’, which had its genesis in the 
Enlightenment movement that began in eighteenth century Europe."
The liberalists characteristically considered profession less vital than 
performance, and considered either individual or social salvation largely a function of 
‘good news’ (Hutchison 1974: 111-12). Walter Rauschenbusch, a well-known liberal 
theologian, rethought the implications of the gospel. In his work Christianizing the 
Social Order (1912), he articulated the view that the social task of the church was to 
work to end human suffering by establishing social justice. The theology that placed 
emphasis on the social implications of the Gospel, and on the social tasks of the 
Christian churches, was called the Social Gospel.12 In other words, the Social Gospel 
attempted to relieve suffering by providing Christianity combined with Western 
civilization, rather than just Christianity by itself.
The Social Gospel approach was heavily criticized by the fundamentalists because 
it captured all the aspects o f ‘Western culture’, including, as fundamentalists perceived, 
‘drinking, materialism, and vice, as Americans practised them at home’ (Hutchison 
1974: 120). The fundamentalist objection to liberalism was not ‘is it effective?’ but ‘is it 
Christianity?’ Just as common in the fundamentalist argument was a determination to 
separate Christianity from ‘Western civilization’. W. H. Griffith Thomas, for example, 
wrote that ‘our sound missionaries have gone to China to proclaim the everlasting 
Gospel ... and not to vindicate any civilization. There is much in Western civilization 
which, because it is not Christian, is not worth vindication’ (1921: 670-71). Rabe (1978: 
177-78) also argues that as far as the fundamentalists were concerned, the desirable path 
was ‘to emphasize the distinction between secular and spiritual kingdoms and to restrict
sociological and historical literature. A similar movement went on within Catholicism, but the papal 
encyclical Pascendi Gregis served to halt the progress of the Catholic modernists (Whyte 1988: 136).
1(1 The majority of literature uses the term ‘fundamentalist,’ as opposed to ‘liberal’. ‘Liberalism’ and 
‘modernism’ have theologically different meanings but they are often used interchangeably in the 
sociological and historical literature. A similar movement went on within Catholicism, but the papal 
encyclical Pascendi Gregis served to halt the progress of the Catholic modernists (Whyte 1988: 136).
" Within the theological literature there are numerous studies on the development of modernism. See, 
Sawyer (2003) Also, for material on the relationship between Christian missions and the 
Enlightenment, see Stanley (2001) and Bosch (1991). In Stanley’s edited book (2001), Stanley 
(2001), Erlank (2001) and Maxwell (2001) explore the relationship between civilization and 
Christianity in the context of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
12 The Social Gospel appeared in the context of the emerging urbanization of eighteenth century Britain 
and nineteenth century America. The industrial revolution thrust the problems of urban society upon 
nations that had until then been primarily rural, and brought about poverty, injustice and oppression. 
Liberal Protestants attempted to apply biblical principles to these problems (Cui 1998: 8; Sawyer 
1998: 10).
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mission work to the simple proclamation of Christ’s gospel for mankind’. The attempt 
by the fundamentalists to restrict mission work to that embedded merely in Christianity 
contradicts the conventional view, which holds that fundamentalists sought to spread 
Western culture to a greater degree than did liberalists. Liberalists, in fact, sought to 
transform the whole of society on the basis of their Western civilizational ideologies, 
which represented so much more than merely religious ideology.
The combination of Christianity and Western civilization in liberal mission 
activity was understood by the fundamentalists as being problematic, yet an increasing 
number of liberal Christian missionaries actually mixed Christianity and Western 
civilizational ideology into their mission activity. The idea of the Social Gospel was 
spread widely not only among British and American missionaries, but also among 
Chinese Christians.13 David Yui, the General Secretary o f the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) in China, also supported the idea of the Social Gospel:
In anticipating the types of Chinese Christian leadership needed in the near future, 
we need to lay more emphasis on the development of Christian social leadership.
This type of leadership, if properly directed, will produce very great results. We do 
not want to limit Christian life only to attendance at church and prayer meetings.
We want it to touch on all respects the community life. Until it succeeds in doing 
this, it will not reach its full power in the lives of men. This at once shows us the 
necessity of developing a social type of Christian leadership (quoted in Kepler 
[1920] 1965: 17).
Appreciation of the Social Gospel idea resulted in a change in the nature of 
missionary activity in China in the early twentieth century, from evangelism to social 
and development work. According to Latourette, ‘by 1911, less than half the total 
missionary staff was engaged in direct fundamentalists work, and the proportion would 
have been still smaller had not the great majority of the members of the China Inland 
Mission ... been in that type of activity’ (1929: 619). In particular, the Social Gospel 
had a significant impact on education, through which the missionaries ‘could educate 
the Christian community’, and most effectively ‘make a Christian impression on the 
country' (Latourette 1929: 625). The number of pupils in mission schools increased 
significantly over time: in 1877, 5,917 pupils were in mission schools; in 1889, 16,836; 
in 1911, 102,533; and in 1915, 169,707 pupils (Latourette 1929: 623). In addition to 
their work in education, the liberal Christian missionaries were involved also in medical 
work, in relief, and in social reform.
13 For instance, A. R. Kepler ([1920] 1965), an American Presbyterian missionary in China, expressed 
support for the Social Gospel.
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It is obvious that this more sophisticated kind of work required more specialized 
knowledge and skills. Although the ethos of Christianity was important to the objectives 
of the Christian missions, in reality, skilled people without a theological background 
were also employed to conduct ‘mission activity’. Christian missions became more of 
professional organizations, and a higher degree of institutionalization was necessary. 
The institutionalization of educational and medical work began in the 1880s and 
continued into the twentieth century, by which time these practitioners had become ‘in 
increasing number no longer just Christian missionaries but missionary specialists’ 
(Hyatt 1966: 115).14
One can argue that this educational and medical work amounted to the 
secularization of the missions. The evangelical missionaries, who devoted themselves 
simply to preaching the message of the Gospel, languished among accusations of being 
old-fashioned. Latourette clearly demarcates the three-dimensional aspects of this new 
type of mission activity:
There was the possibility that Protestant Christianity would be swamped by 
institutions, that the energies o f  m issionaries and Chinese Christians would be 
absorbed in the machinery o f  organization, and that the Church would forget that 
its primary function was to serve as a vehicle for a religious and spiritual 
m essage.... This tendency was reenforced [sic] by the fact that institutions more 
and more demanded specialists — teachers, nurses, and physicians -  whose 
professional training had crowded out careful preparation in theology, philosophy, 
the Bible, and kindred subjects. Protestantism was threatened with secularisation 
(1929: 618).
The trinity of institutionalization, professionalization and secularization that began in 
the 1920s actually remains relevant to the work of Christian NGOs working in China 
today.
In summary, the Protestant missionaries’ understanding of their own ideology 
transformed over time. The ideology of the fundamentalists, the majority of nineteenth 
century British missionaries, was a direct evangelical Christian one In contrast, that of 
the liberalists added Western civilization, underpinned by modernization, to its direct 
evangelical Christian ideology. Somewhat paradoxically, the fundamentalist Christians
14 Anecdotally, the Social Gospel opened up opportunities for an increasing number of Chinese to 
participate in mission activity. This can be seen in the increasing involvement o f Chinese Christians 
in the Social Gospel movement, represented by the YMCAs and the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA), and the Student Relief Committees associated with them. The Social Gospel 
led to a greater indigenization of Christianity than occurred by purely evangelical mission activity. In 
fact, many church leaders in Communist China emerged from the Social Gospel movement (Hunter 
and Chan 1993: 125). For example. Bishop K. H. Ting, a founder of the Amity Foundation, was 
working on one of the Student Relief Committees. This point is very important to an understanding 
of the continuation of Christian activity throughout the twentieth century, even after the significant 
breakdown o f religious activity at the beginning o f the Communist period.
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of that time attempted to limit the scope of civilizational ideology, whereas the liberal 
counterparts attempted to enlarge it by including Western civilization in their work.
What the fundamentalists and liberalists had in common was a belief that their 
respective values and beliefs that they attempted to spread (either based on Christianity 
or a mixture of Christianity and Western civilization) were superior to any values and 
beliefs they encountered in local communities in China, and that their ideologies could 
bring about a better world in those communities. The next section concentrates on one 
village in China's southwest province of Guizhou, where the British Protestant 
missionary, Samuel Pollard, worked in the early twentieth century. It explores the 
civilizational ideology he believed would bring about a better world. It also explores his 
interaction with the ethnic communities of the village.
Samuel Pollard and China’s Ethnic Communities
Pollard is a missionary well known for his mass conversion to Christianity of the Hua 
Miao community in a village surrounding the place called ‘Stone Gateway’ (See Map 
3.1 and Photograph 3.1). According to Hudspeth (1922: 702-05), he converted about 
seventy thousand Hua Miao to Christianity, and baptized fifteen thousand between 1904 
and 1915.
Why examine a single case involving a significant number of apparently peaceful 
converts instead of looking at conflicts arising from the well-known ‘missionary cases' 
(jia o ’an in which local people killed several missionaries?15 Pollard’s case was
not the peaceful conversion one might assume. The interaction between Pollard and 
each of the ethnic communities in the Stone Gateway area offers a range of interesting 
features that fit into one or other of the three frames of interaction. A specific focus on 
this particular one helps us to better understand the nuances in the interaction between 
missionaries and ethnic communities on China’s periphery. The case also has been 
researched by both anthropologists and historians, and therefore offers many useful
^ In the English literature, jiao 'an is translated as missionary cases (Sweeten 2001 and 1996); anti- 
Christian incidents (Daigle 2005); and sectarian cases (Litzinger 1983). The jiao 'an refers to the 
situation in which ‘conflict occurred as a result of actions between religious groups and local people, 
and invoked negotiations’ at the local or/and national levels ITI ifij 'J|^2
5C#k) (Chen 1991: 3). Usually local officers dealt with such incidents in the first instance. When 
they could not settle them, higher levels of government dealt with them (Chen 1991: 156). In fact, 
systematic and basic studies on missionary cases are underdeveloped. There remain questions 
including how many incidents the central government dealt with as court cases and how many 
incidents there existed in which conflict occurred that was settled without government intervention.
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M ap 3.1: The Stone Gateway
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studies to draw on. It further offers the opportunity to make historical comparisons with 
contemporary NGO activities: Stone Gateway is only twenty kilometres away from the 
village o f Zhaotong, the location o f The Salvation Army case study presented in 
Chapter Five.
Pollard's Missionary Work and the Shift in His Activity
Samuel Pollard was born in Camelford in England in 1864, and became a minister o f 
the Bible Christian Church, which made up the United Methodist Church, in 1907 
(Livingstone 2000: 70; Grist 1971; Kendall 1954). At the age o f twenty-two, he applied 
to become a missionary after reading a book on David Livingstone, a missionary who 
had preached the Gospel in Africa. This book inspired Pollard, and led him to seek work 
overseas (Hayes 1947: 10; Gooch and Rao 1939: 4). Pollard's motive to become a
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Photograph 3.1: Stone Gateway
Source: Grist (1971: 212).
Note: The original caption says, ‘How “Stone Gateway” 
(Shih-Men-K’an) Got Its Name’.
Photograph 3.2: The Miao and Samuel Pollard
Source: Grist (1971: 84).
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missionary, and the motive of his organization to send him to China, was simply to 
preach the Gospel. The vision he had seen of China’s uncounted millions waiting for 
Christ was inescapable (Hayes 1947: 12). Following on from the discussion above, 
Pollard was basically a fundamentalist missionary when he began his mission activity. 
It was not his intention in the initial stages to promote ‘Western civilization’.
Pollard started working in Zhaotong, northeast of Yunnan, in 1888 and stayed 
there until 1915, when he died of typhoid fever.16 His missionary work can be divided 
into rough two periods, one from 1884 to 1904, and the other from 1904 to 1915; his 
activity in the first of these two periods contrasted sharply with that in the second period. 
Initially, he relied on direct evangelization in city areas such as Zhaotong and Yunnan 
Fu (today’s provincial capital Kunming). Initially, he preached the Gospel in the busy 
parts of the city, punctuating his pronouncements with musical gongs. This method 
attracted the attention of onlookers, but not to the extent that they converted to 
Christianity on the spot. He also carried out some medical work and established mission 
schools, but did both on a minor scale only. From a simple numerical point of view, 
Pollard’s work was not successful insofar as he converted only fifteen people to 
Christianity in this earlier period of Pollard’s preaching, according to Hudspeth (1922: 
702-05).
By contrast, Pollard’s activity during the period 1904 to 1915, which is the main 
focus of the rest of this chapter, was characterized by indirect evangelisation in rural 
areas. The opportunity to change his mission strategy arose unexpectedly from a letter 
written by James Adam of the CIM, who worked in the city of Anshun in western 
Guizhou (See Map 3.1). In 1903, a group of four Hua Miao met Adam, and heard him 
speaking about Jesus.17 Their interest in what he had to say grew, and over time more 
and more Hua Miao travelled to Anshun to hear about Jesus. However, Adam realized 
that it took the Hua Miao nine days to reach Anshun, and knew that the village of the 
Hua Miao was closer to Zhaotong, where Pollard was preaching the Gospel. Adam
16 The province of Yunnan was chosen as a project site after consultation with the CIM (Hayes 1947: 
11). The CIM played a consultancy role in relation to projects by Protestant missions in China’s 
inland. Even though various denominations working in China’s inland had different origins and 
theoretical standpoints, they cooperated with each other, and their work merged into a similar kind of 
activity in practice. In other words, the denominational difference did not really matter in the local 
context, at least within the Protestant community (Hutchinson 1974: 110).
1 The Hua Miao fall under the category of the Miao nationality under the Communist regime. 
However, as Tapp (2001) argues, the category Miao was created in the process of the ethnic 
identification project of the Communists. According to him, Miao consisted of Hmong, A Hmao, 
Hmu, and Qho Xiong peoples. The Hmong is known in Chinese as Bai Miao (white Miao), Qing 
Miao (blue Miao), or Xiao Hua Miao (small flowery Miao). A Hmao is known in Chinese as Da Hua 
Miao (big flowery Miao). Pollard preached Da Hua Miao (Tapp 2001: 71).
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therefore wrote a letter to Pollard suggesting that Pollard begin to preach the Gospel in 
Zhaotong. The four Hua Miao people delivered the letter to Pollard and sought further 
information about Jesus. Pollard treated them very kindly. After they had talked to other 
villagers about their experience, many flocked in large numbers to Zhaotong to see and 
hear Pollard (Zhang 1992:47-49; Grist 1971: 179).
When the Hua Miao began to gather attentively around Pollard seeking more 
information about Jesus, Pollard preached the Gospel to them; in other words, he simply 
promoted Christianity rather than promoting it in combination with Western civilization. 
His initial motive for going to China, it will be recalled, was simply to convert people to 
Christianity. As outlined in the comparison between Hudson Taylor and Timothy 
Richard, the majority of Protestant missionaries in China in the 1900s still supported the 
idea of direct evangelization in a way that separated ‘Western civilization’ from 
Christianity. So did the Methodist Church, to which Pollard belonged.
However, as the interaction between Pollard and the ethnic communities evolved, 
Pollard began to undertake activity that could be understood as being more related to 
‘Western civilization’. It is important to note that Pollard, a so-called fundamentalist 
missionary, did not intend to actively promote Western civilization within the ethnic 
communities. An unintended consequence of his promoting Christianity was the 
simultaneous but inadvertent promoting o f ‘Western civilization’.
One example to illustrate how ‘Western civilization’ was promoted in practice is 
Pollard’s attempt to develop an education system (Shi 2000; Shen 1999: 25). According 
to Grist (1971: 277):
Pollard promptly recognised that preaching the Gospel is only one part of the 
manifold functions of a Missionary Society. Without a well-organized and efficient 
system of education, under enlightened Christian control, for those who arc to 
become ministers and teachers, the Great awakening in China may lose its 
Christian significance and dwindle to comparative nothingness.
As a consequence, Pollard established a curriculum that introduced subjects not 
previously taught, and mixed religious teaching with ‘ordinary (Western science) 
subjects’ (Grist 1971: 279). For boys, these included ‘arithmetic, geography, simple 
science; such as can be illustrated by the surroundings; Scripture, theology, elementary 
church history; how to teach, preach, and organize church work; mission methods’ 
(Grist 1971: 279-80). For girls, these included training in ‘school teaching, home work, 
cooking, washing, babies, sewing, Sunday-school teaching, elementary hygiene, etc.’ 
(Grist 1971: 284). Even though Pollard began his missionary career as a fundamentalist,
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he eventually began to promote Western civilization through the medium of his 
education system, as a result of his interaction with the ethnic communities.
The Impact on Ethnic Community Identity
The work that Pollard undertook, in which he promoted both Christianity and ‘Western 
civilization’, was perceived by the ethnic communities in the Stone Gateway area in a 
variety of ways. To understand why ethnic community perceptions varied, it is 
necessary to examine these ethnic communities.
The reader will recall that in Chapter One ‘community’ was described as a 
process of boundary making, affected by interaction with outsiders; this process 
constitutes community identity, with a shared understanding of the prevailing social 
hierarchy. Before Pollard’s encounter with the Hua Miao in the Stone Gateway area, the 
community was made up of three ethnic groups, the Hua Miao, the Nosu (today’s Yi) 
and the Han.* 1* Even though the Hua Miao and Nosu had different beliefs and different 
political and economic status, they lived in a community, and shared a common 
understanding of the prevailing social hierarchy within the community. Underneath the 
broader multi-ethnic community, which consisted of three ethnic groups, each 
individual ethnic group consisted of a single ethnic community, based on the following 
distinguishing differences.
The supremacy and wealth of the Han were most prominent. They ‘concentrated 
in walled cities, towns, marketplaces, and villages along the main transport routes' 
(Cheung 1995: 230). The Nosu, as the middle stratum, did not have as much power and 
wealth as the Han in the city areas, but they maintained their independence in the 
mountain areas.14 *They lived in castle strongholds high in the mountains inhibited by the 
Miao (Clarke 1911). The Hua Miao were at the bottom of the hierarchy, and many of 
them were the serfs of Nosu overlords. They were obliged to pay ‘rents, levies, corvee, 
and various other obligations’ (Cheung 1995: 229-30; Grist 1971: 159; Clarke 1911: 
123-24). Pollard wrote of the Hua Miao in his diary in November 1904 that 
‘economically, they were subjugated to a marginal livelihood; any accumulation of 
wealth could not escape the eyes of the rapacious overlords’ (quoted in Kendall 1954: 
83-84). Their children were sometimes seized by the overlord to work as household
ls They called themselves ‘Nosu’ (Clarke 1911: 113).
I 9 The Nosu maintained chieftainship (tumu I. [J, or tingmu H ) even though the Qing undertook the
policy of gaitu guilin (Concise History 1985: 128). The Nosu fought against the Manchurian
invasion in the eighteenth century. Consequently, they left the city area and moved into the
mountains in order to maintain their independence (Grist 1971: 158-60).
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slaves (Kendall 1954: 133), and sometimes treated as private property of the overlord in 
land transactions (Zhou et al. 1982: 336). Also, slaves were tortured by the Nosu 
landlord, and obliged to prostrate themselves in reverence before the overlord's family 
gods (Kendall 1954: 133). In short, there existed a clear hierarchy between the Nosu 
and the Hua Miao in the Stone Gateway area.
At the outset, Pollard meant to evangelize indiscriminately within the broader 
community, but in reality, his activity led to a mass conversion of the particular Hua 
Miao community to Christianity. At one level, this amounted to nothing more than the 
formerly animist Hua Miao adapting to Christianity as a result of Pollard’s teaching. At 
another level, however, the features reflected in the interaction between Pollard and the 
Hua Miao community went beyond those that simply fit the adaptation frame. A number 
of unintended consequences arose, reflecting in the Hua Miao community features that 
fit only the middle ground frame.
Two features vividly reflect the middle ground frame. Firstly, Pollard’s 
cooperation with the Hua Miao to produce a Bible in the Hua Miao script ied to the 
reshaping of the Hua Miao ethnic identity. Pollard created the Miao script using the 
mixture of Braille, shorthand, Hebrew and script developed from the Cree Indians in 
North America (Enwall 1994). His aim was to enable the Hua Miao people to read the 
Bible (Shi 2000: Diamond 1996).
However, learning to read had an enormous impact on the Hua Miao perception of 
their power relationship with the Han and the Nosu. The Hua Miao recognized quickly 
that ‘writing was linked to power as well as to special knowledge, and that it [had been] 
almost inaccessible to the Miao’ (Diamond 1996: 141), because writing was ‘testimony’ 
to the cultural superiority of the Han (Cheung 1995: 241). Therefore, the gaining of a 
written language had a significant impact on Hua Miao perception of their social status 
and place in the social hierarchy in relation to the other ethnic communities living in the 
Stone Gateway area, namely, the Han and the Nosu. It was an epoch-making paradigm 
shift for the Hua Miao. The impact on Hua Miao perception of their social and power 
relationships is reflected in Moseley’s argument as follows:
Christianity was very attractive to the animistic hill people ... for it made possible 
feelings of equality and self-respect which had been denied them by the arrogant 
plainsmen. These sentiments were reinforced by the loss of prestige, in the eyes of 
the hill peoples, of Chinese ... by comparison with the modern civilization of the 
West ... Christian influence among the uplanders of Yunnan and Kwangsi 
persisted into the Communist period (quoted in Swain 1995: 140).
96 CHAPTER THREE
The fact that Pollard created the ethnic script for the Miao made possible the 
development of various Miao communities, including those ethnic groups close to Hua 
Miao—specifically Bai Miao, Qing Miao and Hei Miao, who were formerly scattered 
over the region (Diamond 1996). It led to the creation of a new sense of identity in the 
broader Miao community located in the wider region of Southwest China; and it led to 
the strengthening of the specific Hua Miao community in the Stone Gateway area. 
Within the new broader Miao community and within the narrower community in the 
Stone Gateway area, the Miao language amounted to a lingua franca to be used by those 
who wanted to attend the local schools established by Pollard’s mission, including 
members of the Han and Nosu communities (Diamond 1996: 157).
Beyond the Stone Gateway, based on the hierarchical relationship of the Han, the 
Nosu and the Hua Miao, Hua Miao church leaders ‘who had the competence to acquire 
knowledge of the Bible, as well as physical and mental ability to preach’ had close 
contact with other church leaders in other villages. They frequently met to discuss 
matters concerning the wider Christian community beyond the village level (Cheung 
1995: 242). Put simply, by becoming literate, the Hua Miao community rose from the 
bottom of the hierarchy in the Stone Gateway community to become a Christian Hua 
Miao ethnic community with a stronger sense of identity. As Cheung (1996: 243) states, 
‘[t]he small, scattered, loosely-related villages became connected through the church 
network’. The reshaping of Hua Miao identity clearly reflects features of the ‘middle 
ground' frame, in the sense that this was something neither Pollard nor the Hua Miao 
community in the Stone Gateway area had expected would happen. A reshaping of Hua 
Miao identity occurred as a result of the interaction between Pollard and that 
community.
The second feature that reflects the middle ground frame is the literacy education 
provided to the Hua Miao. It was this literacy education that introduced the idea of the 
‘nation-state’ to the Miao. Pollard wrote ‘the Hua Miao Literacy Text’ so the Hua Miao 
could learn the script, and in it he wrote the following passages:
What is the Hua Miao? The Hua Miao is an old nationality of China.
What is China? China is an old state in the world.
Where was the Hua Miao from? The Hua Miao was from the Yellow River of
inland China (quoted in Shcn 1999: 42-43).
Shi (2000) and Zhang (1992: 148) claim that words such as ‘state’, ‘citizen’ and 
‘society’ did not exist in the original Hua Miao language, but that through church 
education, the Hua Miao acquired recognition and an understanding of such concepts.
CHAPTER THREE 97
This also led the Hua Miao to struggle for official recognition of their minority status in 
the Republic of China. Pollard in fact complained about the Republican national flag 
and its five coloured stripes representing the five recognized nationalities in China, 
because it did not include the Hua Miao (Hong 1999: 43; Zhang 1992: 149).20 When 
Pollard began his missionary activity in the area around Stone Gateway, it was likely 
that nobody would have imagined that he would undertake the task of nurturing the Hua 
Miao in their struggle for national recognition. In short, Pollard’s missionary work had 
a significant impact on Hua Miao ethnic identity. Thus, the interaction between Pollard 
and the Hua Miao clearly reflect features of the middle ground frame.
Missionary influence on the strengthening of ethnic communities is not unique to 
this village, or to a Chinese context. Some scholars (Shen 1999; Tapp 1989) argue that 
Christianity enabled traditional identity and modern state identity to reflect the features 
of the middle ground frame. For example, in his analysis of the White Hmong of 
Northern Thailand, Tapp (1989: 85) contends that:
Christianity offers to its minority converts an ideology which transcends the 
primary alternatives o f  assimilation to a Thai identity or the retention o f  a sense o f  
Hmong ethnic identity, and thus properly speaking represents a third, or resolving, 
alternative to the possibilities o f  the continuation o f  pantheistic Hmong shamanism  
or the adoption o f  the state religion o f  Thailand.
This is a very intriguing and contentious view because it implies that globalizing forces 
do not necessarily lead to a weakened sense of ethnic identity. This is one example of 
so-called ‘glocalization’ (Robertson 1995), the idea that globalizing forces are localized 
and therefore further facilitate local diversity.
At the same time, the fact that tensions were an apparent result of missionary 
influence in the Stone Gateway area should not be overlooked. The Nosu were not 
overly interested in Christianity because they enjoyed a higher degree of power and 
status than the Hua Miao in the community hierarchy. According to Hong, powerful 
ethnic groups such as the Nosu did not ‘like to accept foreign religions and considered 
them as heresy or paganism’ (1999: 22). The Han and Nosu were less receptive of the 
ideology Pollard sought to promote, and therefore Christianity did not spread to them.
The interaction between Pollard and the Han and Nosu communities not only led 
to the situation in which Christianity became unpopular among these communities, but
211 For more on the struggle for official recognition by the Hua Miao elite in the 1930s and 1940s. see 
Cheung (2004). The concept o f ‘state’, new to the Hua Miao language, grew to become significant in 
the minds of at least some of the Hua Miao. Just after the Republic of China was established in 1911, 
one o f the Hua Miao creators of the Pollard Script, Yang Yage ( f^ i f f f .  r 4 ) ,  changed his name to Yang 
Yaguo to celebrate the new state, guo (Shi 2000; Shen 1999: 43; Zhang 1992: 149).
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also to the Han and Nosu community members’ physical attack against Pollard and the 
Hua Miao. Pollard’s diary reveals that violence started from rumour-mongering on the 
part of the Nosu and the Han, who were located higher in the hierarchical system of the 
Stone Gateway community than the Hua Miao (Grist 1971: 188). These two 
communities circulated rumours accusing the Hua Miao of poisoning the streams. 
According to Grist (1971: 188-89), ‘[i]t was even said that they (the Hua Miao) were 
intending to rebel, and that Pollard was not only abetting their schemes but that he was 
going to lead the Hua Miao and the Nosu against the Chinese’. Arguably, the rumours 
started because the Nosu and the Han felt threatened by the strengthening of the Hua 
Miao identity. After all, the Hua Miao people had been the subordinates in the hierarchy, 
but the missionaries had educated and therefore empowered them in relation to those 
formerly higher in the hierarchy. As a consequence, the Nosu attempted to stop the Hua 
Miao from converting to Christianity (Grist 1971: 197). Again, Tapp (1989: 98) 
identifies a similar phenomenon in the case of Hmong in Thailand:
[T]hc adoption of Christianity has never lessened the social distance between the 
minorities and the majorities with whom they, in many cases, maintained difficult 
and troubled relations before the advent for Christianity. Rather, the adoption of 
Christianity has usually alienated the minorities from the states of which they were, 
perforce, a part.
Pollard therefore Threw himself wholeheartedly into the defence of the weak and 
downtrodden Hua Miao’ (Grist 1971: 197). In short, Pollard downplayed the Han and 
Nosu communities largely because he was striving to protect the newly converted 
Christian Hua Miao community from those communities. The Han and Nosu were 
attempting to hamper his efforts to convert the Hua Miao. That is to say, the reason 
Pollard downplayed the Han and Nosu communities was the pre-existing hierarchical 
relationship between the Hua Miao on the one hand and the Han and Nosu on the other. 
For this reason, this case study supports Sweeten’s (2001) claim (referred to at the 
beginning of this chapter) that it is necessary to investigate the pre-existing local origins 
of conflict in a village where a missionary has undertaken activity, rather than simply to 
assume the missionary’s ‘cultural imperialist’ activity to be the cause of any social 
disorder.
To conclude, what is important for the purpose of my thesis is that Pollard's case 
reveals three kinds of interaction between the missionary and the ethnic communities in 
the Stone Gateway area. Pollard did not set out to prefer the Hua Miao community, but 
as a result of trouble arising from the attempt by the Han and Nosu communities to 
prevent the Hua Miao from converting to Christianity, Pollard was on the side of Hua
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Miao. For the purpose of my thesis, I call the Hua Miao ‘preferred community’ in a 
sense that Pollard assisted this community, irrespective of whether such assistance was 
planed or not. The interaction between Pollard and the downplayed communities clearly 
reflected features of the conflict frame. In contrast, from the point of view of the Hua 
Miao conversion to Christianity, the interaction between Pollard and the preferred Hua 
Miao community reflected features of the adaptation frame. In relation to the 
strengthening of Hua Miao ethnic identity and their gaining the concept of ‘nation-state’, 
the interaction between Pollard and the Hua Miao community later evolved to the point 
where their interaction then reflected features of the middle ground frame.
Benefit from the Unequal Treaties?
Before reaching an overall conclusion, it is necessary to touch on the issue of the extent 
to which Pollard benefited from the unequal treaties concluded between China and 
Britain. First of all, the unequal treaties provided him with approval to travel anywhere 
inside China with a valid passport. Article 13 of the 1858 Tianjin Treaty guaranteed that 
French missionaries could ‘travel anywhere inside China ... with valid passports’. 
Britain’s MFN clause in the treaty also guaranteed Pollard’s authority to travel 
‘anywhere inside China’, and such authority to travel was a precondition fundamental to 
his undertaking activity in China’s peripheral areas. This treaty rendered his 
evangelizing activity legally possible.
Second, unequal treaties more directly provided missionaries with the right to be 
protected by British Consuls and Chinese local governments. As a matter of fact, in 
attempting to protect the Christian Hua Miao from the violence of the Nosu, Pollard 
ultimately sought the help of the British consul in Kunming and of Chinese local 
governments, who were subscribers to the unequal treaties with the Chinese central 
government. Grist describes the situation as follows:
[Pollard] availed himself of the Imperial edicts on behalf of toleration and liberty 
and obtained from the mandarins of Chaotong [Zhaotong] and Weining 
proclamations which commanded the authorities to protect Christians. The little, 
white-faced, frail missionary rose to the magnitude of his task, and with amazing 
celerity and splendid tact and courage, intervened wherever the Hua Miao were 
treated wrongfully because of their Christianity. In cases of especial malignity, or 
persistence in cruelty, he did not hesitate to report matters to the British Consul 
General at Yunnan Fu. It was soon recognized by the Chinese officials that Pollard 
could meet them on equal terms in insisting on Treaty rights and Imperial sanctions 
for the protection of the Christians. In dealing with [the] Tu-muh -  many of them 
fierce, ignorant men, entrenched in their strong fortresses among the hills -  he 
would enter into their houses and meet them face to face. In such interviews 
Pollard encountered lowering brows and menacing words with immovable calm,
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and when the first storm had spent itself he would bring into play his conciliatory 
spirit, humour, and quickness at repartee, and seek to win the persecutor to reason.
If these failed he would employ a sterner tone and beat down opposition by a 
display of the official support given him by the mandarins (1971: 197-98).
One can analyse Pollard’s reliance on the protection of the British Consul and on 
that of the Chinese officials in two ways. First, the unequal treaties proved highly 
advantageous in relation to his undertaking mission activity in the Stone Gateway area. 
The treaties provided him with the right to be protected which, in turn, was the ultimate 
reason why he could protect the Christian Hua Miao and himself. Thus, he assisted the 
Hua Miao to maintain their faith in Christianity in the face of their conflict with the 
Nosu. Pollard, as an individual missionary, resided in Stone Gateway and lived a life 
similar to that led by the locals. From the everyday life point of view, Pollard can be 
recognized as a member of the Stone Gateway community. However, once conflict 
occurred in the community, his status changed from being just ‘one of the people within 
the community’ to being an individual with the power of a Western imperial state 
behind him. From the perspective of Pollard and the Hua Miao, this was advantageous, 
given the ‘malignity or persistence in cruelty’ on the part of the Nosu (Grist 1971: 197). 
However, from the Nosu perspective, this change in status can be seen as the 
illegitimate intervention of a Western imperial government into the traditional social 
relations in Stone Gateway.
The second way to analyse Pollard’s reliance on the protection of the British 
Consul and that of Chinese officials is to regard the relationship between the unequal 
treaties and the Hua Miao mass conversion to Christianity as an indirect one. The fact 
that Pollard was able to take advantage of the unequal treaties, and the fact that the Hua 
Miao converted en masse to Christianity, are not in a direct causal relationship, 
although one might argue that Pollard may not have been there in the first place without 
the support of the treaty. The main reasons for Pollard’s ability to convert the Hua Miao 
en masse were, as explained earlier, his provision of education, the creation of a writing 
system for the Hua Miao language, and the fact that Christianity improved the social 
status of the Hua Miao, who were formerly confined to the lowest rank in the ethnic 
social hierarchy in this area.21 If the unequal treaties related at all to the mass conversion 
of the Hua Miao, they did so indirectly rather than directly.
In short, an examination of the interaction between Pollard and the ethnic 
communities in the Stone Gateway area reveals that one cannot fail to take into account
21 Tapp (1989) raises the Hua Miao search for millennialism as one of the reasons for their mass 
conversion.
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the broader influence of the unequal treaties. By the same token, the assumption that the 
unequal treaties facilitated the proselytizing of the villagers directly is arguably 
incorrect.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the fact that initially Christian missionaries working in China 
in the late nineteenth century perceived ‘Western civilization1 as being separate from 
Christianity. But they both began to merge as the twentieth century dawned. The 
attention on ‘Western civilization1 was gradually heightened, and by the 1920s the 
secularization of the Christian mission had begun. It also analyzed the interaction 
between Samuel Pollard and a number of ethnic communities living on China’s 
periphery' in the early twentieth century, and revealed that one particular frame of 
interaction—conflict, adaptation, or the middle ground—is not sufficient to capture all 
the features reflected in the diversity of such interaction.
This chapter introduced the ideas of ‘preferred community1 and ‘downplayed 
community’ in relation to the three frames of interaction. The village where Pollard 
undertook his mission contained a variety of multi-layered ethnic communities. These 
included the relatively broader Stone Gateway community, beneath and within which 
the Han, the Nosu and the Hua Miao communities existed in a hierarchical relationship. 
Indeed, the fact that a single village had plural communities is important for the purpose 
of comparing this historical case with today’s international NGOs. The Hua Miao 
community was the preferred community, and as a result of this status a majority of the 
Hua Miao eventually became Christians. The Han and Nosu communities were 
downplayed communities, among whom Christianity did not spread.
Only the middle ground frame can fully account for the deep engagement of a 
missionary and a community and the self-realization of the community. The interaction 
between Pollard and the Hua Miao community went beyond the latter's adapting to 
Christianity. In the process of interaction, their relationship developed, and something 
new occurred, which neither Pollard nor the Hua Miao had intended. Pollard’s deep 
engagement with the Hua Miao community has been demonstrated by the change in his 
activity, away from the mere promotion of Christianity towards the merging of 
Christianity and Western civilization, and beyond this to assisting the Hua Miao to gain 
national recognition. The strengthening of Hua Miao community identity was also 
highlighted.
102 CHAPTER THREE
Whether this change in Pollard's activity signifies substantive or instrumental 
identity change on the part of Pollard is an important question. To discuss the difference 
between substantive and instrumental identity changes requires investigating how 
Pollard perceived the change in his own activity. It is extremely difficult to do this 
because of limitations in the existing literature. Nevertheless, the fact that Pollard’s 
values that he attempted to promote shifted over time as a result o f his interaction with 
ethnic communities is a significant finding in this chapter.
This chapter has also argued that it is important to recognize the limited impact of 
the unequal treaty system on individual British missionaries. Unequal treaties between 
China and Britain affected the British missionaries favourably, and provided them with 
privileged status. However, the privileged status meant, at least to the individual 
missionaries, merely that they could claim the right to protection by local governments 
in the event that they faced serious threats to their lives. The treaty system, while 
conferring certain limited diplomatic privileges on the missionaries, did not explicitly 
confer a vicarious context for the proselytising of Chinese minorities. This chapter, thus, 
contends that the cultural imperialism argument is ‘distortingly simplistic’.
Now that an historical investigation of Christian missionaries has been completed, 
the following part of this thesis, which focuses on the present day, examines 
international NGOs. To what extent do their perceptions of the values that they attempt 
to spread differ from that of their historical counterparts, and if so, to what extent? How 
can we assess the interaction between international NGOs and ethnic communities by 
using the same three frames of interaction? Each of the chapters that follow will present 
a case study on the work of an international NGO today; Jian Hua Foundation (Chapter 
Four), The Salvation Army (Chapter Five) and Oxfam (Chapter Six).
PART TWO
CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZING MISSIONS’?
Part two of this thesis consists of three chapters, each of which examines a different 
case study NGO: the Jian Hua Foundation (hereafter JHF), The Salvation Army, and 
Oxfam Hong Kong. This section elaborates on the three broad themes that each chapter 
addresses, and provides an overview of the community development projects 
undertaken by each of the three case study NGOs.
Three Broad Themes
The three broad themes that each chapter addresses are the origins and nature o f values 
and beliefs, the reformulation o f identity in China, and interaction with ethnic 
communities. In relation to the first theme, each chapter undertakes an historically 
informed analysis of the values and beliefs of the three international NGOs. Although 
the case study NGOs (re)entered China after the inauguration of Deng Xiaoping’s Open 
Door Policy in 1978 (JHF in 1981, The Salvation in 1991, and Oxfam in 1987), the 
history of the NGOs within and outside mainland China will provide us with a rich 
contextual understanding of the activity of the NGOs today. Each chapter describes how 
and against what background each organization was established, and identifies the 
values and beliefs of each at the time of its establishment. The time and place of 
establishment differ significantly from organization to organization: The Salvation 
Army was established in London in 1865; Oxfam in Oxford in 1943; and JHF in Hong 
Kong in 1981. Therefore, an examination of the values and beliefs of each organization 
in its historical context will add depth to an understanding of the nature of values and 
beliefs espoused by these NGOs today. In keeping with this historical emphasis, I will 
also explore the values and beliefs of each NGO at the time of its entry or re-entry into 
mainland China.
This examination is followed by an analysis of the values and beliefs each 
organization attempts to spread today. Each chapter investigates the perceptions the 
overseas members have of the values and beliefs of their respective NGOs, without 
particular reference to China. International NGOs that operate within mainland China 
have members in other countries, and in Hong Kong. By investigating the origins and 
nature of values and beliefs espoused by the international NGOs, my intention is to
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explore the relevance of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ to the values and beliefs of 
the international NGOs today.
An examination of the values and beliefs espoused by these overseas members is 
also important preparation for an analysis of the second theme of Part Two, which is the 
reformulation of identity in China. In relation to the second theme (the reformulation o f 
identity in China), each chapter investigates whether, and if so to what extent, each 
organization reformulated its identity in the context of project work carried out in 
China. One of the risks faced by international religious NGOs when undertaking project 
activity in mainland China relates to the identity as evangelical Christian organization. 
To avoid unnecessary conflict with the Chinese government, the international Christian 
NGOs dare not overtly evangelize when they work in China. They minimize the risk of 
causing any such conflict by downplaying of their evangelical identity to enable them to 
better blend into the atheist communist system. The question is, to what extent did such 
adjusting actually lead to a substantial reformulation of identity? Do they reformulate 
their identity substantially, by dispensing with evangelism, or superficially, by adjusting 
the presentation of their activities? What, if any, are the religious aspects of their 
community development projects?
Similar questions may be asked in relation to the secular NGOs. The values and 
beliefs that Oxfam advocates, which constitute its identity, include the concept of the 
‘rights’ and ‘participation’ of people. Such values and beliefs are not necessarily 
compatible with the values and beliefs espoused by Chinese communism.
In order to investigate this second theme, each chapter specifically examines the 
personnel and financial arrangements of an NGO, and critically analyzes the design of 
its community development project. Examining these dimensions is helpful in observing 
a ‘substantial’ change in identity, as opposed to a ’superficial’ adjustment in the way the 
NGOs present its identity.
While the second theme addresses how projects are designed from the perspective 
of international NGOs, the third theme (interaction with ethnic communities) looks at 
how the projects are implemented and perceived from the perspective o f local ethnic 
community7 members. Each chapter analyzes the interaction between one NGO and the 
ethnic communities it engages with, and aims to understand local perspectives in 
relation to the case study community development projects. Each chapter focuses 
particularly on the question of how a project has been actually implemented on the
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ground, and on the question of how China’s ethnic communities have perceived and 
responded to the externally generated values, beliefs and activities.
Specifically, the third theme explores the following three points in each project. 
The first is how the international NGOs interpret the idea of ‘community’ in their 
‘community development’ projects, and whether they account for the ‘multiple 
communities’ that actually exist in villages. As will be discussed later, in designing a 
‘community development’ project, the homogeneity of ‘community’ is often assumed 
by development practitioners. The second point is how members of ethnic communities 
respond to the international NGOs. The interaction between NGOs and ethnic 
community members is interpreted by means of the three frames of interaction 
described in Chapter One. The following section briefly discusses the criteria used to 
select the case study community development projects undertaken by the international 
NGOs and comments on the locations of the projects.
Three Case Study Community Development Projects
The three case study community development projects 1 selected were conducted in 
villages with ethnic minority populations. This criterion was essential, not only because 
this thesis focuses on ethnic communities, but also because these communities often 
have their own pre-existing religions. Exploring the interaction between international 
Christian and secular NGOs, and ethnic communities that have their own religions, will 
enable this thesis to address the following questions: Does intervention by international 
religious agencies affect the religious beliefs of ethnic communities? How does the 
religious aspect (both that of the international NGOs and that of the community) affect 
the implementation of the project? The case study project sites are shown in Map 4.1.
As can be seen from the map, there are two project sites in Yunnan. The reason 
for this relates to my focus on ethnic communities. Officially, Yunnan Province is home 
to twenty-six minority groups. Approximately thirty-six percent of the population of the 
Province consists of ethnic minorities.' Many minorities reside in the mountainous and 
extremely poorer areas of Yunnan. More international NGOs are attracted to Yunnan to
I The percentage is calculated based on the population figure in 2001. See Yunnan Statistical 
Yearbook (2002: 668-71).
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Map 4.1: Locations of the Case Study Community Development Projects
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conduct their projects than to any other province, 2 partly because of the large number of 
people living in poverty and the fact that they reside in very inhospitable and 
mountainous areas. Another factor is Yunnan’s geographical proximity to Southeast 
Asia, and the fact that its ethnic minorities are similar to those residing in neighbouring 
countries, making it easier for international NGOs to expand their projects from 
Southeast Asia into Yunnan. 3 These two points naturally led to the selection of the two 
case studies in Yunnan Province. Selecting two case studies in Yunnan Province does 
not compromise my comparative approach because of the high degree of diversity 
among the many community development projects there and the many ethnic 
communities in the province.
A comparative analysis of the three NGOs across the three broad themes will be 
presented in the Conclusion. At this point I will also discuss the implications of the 
comparative analysis for our broader understanding of the nature of the Christian
It is almost impossible to obtain accurate statistics on which province or autonomous region has 
accommodated how many projects conducted by international NGOs. However, it is suggestive that 
the Directory o f  International NGOs (China Development Brief 2006), provided by China 
Development Brief, reveals that Yunnan has the most projects (forty-six projects).
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‘civilizing mission' in China. What follows is an examination of the first international 
Christian NGO: the Jian Hua Foundation.
Interview with a program officer for the Ford Foundation in Beijing, 03 September 2003.
CHAPTER FOUR
A CONFLICT BETWEEN CHRISTIAN EVANGELISM AND 
TIBETAN BUDDHISM: THE JIAN HUA FOUNDATION
Origins, Values and Beliefs
‘Jian Hua’ ( l t ^ )  means ‘build China1 in Mandarin. However, this secular-sounding 
foundation has quite a strong Christian evangelical connection. JHF’s head office has 
been located in Hong Kong since its establishment in September 1981. One might argue 
that JHF is no longer an international NGO in the strictest sense, because Hong Kong is 
now a part of China. Nevertheless, JHF can still be classified as an international NGO 
for two good reasons. First, Hong Kong was a British territory until 1997. Since China 
regained sovereignty over it in 1997, many have speculated that the society and politics 
of Hong Kong would become heavily influenced by the mainland’s political system. 
The extent to which Hong Kong is likely to maintain a degree of independence from 
China’s central government has been at the core of many political debates. Thus far, 
however, Hong Kong’s social and civil legal systems still operate with relative 
independence. Thus, neither JHF’s status in Hong Kong, nor its religious affiliation, has 
changed significantly since its establishment. The second reason is that mainland China 
recognizes JHF as a foreign institution. As Brady (2000: 944) explains, ‘from an 
administrative point of view “foreigners” includes Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan “compatriots” regardless of whether they are foreign nationals’. In 
fact, JHF registered itself with State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs 
(SAFEA) (Guojia Waiguo Zhuanjia Ju a Chinese government
agency overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1
JHF registered with the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA). This was an 
unusual step. Of the more than 200 development international NGOs engaged in activities in China, 
only thirty-nine are fully approved and registered with SAFEA (as of 2002) (Zhonghua Renmin 
Gonghe Guo Guojia Waiguo Zhuanjia Ju 2003). JHF’s registration was its own initiative; not as a 
result of government coercion. One of the reasons JHF registered with SAFEA is that this was the 
only available channel through which to gain some degree of legal recognition in mainland China at 
the time. As one of the earliest organizations to enter China, JHF sought the most propitious way to 
maintain a good relationship with the Chinese government. Its activity was in line with SAFEA’s 
objectives of introducing foreign experts to China, because initially JHF was a placement agency for 
Christian professionals, such as English teachers and medical doctors. Interview with a founder of 
the Jian Hua Foundation in Hong Kong, 13 December 2005.
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Approaching Influential Chinese
JHF was founded by a small group of Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong with an 
interest in supporting China’s development (JHF 2001: 1). The founding members were 
known to each other through various Christian networks outside mainland China.: Some 
of them knew each other through the Fellowship of Evangelical Students (Xuesheng 
Fuyin Yundong and some through Christian publishing companies.
They led several Hong Kong Protestant evangelical organizations.3
Even though JHF does not proclaim its evangelical nature, its founders and 
current associates have a strong belief in the role of evangelism in the conduct of its 
affairs. Agencies that fund JHF also share this belief. However, JHF is very cautious 
about the implications of its Christian identity in relation to the work it carries out in 
mainland China. JHF describes itself on its own webpage as follows:
JHF [sic] is a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) with a 
Christian ethos and background. However JHF does not get involved in political 
issues nor engage in religious activities unacceptable to China (JHF 2005).
JHF’s constitution does not refer to its religious nature, and therefore ‘it is a secular 
organization’, said one of the founders.4 Nevertheless, not only were its founders 
Christians who particularly emphasized the role of evangelism in Christianity, but since 
its establishment all board members and individual ‘associates’ of JHF (with the 
exception of a few local employees) have also been Christian. One of JHF’s founders 
pointed out during an interview that JHF importantly differentiates the organization 
from its individuals. He stated that while JHF ‘does not stop people from believing in 
Christianity, one’s Christian belief has to be purely private’.3 This is consistent with the 
Chinese constitution, which assures individual freedom of belief.
What is striking about JHF’s history is the fact that JHF was one of the earliest, if 
not the earliest, international NGO to enter mainland China: it entered in 1981, just two 
years after Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy was promulgated in 1979. JHF’s
: Written correspondence with International Director o f the Jian Hua Foundation, 1 December 2005.
For example, three of four founders have worked for the Fellowship of Evangelical Students since 
1963, in order to plan and implement a new gospel team for junior high school students in Hong 
Kong. Interview with one of the founders of the Jian Hua Foundation, 13 December 2005. One of the 
founders is the former CEO of the CEDAR Fund, a Christian NGO, and was also a standing 
committee member of the Chinese Coordination Centre of World Evangelism 
( |ll; Vr-^ A fii 'm 'J i  1 .® f$ ‘r rt ,>ll') (Chinese Coordination Centre of World Evangelism 2001). Another 
founder was a Chairman o f the China Bible Seminary ( ‘I1 ^f^'Tl^c)- and taught science and 
theology at several other seminaries. Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation, in Hong 




founders attempted to find a way to explore what they could do for mainland China as 
Christians living outside. Communist China has strictly controlled religious activity by 
foreign organizations, so JHF found it necessary to look for an alternative reason to 
enter China. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping set out his ‘Four Modernizations’, and JHF’s 
founders decided to make their own contribution to them.6
According to one of the founders, JHF did not have enough capital for developing 
the ‘hardware’ of China’s modernization. So instead, it aimed to contribute to the 
‘software’ aspect of development: things such as education, medical know-how, and 
agriculture. Assisting in the modernization of China dove-tailed neatly into another 
important JHF purpose: to make a ‘Christian impression' on Chinese government 
officials.7 In the minds of JHF’s founders, making Christianity a legitimate part of 
Chinese society and demonstrating to the Chinese that Christians could make a valuable 
contribution to the Four Modernizations was an urgent and important task.
To achieve this purpose, JHF needed to establish a close relationship with the 
Chinese government. As one of the first international NGOs to enter China after 1979, 
whatever impression JHF made on China would have a great effect on overall 
impressions of Christian organizations.8 The connection with Chinese government 
authorities was initiated on the basis of a personal relationship between one of the 
founders and a few top Chinese governmental officials.* 4 A booklet celebrating JHF’s 
twentieth anniversary (JHF 2001: 1) states that ‘already by [1981] JHF was making 
contacts in various provinces and being invited to send teams of doctors and teachers [to 
those provinces], JHF was already up and running, seeking ways to help “build China’” .
JHF was able to enter China on the strength of a formal connection to Huang 
Zhen (ItfH), then Chinese Minister for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries 
(Duiwai Wenwei Tj^b^C^). JHF and Huang Zhen ‘signed two agreements regarding 
scholarly exchanges and the building of the ICEC (International Cultural Exchange 
Centre) headquarters' (JHF 2001: 2):
The idea for the ICEC started when Deng Xiaoping wanted to develop people’s 
diplomacy. [Deng suggested that the] relationship should start with friendship 
between people; not so much [between] officials at the conference table. So Deng
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Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation in Flong Kong, 13 December 2005.
Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation, communication by telephone, 7 December 
2005.
s Written correspondence with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation, 5 May 2006.
4 Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation in Hong Kong, 17 December 2005.
CHAPTER FOUR
Xiaoping wanted the ICEC as a venue [for people’s diplomacy]. China came out of
the Cultural Revolution impoverished. Who would volunteer to contribute?10
This was the crucial moment at which JHF entered the picture. The purpose of the 
ICEC was to encourage cultural exchange between China and other countries. It was 
planned that the facilities in the ICEC building would ‘include a modem theatre that 
[could] be used for international conferences as well as for the performance of large- 
scale operas, ballets and concerts’ (JHF 1985: 27). The ICEC enjoyed the support of top 
party officials. Peng Chong ( s ^ l1), a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of 
National People’s Congress, was appointed the chairman of the ICEC Council, and one 
of its vice-chairmen was Hu Jintao, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Youth League of China and now President of China (JHF 1985: 11, 14).
JHF was a genuine pioneer Christian international NGO in mainland China. It was 
a challenge for both the Chinese government and JHF to find a way for foreign 
Christian organizations to work in China when JHF entered China in the 1980s. In mid- 
1982, JHF experienced a setback. In spite of its strong connection to the Chinese 
government, its activity was not without its detractors; a religious leader under the 
Communist government did not fully appreciate JHF’s position, and openly criticized it 
in mid-1982, arguing that it did not enter China under the auspices of the Three Self 
Patriotic Movement (TSPM), the Protestant organization authorized by the government. 
He did not refer to JHF by name, but it was clear from his statements that JHF was the 
target of his criticism because it was one of the very few organizations involved in 
China at that time. Such criticism actually affected JHF’s projects, particularly in 
relation to raising funds for the ICEC (JHF 2001: 2). However, the organization 
eventually overcame the setback through the support of authorities in the upper 
echelons of the Communist government.
A second shock came in 1989 after the violence at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. 
Immediately after this incident, all the banks, fearing a run on their funds, decided to 
withdraw or limit credit facilities. The ICEC was being built by funds in part 
contributed by JHF and in part by a loan from a bank. By recalling the loan to the ICEC, 
the bank put the ICEC on the verge of insolvency. ICEC had to sell the Cultural Centre 
project to the Beijing Foreign Trade and Economic Commission (Duiwai Maoyi Jingji 
Weiyuanhui C j v r  W ^). One of JHF's founders commented:
1 1 1
10 Written correspondence with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation, 5 May 2006.
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JHF lost everything, but the fact that even Deng Xiaoping recognized that JHF was 
doing good work was of fundamental importance. Originally, JHF was not too keen 
on building dance theatres and conference rooms. The building of the ICEC was of 
‘strategic importance’. It helped to provide a window into the contribution that 
Christian organizations could make to China’s modernization, a positive 
impression of Christian organizations, and gain political recognition."
In short, JHF’s strong relationship with the Chinese authorities enabled it to make 
inroads into a long-closed China, and underpinned the security of the organization. The 
extent to which this relationship was based on trust rather than control is an important 
but difficult question to address. Anne Marie Brady’s paper on foreigners in China 
provides some useful insights. After China’s opening up, the ways the Chinese 
government dealt with foreigners were:
...designed both to control and to utilize foreigners for China’s purposes, taking 
[their] cue from earlier aphorisms such as Mao’s call to “make the foreign serve 
China” and the late Qing catchphrase “Chinese knowledge as the essence. Western 
learning for practical use” (2000: 963).
At least at the beginning, the relationship between the Chinese government and JHF 
appeared to be more one of surveillance. However, the fact that JHF started working in 
China soon after the Open Door Policy and still managed to retain its evangelical 
nature, had significant implications for hundreds of international Christian NGOs that 
have worked in China to date.
Values and Beliefs outside Mainland China Today
The values and beliefs of JHF’s founders have been maintained since its establishment. 
It seeks to make a Christian contribution to ‘build China' in material as well as spiritual 
dimensions. Its Mission Statement, although it does not emphasize Christian evangelical 
values, implicitly suggests the two dimensions of material and spiritual help:
JHF’s purpose is to build China through cooperation in education, development, 
medical and social services, serving her peoples with compassion, integrity & 
expertise (JHF 2005a).
Although JHF is not permitted to directly evangelize Chinese people, it still seeks to 
make a ‘spiritual’ contribution through ‘compassion’. Compassion is a core value of the 
organization. Martin Klopper (2005b), the Chief Executive Officer of JHF, provides the 
following explanation:
Compassion is an undervalued “commodity” in the world today.... In our 
materialistic world, how is greatness to be measured? If not by economic means 
and technological advance, important as these arc, then by what measure? The
11 Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation in Hong Kong, 17 December 2005.
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human spirit constantly reaches out to that which is beyond self-interest, but so 
often miserably fails! Reflected in many of the great belief systems, we find the 
principle of “doing to others what we would have them do to us”. If this was the 
basis of all human interaction and the foundation of social contract, the world 
would be a better place.... One of the recurrent themes in famous paintings is the 
passion of Christ.... It appears that the defining moments of history cither derive 
from the barrel of a gun or from great acts of compassion. By far the more 
significant of these are those acts of compassion which defy our own interests....
[E]ven small acts of kindness arc history making. It is our desire in JHF through 
acts of compassion to be making a difference in China (Kloppcr 2005b).
It is evident from this reference to the paintings of the passion of Christ that his 
understanding of compassion is based on Christian beliefs. JHF’s values, or more 
correctly the values of those individuals who work for JHF, are evangelical rather than 
liberal and modernist. It is not just a question of showing compassion, but if possible, in 
a ‘law-abiding’ way in the Chinese context, to let people know about Jesus Christ.
The evangelical underpinning of JHF can be seen more clearly in relation to its 
partnerships with Christian evangelical organizations worldwide, including the 
Christian Reformed Church in North America, and Global Connections in the UK 
(Christian Reformed Church in North America 2006: 211; Global Connections 2006). 
The Chinese Church in London, which is a member of the Evangelical Alliance, also 
refers to JHF as a ‘partner mission organization’ (Chinese Church in London 2005). 
Importantly, JHF’s partnerships outside of China are all with evangelical, rather than 
liberal Christian organizations. This does not mean, however, that JHF is a tool for 
overseas evangelical organizations wishing to make inroads into China. Instead, one of 
JHF’s directors revealed that JHF sometimes has to ‘translate’ the evangelical values of 
overseas organizations to suit the Chinese context.12
It is important to note that the evangelical values espoused by JHF members are 
based on the assumption of the superiority of Christianity over other religions. This is 
demonstrated, again, in Klopper’s (2005b) writing in a JHF newsletter:
So much of what people do is based on “contract giving”. We give or we serve in 
order to get something back. The “payback” or “reward” may not be financial but 
we may get prestige, or a good feeling, or a sense of achievement. Unconsciously, 
we may even feel we arc gaining merit! This is not so different from what 
motivates Tibetan monks, for example. Indeed, some Tibetan monks were moved 
by a JHF team bringing truckloads of food supplies to an area following a snow 
disaster and asked one of our associates, “Why did you come to help us? Is it to 
earn merit?” In terms of contract giving, this made more sense than the associate’s 
answer, “No, it is simply the Christian response to human need. JHF wants to help 
where and when we arc able”.
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12 Interview with the Director of Finance and Operations, Jian Hua Foundation, in Hong Kong, 12 
December 2005.
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In other words, Tibetan monks are described as serving people based on ‘contract 
giving’, and the Christian approach to ‘compassion’ is deemed superior to Tibetan 
Buddhism. Indeed, one of the founders mentioned, ‘we hope that we will eventually 
make a Christian impression on Chinese Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists’ . 13 The sense 
of superiority of Christian evangelical values clearly symbolizes a part of the ‘civilising 
mission’, explained in chapter one. The underlying assumption is that the civilizer’s 
belief is superior to that of the civilizees. Therefore, this worldview is constructed 
hierarchically, claiming that Christianity occupies the top of hierarchy with its virtue 
and morality, and that others should, by being civilized, be brought up to the same or 
similar level as those at the top, following the Christian way of civilizational values.
Reformulation of Identity in Mainland China?
Funding and Personnel Relations
How and to what extent the JHF has reformulated its evangelical nature in conducting 
its activity in mainland China is an interesting question, especially given the fact that its 
relationship with the Chinese government has been very close. An examination of its 
personnel and funding relations, as well as its design of community development 
projects, demonstrates how JHF maintains its values in China, rather than substantially 
reformulating them. This section reveals that the international Christian network is 
fundamental to JHF. Those who work for JHF do so because of their firm belief in 
Christianity. Those who fund JHF do so for the very same reason. Put simply, belief in 
Christianity is the very basis of the activities carried out by the organization.
JHF’s strong Christian identity and its total trust in Jesus have characterized its 
financial situation. As a relatively small organization, JHF has not put much effort into 
fundraising. According to the Director of Finance and Operations, one reason for this is 
that JHF has acted as a kind of placement agency for English teachers and medical 
doctors, and its history of involvement in development projects, which are more 
expensive to run, is quite a recent one. ‘We have not done active fundraising activity', 
he said; ‘We leave that to God. When we have ideas about projects and personnel, but 
no money, somehow the money eventually comes. When the money is available, but 
there are no personnel to conduct the projects, somehow the personnel eventually come. 
A trusting relationship between the church and the people brings projects and money
1' Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation, communication by telephone, 5 May 2006.
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together’ . 14 In other words, JHF is doing things ‘naturally’, rather than exerting a great 
deal of effort in that direction. However, the Chairman of the Board of Directors has 
acknowledged the need to plan more strategically:
The Board of Directors docs not want to go bigger. Whether making organizations 
bigger is a Christian thing to do or not is an interesting question. However, the new 
Chief Executive Officer of JHF tries to have more strategic plans for JHF, rather 
than natural growth. 15
Apart from disaster relief funding provided by the Hong Kong government, the 
majority of JHF funding comes from Christian organizations, for example the Cedar 
Fund. 16 In fact, Oliver Mark, one of the founders and members of the board of JHF, is 
also the CEO of the Cedar Fund, a Christian NGO based in Hong Kong and working on 
the mainland. 17 At the project level, the Cedar Fund provides funding for its partner 
organizations, including JHF, Project Grace, and the Evergreen Family Friendship 
Services. Church and Christian organizations do not usually have particular conditions 
attached to their funding.Ix However, the funding that is provided is based on trust in the 
belief that JHF’s projects emphasize Christian evangelical values.
With regard to its personnel relations, too, Christianity is fundamentally 
important. All JHF’s overseas ‘associates’ are Christian. For example, its Japanese 
brochure states that ‘the JHF Foundation dispatches volunteers from all over the world 
to China. We welcome Japanese Christian professionals and Christian students’ (JHF 
NDa). One of my interviewees stated that development work is very difficult, and 
would be made much more so if staff members were of different faiths’ . 19
A project coordinator working in Qinghai illustrates the way his devotion to 
Christianity encouraged him to work as a member of the JHF staff. He is a New Zealand 
citizen, and before he started working for JHF, he was working as an engineer in New 
Zealand. He did not have any previous experience in, or special connection to, China;
14 Interview with the Director of Finance and Operations, Jian Hua Foundation, in Hong Kong, 12 
December 2005.
15 Interview with Chairman of JHF International Board, in Hong Kong, 13 December 2005.
16 A small number of projects conducted by JHF receive Western government funding, for example 
from the New Zealand government. It seems that there is no particular policy in JHF as to which kind 
of projects may receive government funding. In any case, the portion of Western government 
funding of JHF’s entire project funding is only a small part of overall JHF funding. Interview with 
the Director of Finance and Operations, Jian Hua Foundation, in Hong Kong, 12 December 2005.
1 The Cedar’s mission statement reveals that the ‘CEDAR Fund ministers holistically to the poor and 
disadvantaged in partnership with churches and Christian groups, through education, development, 
advocacy and relief programmes, to share the good news of God’s kingdom with them and to 
demonstrate God's love, compassion and justice to the world’.(Cedar Fund ND).
Is This is unless Christian organizations specialize in a particular area, such as blindness.
19 Interview with Japanese Programs’ Coordinator and Coordinator for Short-term Programs, Jian Hua 
Foundation, in Hong Kong, 2 December 2004.
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nor had he studied community development, or learnt Mandarin. In his own words, he 
‘heard a call from Jesus’; ‘Jesus guided him to Qinghai’, of which he had never heard 
until then. He first stayed in Xining, the provincial capital, where he studied Chinese 
and Tibetan for about a year. Then he went to Tongren County, a rural town with a 
population of 75,645 as of 2003 (Qinghai Sheng Tongji Jii 2004: 82). There he set up a 
JHF representative office and started the ‘Huangnan Community Development Training 
Programme’. This project coordinator’s response to a spiritual calling made it possible 
for JHF to establish its office and its project in Tongren.20
Surprisingly, ‘most JHF staff members and representatives serve as non-salaried 
volunteers, and receive financial support from friends and churches’ (JHF 2005), even 
though it is usual for both secular and religious NGOs to employ their staff members on 
some sort of salary. In other words, most JHF staff members are not ‘employees’ who 
earn a salary from JHF; instead, they pay JHF to work for JHF, paying an annual 
administration fee of US$500 (for a single person)/US$700 (for a couple) (JHF 2005). 
This style reminds one of the works of the China Inland Mission (CIM) in the early 
twentieth century, which clearly stated ‘the members of the mission had no guaranteed 
salary but were to trust God to supply their needs’ (Latourette 1929: 385). Although it 
does not state so, JHF really places its faith on a reliance on Christian and church 
support to supply its needs. Christian churches outside China fund JHF and the church 
missions that work with JHF. It seems that the approach to ‘trust God to supply their 
needs’ continues to work for JHF, just as it worked for the CIM.
There are more than two hundred long-term volunteers from about twenty 
countries working for JHF in China, and many of them come as married couples or 
families. This could be interpreted as a significant self-sacrifice or devotion based on a 
belief in Christianity. Usually a development worker goes to a project site as an 
individual, leaving his or her family in the city, and receiving a salary or fee from the 
particular NGO he or she has chosen to work for. JHF’s style accentuates family 
commitment, which cannot exist without the belief of all family members in 
Christianity. In the case of the project coordinator in Tongren, he too was accompanied 
by his wife and four children. Everyone in the family seemed very happy.
In addition, it is worth noting how JHF cooperates with other Christian 
organizations by facilitating the movement of people into China to engage in project 
work. JHF plays a kind of introduction-agency role in relation to ‘Christian
20 Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation, 3 November 2004.
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professionals’. On the one hand, overseas Christian churches and other Christian 
organizations, such as Christian Reformed Church in North America, and the Chinese 
Church in London, and Global Connections, send people to JHF to work in mainland 
China (Christian Reformed Church in North America 2006: 211; Chinese Church in 
London 2005; Global Connections 2006). On the other hand, there are organizations 
operating only in China, such as Project Grace, Evergreen Family Friendship Services, 
and the Friends of China, each of which is run by non-mainland Chinese staff members, 
many of whom have a Western Christian background. These organizations work in 
China on long-term projects, and therefore, have learnt how to comply with the 
expectations of the Communist government. However, they are more inclined to be 
inward looking, attending to their business rather than generating interest among other 
overseas recruits. In other words, their primary motivation is not the recruiting of 
personnel. JHF, which is a Hong Kong-based organization with strong ties to, and 
relationships with, overseas Christian organizations, acts as a go-between to introduce 
‘Christian professionals’ to the organizations operating only in China. Some of the staff 
members introduced by JHF take leadership roles in some of these organizations.21 
These organizations, as well as overseas church organizations, both of which cooperate 
with JHF, all espouse very similar Christian evangelical values, and their cooperation 
would be impossible without sharing the same values and beliefs.
It is important to note, also, that JHF plays a role in translating those values. 
When overseas Christian workers go to China to work, they need not only to understand 
the political conditions and restrictions on Christian activity in China, but also to 
overcome a ‘particular mentality and cultural gap’ in China.22 By introducing overseas 
Christian professionals to home-grown organizations, JHF enables Christian 
professionals to work in accordance with their Christian values, and, at the same time, 
to do so under Communist circumstances.
As a result of strong international Christian cooperation in assisting JHF’s need 
for human resources, staff members in the representative offices in mainland China, 
including the family of the project coordinator mentioned above, are generally foreign 
nationals of Western (Anglo-Saxon) appearance. Of the three case-study organizations, 
JHF is the only one in which ‘Western’-looking project officers, or ‘foreigners’, directly




intervene in local communities. One of JHF’s directors explained this situation as 
follows:
When JHF was established, the Board members were Hong Kong Chinese, but all 
other staff members were volunteer foreigners. The good thing about the foreign 
connection is the funding. There arc many supporters and volunteers throughout 
the world. JHF’s two representative offices employ local people, but there is the 
issue of how to find the money to pay for them. It is easier to get financial support 
for our own (Western) people. Donors expect money to be well spent, so the use of 
Western volunteers frees more donor money to go directly to the project itself.2'
JHF’s local staff members are remunerated for their work, so the comment about 
effective use of funding by using volunteer foreigners makes sense. However, when I 
asked if JHF expected to establish local NGOs or to set up some projects to be run by 
local staff the interviewee stated:
In the future, there is no reason why we should stop local staff members from 
becoming leaders, as long as they are Christians.
This comment is highly revealing. Clearly, JHF is specific about the Christian identity 
of its project leaders.
Design o f the Community Development Project
To what extent the Christian aspect is reflected in actual projects is an important 
question. From 2002 to 2004 JHF conducted a pilot community-based project in 
Xibusha Township, Zeku County in Huangnan District in Qinghai Province 
ürffi h T h i s  is a remote nomadic Tibetan area, lying 
approximately 130 km south of the town centre of Tongren County, where a JHF 
regional office exists and where the JHF associate and his family reside (see Photo 4.1). 
Zeku County lies on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. Xibusha Township has 2,200 people, 
mostly Tibetans (JHF 2003).24 The average altitude of the county is some 3,500 metres, 
and the economic conditions of the village are extremely poor. Villagers depend on 
their livestock for their livelihood, trade yak skins and yak butter to earn cash. Some 
villagers even sell yak dung for fuel.
23 Interview with International Director of the Jian Hua Foundation, 2 December 2004.
According to the government statistics, in Zeku County, 95.93 percent of the population are the 




Photo 4.1: Xibusha Township (Hongqi Administrative Natural Village) (Taken by author)
JHF’s pilot community development project in Xibusha was one of the two major 
components of the organization’s ‘Huangnan Community Development Training 
Programme’. The other major component involved the provision of training to doctors 
and nurses from throughout the Prefecture based at the Huangnan Health School and the 
supply of medical equipment and library books to the Prefectural hospital. My focus in 
this case-study is only on the project carried out in the remote nomadic Tibetan area, 
which aimed to provide primary healthcare and literacy training. This was a JHF 
community development project in a rural ethnic community, so it can be easily 
compared with the other project supported by The Salvation Army and Oxfam Hong 
Kong. The whole program cost US$156,000 (1,248,000RMB) (JHF 2004b), of which 
the Xibusha community development pilot project’s portion was US$8,300 
(approximately 69,000RMB).25 While financially, the medical training project at the 
township hospitals cost eighteen times more than the Xibusha community development 
project, JHF considered the Xibusha project component to be of importance because it 
would have a bearing on future JHF projects in those communities.
25 The final audit totals HK$66,380. Currency rate is approximately HK$8 for US$1.
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This community development project started as a means of undertaking in-depth 
assessments of ‘health and community development needs’ in the nomadic communities 
(JHF 2002a). At the same time, JHF emphasized ‘relationship building at the 
community level’. It believed in building ‘relationships of trust in these three or four 
communities using participatory methods in order to carry out subsequent and later 
projects which [would] build on the successes of this proposed project’ (JHF 2002a). In 
other words, this project amounted to a ‘pre-project project’.26
JHF’s emphasis on the importance of relationship-building originated from the 
experience of the project coordinator in Tongren. When JHF attempted to conduct a 
needs analysis in selected communities, the project coordinator noted the frustration of 
the local villagers. The fact that foreigners had visited their communities and conducted 
a needs analysis raised the expectations of these remote villagers, as they rarely got to 
see outsiders. At that time, the villagers had no idea how long it was going to take 
before they would be able to see actual progress in the projects. They had to wait until 
JHF had analysed their needs, written a project proposal, translated it from English to 
Chinese, discussed the project with specialists and with Chinese local government 
officials, raised the requisite funding, and organized specialists to come into the 
communities to begin the actual project work. This kind of frustration among aid 
recipients is common. The JHF project coordinator realized that a needs analysis would 
take time, and that the expectations of the communities would not be met in the short 
term. Therefore, he thought it necessary to have something to offer while completing 
the needs analysis. In accordance with this thinking, JHF built four primary schools in 
these communities in 1998 alone. The interviewee stated that it is more meaningful to 
complete a needs analysis after some effort has been expended in relationship building 
with the local communities, and that such analysis would be better conducted later 
rather than at the initial stage.27
This approach to a needs analysis actually makes a lot of sense in the context of 
understanding development projects as being predicated on human relationships, and of 
genuinely believing in the importance of participation and the ‘partnership’ between 
outsiders and local people, as emphasized in the literature on Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA). The fact that the villagers have difficulty getting accustomed to the 
idea that they should work with the outsiders reinforces the importance of relationship 
building. Building primary schools at the early stage as a gift can act as a meaningful
26 Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation, 3 November 2004.
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icebreaker in this sense. The participation literature does not offer an explanation of the 
different strategies that may be used by outsiders during the various stages of projects, 
but JHF’s experience highlights the importance of tailoring the approach to each 
development project.28
Because the primary focus of this project was to build a trusting relationship with 
the community and to analyze its needs, the actual design of the project was left vague. 
However, what became vital in determining project content, and the relationship 
between JHF and community members, was JHF’s expectation of ‘likely’ future 
projects. The project proposal states, ‘the four main areas of needs assessment will be 
the following; health, education, business and social issues’. It continues as follows:
• From the health needs already evident, primary healthcare training is a 
likely training program, coupled with an improvement in the standards of 
healthcare provided by the current healthcare workers.
• From the education needs already apparent, it is likely that an adult literacy 
programme could be initiated (JHF 2002a).
How the local villagers responded to these two ‘likely’ future programs will be 
examined in the next section on local interaction.
The way this project fits into JHF’s evangelical nature is closely related to JHF’s 
emphasis on an ‘holistic approach' to development.29 The guiding principle of ‘holistic 
training content’ is clearly written in the programme proposal (JHF 2002a: 3). 
According to Savage (2004), in an holistic approach, the religious mediator plays an 
important role in improving health: ‘The belief system and ritual performances that the 
religious mediator represents and affirms are recognized as important to the well-being 
and health of the individual’ (Savage 2004). Savage goes on to argue that the Bible also 
shows an holistic approach to health, that is, a connection between health and spiritual 
practices. He writes:
In Acts and Mark we read of Jesus [sic] going about doing good and curing all who 
had fallen into [sic] the power of evil. Further, the apostle James notes the 
influence on the ill person of the power of grace through the healing gifts of the 
community. Christians believe that spiritual practices (religious rituals) and prayer 
strengthen the ill person, arouse confidence in divine mercy, and belief about 
spirituality and health (Savage 2004).
27 Ibid.
2s 1 am grateful to the Programme Coordinator for his suggestion on this point.
Some of my interviewees (who work for a Christian organization) think that a ‘holistic’ approach 
relates to religious values, whereas ‘wholistie’ approach refers to secular.
29
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One of JHF’s directors also suggested that health was actually related to one’s 
value system. In answering my question on the Christian aspects of JHF’s projects, he 
answered as follows:
One of our projects’ Christian aspects is to teach values. For example, it is not right 
to have premarital sexual intercourse. It is important to be faithful to your partner.
These arc taught in the context of AIDS prevention. Forgiveness is important 
because it is related to health. Heart disease and high blood pressure result from 
stress. Health is actually related to one’s value system. Also drunkenness and 
smoking relate to self-respect and self-control. In fact these are very big problems 
in Tibet. Education predicated on a health and ethical content was very well 
received by the locals. We don’t push Christianity, but we do this work based on 
biblical values.31’
This very answer demonstrates the way in which JHF translates its religious 
values and beliefs into projects. To JHF, evangelism and health education and literacy 
are two sides of a single coin. Most importantly, even though JHF attempts to spread 
health values, as long as it does not refer to these values as biblical in its projects, the 
Chinese government is content for the projects to go ahead. In this case, translation of 
the values is really the key to JHF’s success in project design and implementation. This 
particular health education project, therefore, is one of the more convenient ways for 
JHF to spread its beliefs, without creating any friction between it and the atheist 
Chinese government.
From this perspective, the comment made by the Chief Executive Officer of JHF, 
Martin Klopper (2005a), is worth noting. He emphasizes JHF’s focus on the spiritual 
aspect in development, as one of its contributions to building China.
Not all social and economic development should be seen in terms of the ‘hardware’ 
that is delivered. In the initiatives that we arc involved in, training forms a core 
component. Underlying this training is a commitment to see skills transferred and, 
often, integral to these skills arc the values that under gird them.... In a very real 
sense, much of our training contributes to what we might call the ‘software’, not so 
much of ‘material civilisation’ but of ‘spiritual civilisation’. It is not possible to 
have one without the other (Klopper 2005a).
This comment is highly pertinent to the broader focus of this thesis; that is, to the 
‘civilising mission’. As discussed in chapter one, the ‘civilizing mission' is not a 
popular term among international NGOs today, but JHF still uses ‘spiritual civilization' 
to describe the purpose of its training projects. JHF’s version o f ‘spiritual civilization' is 
closely related to biblical values. This suggests that JHF aims to raise the level of the 
spiritual civilization of ethnic communities who have different religious faiths to the 
level of Christianity. JHF’s activity can be identified as a Christian ‘civilizing mission’
30 Interview with International Director of the Jian Hua Foundation, 2 December 2004.
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in the contemporary period, which attempts to promote ‘spiritual civilization’ centring 
on biblical values among ethnic communities in China.
Local Interactions
Downplaying Religious Communities
How the self-proclaimed Christian ‘civilizing mission’ is undertaken in practice is an 
interesting issue to explore in this case study, given that the case study village is 
composed of Tibetan Buddhists. The Tibetan people in this village are distinct from the 
Han in appearance, identity and religion among others. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
many contemporary ‘minority nationalities’ have been ‘modernized’ or ‘sinicized’, and 
do not necessarily appear to be distinct from the Han. Particularly those who live closer 
to eastern China, historically called ‘China proper’, often wear Western clothes, and 
many of them speak Mandarin. However, the Tibetans in this village seem to have kept 
their traditional way of life. They wear Tibetan clothing, speak Tibetan, and believe in 
Tibetan Buddhism. The village, even though it has only 180 households, has a 
monastery (see Photo 4.2), and the Buddhist monks are highly respected by the 
villagers.
JHF’s community project centred on the Hongqi (tlMC) Administrative Natural 
Village. In fact, the Communist government has had a significant impact on this village. 
For example, it is quite obvious in the name of the three administrative natural villages 
{Xingzheng Ziran Cun 'if Mi within Xibusha Township; Hongqi (tXM), Tuanjie
(0|£n) and Yuejin The names of these villages mean Red Flag, Unity, and Leap
Forward respectively. These names are symbolic words for Communist China; therefore 
it is clear that the Communist government established these Tibetan villages in 1953.31
The impact of the Communist government on these villages can also be seen in 
everyday life, for example in the illustrations hanging on the walls of some of the 
villagers’ houses. I visited the house of a Hongqi village group leader (duizhang fAIA;) 
(Hongqi Village consists of six groups).33 There are many posters and pictures on the 
walls of the group leader’s house, and a prayer wheel (which Tibetan Buddhists spin 
while they pray) on his table. The posters and pictures include those of a yak in Heaven,
31 Interview anonymous.
The County is called Da Dui (9cPA), big group; the Administrative Villages are called Xiao Dili 
(T P A ), small group; and groups equivalent to natural villages (in the Administrative Villages) are 
called Dui (PA), group.
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yaks on beautiful sunny grasslands, a Buddhist monk on the back of yak, a large picture 
of the Dalai Lama, many small pictures of the Panchen Lama and other Lamas, and a 
big poster of Mao Zedong. Intentionally or unintentionally, the picture of the Dalai 
Lama and Mao Zedong are on the walls at either end of the house, while the pictures of 
the yak in Heaven and so on are on the two other facing walls in the middle of the 
house. By way of another example of the Communist government’s impact on these 
villages, Hongqi Village is surrounded by huge grassland, with many yaks at pasture. 
Extremely long wire fences demarcate the grassland, where there are neither buildings 
nor roads (see Photo 4.3). According to a JHF project coordinator, the government 
implemented a settlement policy in this area, and erected the wire fences. The Tibetans 
in this area were nomadic, but they now have houses to live in, and are settled in the 
areas prescribed by the wire fencing.33
In this community, villager committee members and Xibusha Township 
government officials reside in the top layer of the social hierarchy. They make decisions 
on the public affairs of the village. In contrast, another overlapping community at this 
village is one based on a belief in Tibetan Buddhism. This community overlaps with the 
Hongqi administrative natural village community. The difference is that this community 
centres on the Tibetan religious belief rather than on being a political construction, and 
the top layer of the social hierarchy within this community is comprised of Tibetan 
lamas and monks.
It is important to analyze the way JHF, with its strong Christian evangelical 
emphasis, has dealt with this Tibetan community. According to an explanation by a 
local Tibetan, the hierarchical social structure is understood as lamas and monks at the 
top, then villagers’ committee members, and then local older men with experience.34 
Tibetan lamas and monks in this village have positions of great respect and power 
among the villagers. To illustrate the villagers’ respect for the Buddhist monks, and the 
impact of the monks on JHF staff members, a JHF consultant’s report on an early stage 
of the encounter between JHF and ethnic community is quite helpful:
33
34
Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation, 4 November 2004. 
Interview (anonymous), 5 November 2004.
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Photo 4.2: Monastery in Hongqi Village (taken by author)
Photo 4.3: Hongqi Village, Yaks and Wire Fences (taken by author)
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We [JHF associates and the consultant] had a walk around the village and bumped 
into the leading monk, who was thrilled by us having come and enthusiastically 
gave us a tour of the monastery. Afterwards, he himself gave us the Tibetan 
Kadakh. Walking back with the yellow Kadakh around our necks and answering 
people’s questions as to who had given it to us, we had clearly gained in face and 
reputation. When we left the village the main leader, presumably because of this 
honourable treatment at the hands of the monk, did not want to appear to treat us 
any less respectfully than the top monk, and also gave us the Kadakh (JHF 2002b:
5).
It is clear from this description that cooperating with local religious leaders is a key to 
building a relationship with the local villagers in this village. Furthermore, JHF’s 
associates conducted an analysis of the world view of five young nomad villagers from 
Xibusha County. Part of this analysis covered so called levels of ‘being’ in this world. 
The analysis was helpful in identifying ethnic community member understanding of, 
and very high respect for, lamas and monks. In response to a question on the levels of 
‘being’, the ethnic community members answered:
1. Buddha (not involved in the matters of this world except for guiding people the 
right way)
2. Dalai Lama and other lamas (are not involved in the matters of this world 
except for guiding people the right way, are intermediaries between humans 
and Buddha)
3. Monks (just a little involved in the matters of this world, are also intermediary)
4. Small gods (are involved only in matters of this world, have control over 
normal people’s lives and can help with practical problems of life)
5. Human beings
6. Devils (can cause trouble to human beings, e.g. possess a person many times 
which can lead to death over time, can cause accidents) (JHF ND)
Whether or not this understanding is theologically accurate, this is the hierarchy in 
which the ethnic community members believe. Therefore, the following comments by 
the ethnic community members interviewed by a JHF associate/consultant are quite 
understandable.
When someone gets sick, the family goes to the lama first. The lama decides how 
to treat it (operate or not), and whether to direct a patient to a hospital (e.g. go to 
Xining, not Xiahe).
Some people even consult the lama on such things as when to go on holiday, and 
whether to go at all. It’s the same for conducting business or any other activity.
Even if the lama’s advice proves to be negative or unproductive, the lama’s 
wisdom will not be doubted.
Couples wanting to get married first consult the lama (JHF ND).
The ethnic community members’ high level of respect for and trust in the lamas reveal 
how important the Tibetan Buddhist lamas and monks are in this village. The author
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asked JHF’s project coordinator whether Buddhist monks could have possibly played 
some role in JHF’s projects, given that the Buddhist monks’ cooperation with JHF 
would add some respect and trust to the relationship between JHF and villagers. Respect 
and a trusting relationship should increase the effectiveness of the project, and indeed, a 
trusting relationship is one of the objectives of this project. JHF’s project coordinator 
replied that he had never thought of it, but that JHF cooperated with the local 
government. JHF and the local government had something in common, with respect to 
how they thought about people.'- JHF’s project coordinator mentioned that he simply 
did not think that JHF needed to cooperate with the Buddhist monks, because JHF 
always took a ‘pragmatic’ approach. For this purpose, cooperation with local 
government officials is enough. He mentioned that if the monks wanted to participate in 
JHF’s projects, JHF would not exclude them. However he did not actively seek 
cooperation with the monks.36 Even though he identified the most important points in 
the project as partnership and cooperation with local villagers, cooperation with 
Buddhist monks was overlooked in the process of implementing the project. Arguably, 
this attitude derived from not only downplaying the importance of local religious 
community, but also from a sense of the superiority of Christian evangelical values. As 
quoted earlier, one of the JHF’s founders claimed, ‘we hope that we will eventually 
make a Christian impression on Chinese Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists’.37
The fact that JHF overlooked the importance of the religious community in this 
village leads to the argument that JHF’s understanding of ‘community’ is in accordance 
with the way the Communist government deals with the village. JHF preferred an 
understanding of ‘community’ that had a local government and a village committee at 
the top. The religious understanding of ‘community’, which has lamas and monks at the 
top, was not taken into account in JHF’s project.
Participant Response to Project: Health and Literacy Trainings
As explained earlier, because JHF’s project proposal strongly emphasized the necessity 
to undertake a needs assessment, such an assessment was designed as a part of the 
project and so a thorough project plan had not been prepared. However, at the time of 
proposal writing, JHF did identify two ‘likely’ programs, one being primary healthcare 
training, the other adult literacy (JHF 2002b). Having discussed project content with the
Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation, 5 November 2004.
36 1 bid.
Interview with a founder of the Jian Hua Foundation, communication by telephone, 5 May 2006.
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villagers, JHF began to implement these two ‘likely" programs. As a result, these two 
programs had a positive impact on the ethnic community members insofar as it raised 
their awareness of the issues of health and literacy.
For health training, JHF translated into Tibetan a Facts o f Life booklet provided 
by the World Health Organization, and taught twelve trainers in Hongqi Village basic 
health knowledge, using the booklet as a study guide. Having gained such knowledge, 
these twelve trainers went back to their village and taught 181 fellow villagers the same 
material. A JHF report reveals that the program was successful in conveying health 
knowledge that is, in the words of one trainee, ‘useful and applicable to their lives’ 
(JHF 2002: 7). One of the villagers whom I interviewed said that she remembered 
having learnt how to protect a mother’s health during and after a pregnancy. Another 
villager said that he had learnt how to avoid disease. Both villagers admitted that they 
had learnt that washing their hands was important to avoiding diseases, but they just had 
not acquired the habit of washing their hands. They said that they just ‘tended to forget’. 
Even though it is difficult to reform one’s habits in the short term, changing the 
villagers’ attitude to health issues is meaningful.
For literacy training, JHF originally planned that it would teach Tibetan literacy, 
but ‘at the request of the leadership and the villagers of Hongqi village’ the project 
provided basic Chinese language skills (mainly conversation, and a modicum of writing 
and reading skills) (JHF 2002b). According to a JHF report (2002b), some of the 
villagers were ‘completely illiterate’; others had graduated from primary school and had 
acquired basic literacy skills. According to the local coordinator, participants were 
primary school graduates and had acquired basic literacy at primary school, and they 
had participated in the literacy project voluntarily.38 However, ‘initially, eighteen adults 
attended the class (one female, seventeen males), [but] by July 2004 the numbers had 
dropped to six students (one female, five males)’ (JHF 2004a: 11).
Even though the number of participants was only small, my interviews with 
several of the villagers, which 1 conducted half a year after JHF’s literacy project had 
been completed, left me with the impression that some villagers had a renewed interest 
in literacy education. These villagers actually did not participate in JHF’s literacy 
program, but when 1 visited them, some of the villagers had gathered privately to look at 
a Tibetan language textbook. They pointed at some pictures and characters, and 
discussed things about the book. One of the villagers told me that the local government
38 Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation, 3 November 2004.
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had just started a literacy program and that some villagers were studying the Tibetan 
language. The mother of this villager said, ‘These guys cannot read anything, so they 
are the same as the yaks outside our house. When these guys can read, and in particular 
become literate in Mandarin, they can go to Tongren and sell and buy things’. I asked 
all the villagers there, ‘If an NGO were to come here and conduct a project, what would 
you want it to do?’ One of the villagers answered, without reservation, ‘We want a 
school. We want a clinic too, but a school is the priority. Education is most important’.
These comments from the villagers are worth noting, because before JHF 
conducted its project, the majority of villagers wanted a clinic in the village (JHF 
2002b). No one voted for a literacy project. It is not certain whether JHF’s literacy 
project had directly generated the villagers’ interest in literacy education, but JHF’s 
project might have had an impact on the villagers’ interest in literacy education. These 
responses of the ethnic community members to both health and literacy training reflect 
the features of the adaptation frame.
This point actually leads to another: that the longer-term impact of community 
development projects, such as changes in the villagers’ attitudes towards health and 
literacy, cannot be properly assessed without follow-up evaluation sometime after the 
project ends, rather than immediately after. Most development NGOs usually conduct 
project evaluations immediately after the project formally ends. This is, of course, 
necessary for reporting to donors. However, development affects a variety of social 
issues, which are by their very nature extremely complicated, and any impact on social 
phenomena takes time to manifest. In order to explore the in-depth impact of a project, 
it is necessary to carry out a long-term analysis. It is only possible to assess in depth any 
change in the villagers’ attitudes if one carries out a follow-up analysis some time after 
the project, even though it may not necessarily be possible to identify a direct causal 
relationship.
Local Reaction to Values: Trust
Even though the responses of ethnic community members who participated in the 
training reflect features of the adaptation frame, it seems that the interaction between 
JHF and the ethnic community members was not altogether smooth. This was 
particularly so in the earlier stages of the project. This section illustrates an interaction 
that reflects features of the conflict frame.
130 CHAPTER FOUR
In JHF’s health training project, JHF attempted to train health trainers. JHF’s plan 
was to train trainers selected from among the members of the ethnic community and to 
have those trainers return to their own community to train their fellow villagers on 
completion of their own training. Therefore, those selected for training were to be 
highly motivated, respected and reliable from the local point of view. Accordingly, the 
JHF local coordinator asked village leaders, such as the village secretary, the deputy 
village leader, and the township secretary, to select ten villagers of either gender as 
potential health trainers, based on reliability, teaching ability and availability.
On the first training day, however, the JHF local coordinator discovered more 
than twenty young men in the room the training session was to be held in, ‘some of 
whom were only present out of curiosity ... full of expectations and hopes about being 
selected to go to Tongren for training’ (JHF 2002b: 2). There was not one woman, as 
‘the women are all busy milking cows’ (JHF 2002b: 2). When JHF brought the 
imbalance and the excessive number of applicants to the attention of the village leaders, 
the leaders hurriedly rounded up some women. Then the JHF coordinator went ahead 
with the morning session.
While the villagers expected to be selected to receive training on health issues, 
JHF had a different aim for this particular session. It completed two exercises. One was 
to draw up a ‘seasonality diagram’, and the other was an ‘historical time line exercise’, 
both of which are tools used for participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) to gather 
information on project sites.39 JHF’s plan was to:
come to know those people and do a few participatory exercises with them in order 
to 1) observe them interacting in a group discussion setting and thereby to narrow 
the group to one which would be most useful in the training, 2) gain data for 
project planning as a result of the PRA exercises (JHF 2002b: 2).
However, from the point of view of the villagers, these exercises were quite 
disappointing. They found the exercises ‘entirely unrelated to what they had expected' 
(JHF 2002b: 3). The village leader noted that as a result of morning session, many 
young villagers felt a certain loss of face because of the unexpected selection process 
(JHF 2002b: 5).
The seasonality diagram is used for ‘rainfall, cropping patterns, fodder use and availability, food 
availability, busy farming days, milk production, animal diseases and expenditures. The most 
valuable data revolve around the cropping patterns and busy farm days, since these data were found 
to be essential in the detailed planning of activities implementation' (Chapa et. al. 1997). The 
historical time line exercise provides ‘information on ethno-history, and history of forest, cropping 
systems, livestock, and issues like major landslides' (Chapa et. al. 1997).
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Despite this session, one purpose of which was to identify suitable health trainers, 
JHF failed to identify any suitable trainers. Therefore, it had the primary school 
headmaster of the village select seven villagers. The headmaster had taught almost 
everyone in the village, and therefore he knew the villagers fairly intimately.
JHF’s project coordinator later offered an apology to the village leaders for any 
misunderstanding over the purpose of the session. A JHF consultant who accompanied 
the coordinator wrote a report of the incident, in which he admitted, ‘[w]e might have 
lost somewhat in our relationship with the local young men’, while ‘our relationship 
with the headmaster as well as [with] the village leader appears to be very good’ (JHF 
2002b: 5).
This incident occurred in the first year of this project, and whether or not the 
relationship between JHF and the local young men recovered afterwards is unclear. 
However, what is important for our discussion is which features of which frame the 
interactions between JHF and the ethnic communities reflected. While JHF’s interaction 
with the village leaders reflected features of the adaptation frame, its interaction with 
the local young men reflected features of the conflict frame. There were arguably at 
least three reasons for this. The first and main reason was inadequate communication 
among the JHF associates, the villagers, the village leaders and government officials. 
This led to the lack of a proper understanding by the villagers and the village leaders of 
the reason for the JHF activity. This also speaks to the fact that JHF did not use a local 
Tibetan actor as its primary project coordinator. JHF did have local staff members, but 
their main tasks were interpreting and translating, rather than designing and 
implementing the projects, and they were merely secondary to the project coordinator. 
JHF’s local coordinator was an English speaker. One of the JHF directors revealed that 
‘if the locals are not Christians, they may not be able to become leaders of projects’.40 It 
seems that prioritizing Christian personnel in this way led to features of the conflict 
frame appearing in the interaction between the parties involved.
The second reason for the appearance of features of the two frames relates to 
JHF’s neglect of the religiously-oriented ethnic community. What should be also noted 
in relation to JHF’s approach to establish a trusting relationship is that, again, it lacked 
any attempt to engage with the religiously-oriented ethnic community; more specifically 
to get involved with the Tibetan monks, whom the ethnic community members 
obviously highly respected. I am not suggesting that JHF would not have had similar
40 Interview with International Director of the Jian Hua Foundation, 2 December 2004.
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problems if it had established a close relationship with the local religious leader, if only 
because I am unable to provide specific evidence in relation to JHF. However, given the 
amount of literature suggesting that there is a fairly high level of solidarity within 
religiously-oriented communities in China, and that solidarity may play a secular role in 
providing welfare for the people of the community (Yang 1963), the positive impact of 
a close relationship with the religiously-oriented ethnic communities in order to 
establish a trusting relationship was certainly worth JHF’s consideration. This is 
particularly so given the high level of trust in and respect for the Buddhist monks 
among the members of the ethnic community. However, JHF did not make any attempt 
to establish a close relationship, or even to consider the possibility that such a 
relationship would have raised the level of trust of the ethnic community members and 
may well thereby have mitigated the problem mentioned above. Such neglect is, 
arguably, not inconsistent with the JHF’s sense of the superiority of Christianity over 
other religions, which was discussed earlier.
The third reason for the appearance of the features of the conflict frame in the 
interaction between JHF and the local young men relates to the fact that JHF’s project 
did not particularly emphasize the importance of ‘participation’. While the project drew 
on the PRA method, JHF did not pay much attention to ‘participation’ in the sense of 
motivating the ethnic community members to voluntarily participate in the project, on 
the basis of an understanding of the importance of the project. ‘Participation’ used in 
this project merely amounted to what Cornwall (1996) calls ‘cooptation’ which refers to 
no more than that representatives of the villagers were chosen.
JHF’s project coordinator was, in fact, very bluntly critical of the concept of 
‘participation’. He wrote:
At the grassroots level, development projects must have local ownership. But docs 
this mean that the training project itself must be all their idea? Development 
workers go to communities with many good ideas, lots of resources education and 
skills. So although the local community are [sic] able to express a general need, 
they are not able to know exactly how this need might be met. And so the 
development worker must apply a lot of wisdom, in putting together an appropriate 
package that is going to meet the felt need. Again, this must be done in 
consultation with the community, but the content of the package is primarily the 
responsibility of the development worker (JHF 2004c: 5).
It is necessary to assess these comments on two levels. On one level, it needs to be said 
that JHF’s project coordinator was critical of the hypocrisy of a lot of development 
workers who use a participatory approach to their projects. Usually, project content 
does not spring from the ideas of the villagers. Rather, it is often designed by the
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international religious agencies, which try to make it look as though the villagers 
engaged in a participatory process in order to arrive at the future design. On the second 
level, however, this comment reveals a sense of the ‘superiority’ of development worker 
resources and knowledge to those of the local villagers. An example of this is reflected 
in a JHF preference for the use of Western medicine rather than Tibetan medicine in a 
hospital in Hongqi Village. In response to questions about the reason for a preference 
for Western medicine, JHF’s local coordinator stated without reservation that he would 
not want to be cured by Tibetan medicine, if he, himself, were sick. He added that JHF 
had expertise in Western medicine.41 However, this second point suggests that JHF’s 
priorities are confused. The fact that JHF has expertise in Western medicine should not 
prevent the undertaking of projects that call for the use of Tibetan medicine. In the 
context of the coordinator’s comments, one might conclude that at least the coordinator 
has a sense of the superiority of Western knowledge over Tibetan knowledge.
Local Reaction to Religious Values
Other important questions are whether and if so how JHF’s project affected the 
religious beliefs of the villagers, and how the ethnic communities responded to the 
Christian nature of JHF. First, it is important to identify how the project’s ‘holistic 
approach’, emphasized in JHF’s project proposal, manifested itself in the course of the 
project. Information on specific examples of any holistic content was by and large 
unavailable. Lack of such information is probably attributable to the high level of 
political sensitivity surrounding the project. The following entry appears in JHF’s 
internal report on the health training session:
After the training... [the project coordinator] shared the story of a lost son, which 
was very well received and readily understood by all trainees. [The project 
coordinator’s] point was that not only physical but also social health (e.g. in 
relationships) is important (JHF 2000).
The story of the lost son comes from the Gospel of Luke, Chapter 15, Verses 11-32. I 
was unable to get to the heart of how, and in which health context, the project 
coordinator shared this story, and whether he mentioned its Biblical origin, but this 
example is suggestive of how the project’s holistic content may have manifested itself.
In my interview with the villagers who participated in the project, I asked what it 
was that they had learnt from the training. No villager referred to any ‘spiritual’ aspect, 
and it was difficult to fathom any extent to which the Bible story might have made a
41 Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation, 5 November 2004.
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difference to the community. On the balance of probabilities, it is unlikely to have had 
any lasting impact on the villagers’ belief in Tibetan Buddhism, or on their perception 
of Christianity.
It is important to note, also, that JHF failed to account for Tibetan Buddhism’s 
view of its holistic approach to project management. JHF’s holistic content was defined 
by the Bible, but there was no apparent effort to connect an holistic Christian view to an 
holistic Tibetan Buddhist view. By way of a contrast, for example, Matteo Ricci, one of 
the better-known Christian missionaries in China in the sixteenth century had The idea 
that the ethical content of the Confucian Classics proved the Chinese were a deeply 
moral nation and had once practised a form of monotheism not so different from that 
found in the Judaeo-Christian tradition’ (Spence 1990: 113), and Ricci evangelized in 
China using Confucian thought.
Story o f a Widow
In an examination of the holistic approach it is crucial to discuss what the project 
coordinator was doing other than implementing the health and literacy training. It was, 
after all, these on which the project centred. What he did outside the scope of the 
approved project mattered from the points of view of both JHF and the villagers. Any 
religious impact cannot be assessed merely on the basis of a Bible story taken out of its 
social context. How messages of love and care are conveyed in a real and human 
context is a much better basis on which to proceed.
For example, in this village lived a widow whose husband had died of 
tuberculosis. She had four children, two of whom also suffered with the disease. Since 
the death of her husband, the family, already extremely poor, had had to ask other 
villagers for food assistance. According to the JHF project coordinator, the local 
villagers told him that if he would like to help someone, he should help the widow. He 
called this ‘local initiative’.42
The coordinator bought two twenty-kilogram of bags of flour in Tongren, about 
one and half hours away from the village. I accompanied him on his trip to deliver them 
to the widow’s house by jeep. Her house was in the middle of grassland. There were no 
other houses nearby. Nor was there a road running to her house. As the jeep approached 
her house across the grassland, the widow rushed out and lay across the wire fence 
circumscribing her land, enabling the coordinator to approach much closer than
42 Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation. 4 November 2004.
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otherwise. I could see, even before we reached the fence, how extremely happy she 
looked, waving at us frantically as she ran to the fence with a big smile on her face. 
When the coordinator, other JHF local officers, and 1 got out of the jeep, she happily 
welcomed us and ushered us into her house. She treated all of us to Tibetan milk tea, 
and incessantly smiled at us. The vigour of her welcome frankly amazed me. I had not 
seen a villager welcome people with such an obvious expression of joy. It was as if she 
was expressing something more than happiness for receiving what to her was more than 
mere material gain. Although this occasion is not easily offered up as evidence of 
something spiritual resulting from the association of the widow and the project activity 
of JHF, the sense I have of the atmosphere I observed goes well beyond a simple 
thankyou transaction to a much deeper sense of spiritual gratitude, very much warm and 
wholehearted. Inside her house, the project coordinator deposited the bags of flour, and 
picked up a couple of bags of yak dung, which the villagers use for fuel. The widow had 
collected the yak dung for sale, but had no means of transporting it to the markets. The 
JHF project coordinator delivered the bags of yak dung to the local town, and sold them 
for her, something he does from time to time.
Such simple transactions can be expected to make people happy and perhaps even 
grateful and clearly the widow looked extremely happy. But the happiness went beyond 
simple happiness to something else. This something else could be interpreted as being 
cared about -  in JHF’s word, as ‘compassion’. This particular exchange resonates with 
Mother Teresa’s famous words, ‘[t]he world today is hungry not only for bread but 
hungry for love; hungry to be wanted, to be loved’. It seemed to me at the time, and 
there remains a lingering sense of the superabundance of emotion associated with the 
actions of the JHF coordinator: that JHF staff made a difference, not only in terms of the 
short-term food supply, but also from the point of view that someone cared about this 
widow. This widow was one of only very few, perhaps even the only person in the 
village who was personally visited by JHF, and who personally received direct material 
help. From the widow’s point of view, it seems that the importance of this visit went 
well beyond her simple material needs to embrace a deeper human need for spiritual 
recognition of any kind.
The JHF coordinator was critical about the fact that the majority of development 
professionals espouse the concepts of non-dependency and sustainability (long-term 
effect), regardless of the situation on the ground. ‘Development’ is much favoured, 
while welfare is overlooked. However, in reality, the conditions of people vary widely 
within one village, from abject poverty to relatively well off. ‘It is meaningless to
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undertake development in places where there is scarce food, and aid [welfare] is more 
appropriate. It is necessary to tailor the project and make the project fit the situation’.43
Critics of welfare would argue that even though the project coordinator made a 
difference in the widow’s life, it was a difference in the life of only one person, and that 
providing welfare alone is unsustainable and ineffective in the longer term. 
Conventionally, it is argued that aiming at long-term sustainability is more important 
than aiming for a short-term impact. However, if one were to stick to the principle of 
long-term sustainable development, the widow may not have had her significant 
encounter, and perhaps would have been overlooked.
The project coordinator’s written reflections on community development (JHF 
2004c: 6) reveal how he thinks about spiritual impact on community development.
Project staff members bring their own personal values with them into the project, 
and these values flow into the project. For example, respect for others, and 
compassion, are two positive values which readily flow into the community. In like 
manner, the values of the local community touch the lives of the project staff.
The local people not only learn from the ideas that we formally express, but they 
also learn from the people who express them. It is universal law that people impact 
each other as they interact with each other, and study each other, and leam from 
each other -  this is the very nature of any interpersonal relationship. It is not a 
planned thing -  it happens automatically -  whether we like or not.
If we are intentional in our modelling, then this is good. Obviously we need to 
model respect, patience, kindness, faithfulness, and morality. These things are not 
usually written about in training manuals on community development -  however 
the potential for impact (positive and/or negative) in these areas is great. This is 
empowerment, where positive values arc passed on through interaction, and 
everyone moves forward. At the end of the day, it may well be that the deeper of 
the relationships formed will have more ‘impact’ than the ‘project’ we do! (my 
emphasis)
His use of the term ‘empowerment’ in a spiritual sense is very different from how the 
term is discussed in mainstream development literature (Arnstein 1969; Pretty 1995), in 
which the concept of ‘empowerment’ is intricately linked to a higher level of 
participation, such as self-mobilization.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the villagers may have understood the 
importance of spiritual health, or more explicitly, the extent to which the villagers may 
have recognized any Biblical message in JHF’s project. The evidence suggests that the 
ethnic community members did not perceive the ‘spiritual aspect' as relating to 
Christianity. From this point of view, the response of the ethnic community to JHF’s
43 Interview with Project Coordinator, Tongren Office, the Jian Hua Foundation. 5 November 2004.
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values does not reflect the features of either the conflict frame or the adaptation frame. 
These frames were built based on the assumption that the values could be presented 
clearly. However, in the context of mainland China today, religious values have to be 
presented subtly, as described above, and whether JHF’s religious message reached to 
the heart of the ethnic community members was not certain. This aspect will be 
mentioned again when 1 revisit the frames of interaction in the conclusion of this thesis.
However, the certain fact is that JHF did make a difference to the widow. It is 
difficult to measure the difference because of its spiritual nature. The widow’s story 
suggests that both ‘development’ and ‘welfare’ are important in a very poor village. 
Practising compassion, caring and instilling hope by making an effort to help even a 
small number of people in small ways can make a big difference to some. The 
coordinator appeared to have been successful in demonstrating ‘compassion’ to the 
widow. This may have been the most important value JHF imparted to her. From this 
point of view, the interaction between JHF and the widow reflects features of the 
adaptation frame.
Conclusion
JHF’s sense of the superiority of its own civilization, in particular, the superiority of 
Christianity over other religions, is evident from my analysis of the perception of its 
personnel in the field. JHF describes its activity as promoting ‘spiritual civilization’. 
My analysis suggests that the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ is still alive today and 
continues to be undertaken in mainland China.
This chapter has also explored the fact that JHF places a strong emphasis on the 
importance of evangelism. Within the Chinese context, the manifestation of evangelism 
was only subtle in the course of interaction with the ethnic community members; and 
the extent to which the respondents picked up on the message of the gospel was 
evidently very limited. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the JHF local coordinator 
did leave a very strong impression on a widow living in dire poverty by demonstrating 
the ‘love of Jesus’. The fact that the interaction between JHF and the widow reflected 
features of the adaptation frame is indicative that an international religious NGO can 
still have a religious impact, in the broader sense, at an individual level.
The way the ethnic communities responded to JHF activity and the values 
imported through the JHF project reflects the features of both the conflict and the 
adaptation frames. The relevance of each frame depended on the way in which
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community was understood by the external agents. JHF preferred a community based on 
the administrative-natural village and there was a high degree of dialogue between the 
JHF local coordinator and the project participants who were at the top of the village 
hierarchy. However, in relation to the young men in the village, one of the values that 
JHF’s project aimed to establish, a trusting relationship, was not successfully carried 
through; this situation reflected features of the conflict frame.
The difference between the adaptation and conflict frames reveals two 
fundamental points about the interaction between JHF and ethnic communities. The first 
is that JHF defined ‘community’ in reference to a hierarchical system based on formal 
local governance structures, with local government and the villagers’ committee at the 
top. However, a community based on the religious beliefs of the villagers, with the 
Tibetan monks at the top of the hierarchy, was completely neglected. The second point 
is that the lack of dialogue between JHF and the ethnic community members, 
particularly those who did not participate in the JHF project, hindered the building of a 
trusting relationship between the two. Both points are in fact closely related to each 
other. To establish a trusting relationship, it would have been important to at least have 
considered cooperating with the local Tibetan monks, who enjoy a high level of respect 
among the ethnic community members—in other words, to have engaged with the 
community that centred on local religious belief
CHAPTER FIVE
NEGLECT OF LOCAL BRETHREN BY AN INTERNATIONAL 
CHRISTIAN NGO: THE SALVATION ARMY
Origins, Values and Beliefs
To describe the origins of The Salvation Army, one should begin with the way the 
founder, William Booth, started and organized the activity of the Army.1 Booth was 
bom in 1829 into a working class family in Nottingham, England. Throughout his 
childhood the family was desperately poor, and Nottingham was full of ‘breathless tales 
of murder and garrottings’, and ‘surging drunken crowds watching the hanging of 
criminals’ (Begbie 1920: 2). This was a period of rapid urbanisation and increasing 
social problems in England, brought about by the Industrial Revolution and increased 
immigration from Ireland (Horridge 1993: 9-11). In 1842, at the age of thirteen, Booth 
started working as a pawnbroker in the Nottingham slums. In 1846 he began to attend a 
Wesleyan Methodist chapel, and was deeply influenced by the Rev James Caughey, an 
American revivalist evangelist who was visiting Nottingham at the time. Revivalism 
generally refers to a movement that started in the sixteenth century in some Protestant 
churches to revitalize the spiritual ardour of masses (Livingstone 2000: 493). Caughey 
was one of the representative figures of eighteenth century revivalism, peculiarly known 
as the Second Great Awakening. This was characterized by ‘camp meetings’, a unique 
frontier institution aimed at evangelizing working class people. Encouraged by Caughey 
to start street meetings and to work for the conversion of others, Booth committed 
himself to evangelizing and helping the working class poor in England.2 The Methodist 
church, which tended to overlook problems among the working class and in the slums in 
those days, did not welcome Booth’s evangelical approach because it led to disturbance 
and criticism within the church.
Catherine Booth, William’s wife, was with her husband a co-founder of The Salvation Army; her 
role in its foundation was particularly notable for the enormous amount of work she carried out 
caring for women, something for which The Salvation Army was well known.
Booth’s enthusiasm for revivalism eventually led him to become a preacher in the Reform Movement 
in 1852, a movement derived from Methodism but excluded from mainstream Methodist churches 
because it over paid attention to working class people. However, he left the Reform Movement after 
a year or so because he realized that ‘unless the Reform Movement became organized and set up a 
central authority he would have to leave it and attach himself to some Church that possessed these 
essentials of stability’ (Booth; cited in Horridge 14). His quest for an organized central authority in 
the movement is an early hint at the establishment of The Salvation Army in 1878. After he
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The deteriorating social environment encouraged Booth to seriously consider the 
role of Christianity in social work (Hempton 1984: 307). In 1865, he worked as part of 
the Home Mission Movement, which consisted of volunteers from various 
denominations. The aim of this mission was to preach to the poor of the working class 
in East London. As Booth described it, his preaching was conducted in ‘a dilapidated 
tent’ in a one-time (Quaker) graveyard' (Horridge 1920: 15). His preaching enjoyed 
great success and attracted large numbers of listeners.* 3 As a result, he was asked to take 
charge of the Home Mission Movement, and from this was bom The Salvation Army.4 
As the name suggests, The Salvation Army was an organization institutionalized along 
military lines, with William Booth as the General and with highly centralized control 
and power.5 6
The values The Salvation Army has had since its establishment are reflected in its 
identity as an ‘international movement', as distinct from a formal church organization. 
Booth explained his reason for this as follows:
In the north of England ... a clergyman said ... that it is evident The Salvation 
Anny is not a church. To be a church there must evidently be the exercise of 
sacramental functions, which evidently arc not duly appreciated by the Army 
(Booth; quoted in The Salvation Army Australia Southern Territory 2005).
The Salvation Army has not exercised any sacramental functions, such as communion 
and baptism, since 1883.° The major reason for this is that it focuses on inward faith and 
salvation, rather than outward signs of spiritual grace.7
withdrew from the Reform Movement, he became a preacher of the Methodist New Connexion in
1854.
3 Booth describes the Home Mission Movement as ‘a miniature Salvation Army’ (1889: 9). With 
regard to the characteristics and activity of the Home Mission Movement, Booth wrote as follows: 
‘Our (Booth’s and his ‘comrades’) plan of operation was simplicity itself. We obtained the loan of 
cottages, and in these held meetings every night, always commencing with an open-air address, fine 
weather or foul, all the year round, inviting the people indoors for another meeting. Here again we 
had lively songs, short and sharp exhortations insisting upon decision for Christ upon the spot, which 
was to be signified by coming out and kneeling at the round table that stood in the middle of the 
room. These efforts were accompanied by visitation of the sick and of the convents, whose names 
and addresses were always recorded, together with processions to the big chapel on the Sunday, 
which the respectable authorities of the society soon compelled us to take in at the back door where 
the free seats were. When our converts died, we had Salvation funerals; placing the coffin in the 
street, singing around it, and holding another meeting at the grave when the parson had done’ 
(Horridge 1993: 17).
4 It was renamed The Salvation Army in 1878, when Booth introduced the institutional structure into 
the Home Mission Movement. In the period from 1865 to 1868, Booth changed the movement’s 
name to the Christian Revival Association, to the East London Revival Association, and to the East 
London Christian Mission. In 1868 the name became The Christian Mission, and this name lasted 
until 1878.
Because of its military style, The Salvation Army describes its religious activity in military terms. 
For example, ‘corps’ refers to church and ‘to invade’ refers to ‘send missionaries’.
6 Walker (2001: 117-19) reveals that, when The Army was established, it instructed all officers to
offer communion monthly. However, its attention to the equality between men and women posed a 
challenge to explain why women were permitted to perform the sacrament ritual. The Army
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Catherine Booth wrote:
What an inveterate tendency there is in the human heart to trust in outward forms, 
instead of inward grace! And when this is the case, what a hindrance rather than 
help have these forms proved to the growth, nay to the very existence, of that 
spiritual life which constitutes the real and only force of Christian experience 
(Sandall 1964: 130).
In addition, the Army’s values are, as Booth insisted, that churches should take an 
active role in tackling social injustice, that the Army should not follow the established 
church, which accommodates mainly upper classes. Rejection of any identity as a 
church also came from Booth’s antagonism towards the ecclesiastical bodies that had 
rejected him and the classes of people he had set out to save (Murdoch 1985: 377). In 
sum, the Army’s identity as an ‘international movement’ derived from the fact that it 
did not exercise sacramental functions, but focused on inward faith and salvation, and 
that Booth resisted the established church, and promoted the fundamental values in 
which the founders of The Salvation Army believed.
In the 1880s, The Salvation Army’s work expanded its scope in two directions. 
The first was a greater focus on social issues. As Murdoch (1985: 436) explains:
The Army turned from a singular concern for revivalism to work to save “fallen 
women” drunkards, and released prisoners. By 1888 Booth was preaching not only 
individual salvation from sin, but salvation from a diseased environment which 
perpetuated a pattern of evil in urban slums.
It was at this moment that The Salvation Army formulated the values that have 
continued until today: a mixture of evangelism with an emphasis on inward faith and 
salvation, and a belief that it is more properly the mission of churches to tackle social 
injustice.
The second direction was geographical. Its activity expanded from the slums of 
East London to encompass the United Kingdom, British colonies, the United States, 
Europe and Scandinavia. The Army had ‘invaded’ thirty-four countries by 1890, and
answered with its theological understanding that the Lord’s own principle there being ‘neither male 
nor female’ in Christ Jesus is fully acted upon. Walker (2001: 118) explains that ‘[paradoxically, the 
very theological understanding that made it possible for women to offer communion also led 
Salvationists to believe that it was redundant'.
As other relatively minor reasons, the Army states as follows: (1) The Bible does not have basis for 
regarding the sacraments as essential to salvation or Christian living, nor does it show that Jesus 
intended that sacramental practices should have become fixed ceremonies; (2) The sacraments had 
been a divisive influence in the Church throughout Christian history, and at times the cause of bitter 
controversy and abuse; (3) Some churches do not allow women to administer the sacraments. The 
Army, however, believed that women could place an equal part in its ministry, and did not want to 
compromise this stance; (4) The Society of Friends (the Quakers) had managed to live holy lives 
without the use of sacraments; (5) Many early-day converts to the Army had previously been 
alcoholics. It was considered unwise to tempt them with the wine used in Holy Communion (The 
Salvation Army United Kingdom with the Republic of Ireland 2005).
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pursued in its ‘invasion' the dual objectives of spiritual and physical salvation. Booth 
was ‘building a benevolent empire, a Christian Imperium' (Murdoch 1985: 421).
Encounter with China: Reformulation o f Identity on the Surface?
William Booth intended to make China part of the Christian Imperium, but he was 
unable to ‘invade’ China during his lifetime. In 1912, he charged his son and successor, 
Bram^well Booth, to make the ‘invading’ of China one of his first official acts as the 
new General (Jeffries 1918: 301-02). The outbreak of World War I delayed the 
‘invasion’, so the first contingent, consisting of forty international officers, did not leave 
London until 1915.K Illustration 5.1 shows the farewell service for missionary officers 
who set off to China at that time. The headline ‘For the Salvation of China’s Millions!’ 
reflects very clearly the values the Army had before it went to China, and that it took 
with it as its mission.
Commissioner Charles H. Jeffries represented The Salvation Army on its first 
mission to China, landing with his officers in Beijing in 1916 (see Photograph 5.1). 
Having received language education, they began to evangelize the Chinese, and 
according to Jeffries (1918: 303), ‘a splendid body of converts [was] won’.
The evangelical activity The Salvation Army undertook in the Republican period 
was the same as it had undertaken in England. As expressed in The Chinese Recorder 
(1918: 765), ‘[w]ith flag dying, drum and tambourine beating, cornet playing and hearty 
singing, we marched down the streets’. The Army’s evangelical work continued and it 
gradually raised its presence in China. For example, in the 1920s, General Feng 
Yuxiang, a Guomindang General known as the ‘Christian General’, extended an 
invitation to The Salvation Army to conduct evangelical meetings with his troops. 
‘Under his command were fifty thousand soldiers’, and ‘his wish was that all would 
know Christ’ (Yee 2005: 22-23).
Although Booth’s power in the Christian Imperium was centralized under a 
military style leadership, as its General, Booth was also aware of the need to 
‘indigenize’ the Army, stating, ‘we have no right to impose Western notions on the 
Eastern peoples’, since that would be ‘the sheerest folly [and] practical tyranny’ (Booth; 
quoted in Murdoch 1985: 422). In an article published in the Missionary Yearbook of 
1918, Jeffries explains the Army’s standpoint on the issue o f ‘indigenization’.
s The forty officers represented nine different countries: England, Canada, America, Scotland, Finland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand (Jeffries 1918: 302).
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Illustration 5.1: "For the Salvation of China’s Millions!’
THE
WAR Ä
Official. Orüan of The S alvation A rmy
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H*. 2,158 JNTE8NATKMULJ LONDON, SA TU R D A Y , D E C E M B E R  1, 1SJT p tE A tK ie A in * * »  h i m  o s *  * * * * *  ( w ,T u™ .;
For the Salvation of China’s Millions!
The Chief of the Staff Dedicating Outgoing Missionary Officers in the Central Hall, Westminster. 
] m e l : Commissioner Jeffries Delivering his Farewell Message
Source: The War Cry: Official Organ o f The Salvation Army, I December 1917.
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The “Memorandum of Appointment” that General Bramewell Booth gave to 
Charles Jeffries, the first Commissioner for China, clearly expresses the principle 
of the indigenisation of The Salvation Army: Chinese customs must be followed as 
far as is considered necessary to the successful working of The Salvation Army in 
the Territory.
Chinese officers should be raised, trained and pushed forward. They must be made 
to feel that they are loved, trusted, believed in, given opportunities and 
responsibilities suited to their capacities.
You must seek to make the people feel that our object is to raise up an Army of 
Chinese, which shall, as part of the world-wide Salvation Army, take its share in 
the salvation of the rest of the world (Jeffries 1918: 303).
However, the ‘indigenization’ referred to above resulted in only superficial 
changes. The first and most obvious change was to indigenize the appearance of the 
Army’s officers. Photograph 4.1 is a 1918 photograph of a uniform of The Salvation 
Army, in which Commissioner Jeffries is wearing Chinese clothes and a Manchurian 
hat with the words ‘The Salvation Army’ written on it in Chinese {Jin Shi Jim 
He explains the reason for adopting the Chinese costume as follows:
That such a costume will enable the foreign officers to associate themselves more 
closely with the Chinese in general and their colleagues in particular, will help to 
undermine the idea that Westernization and Christianity are one and the same thing, 
and will emphasize the fact that the Chinese Christians are not following foreigners 
when they become Christians {The Chinese Recorder 1918: 765).1 *0
His distinguishing of Westernization from Christianity is reminiscent of the values of 
Christian missionaries discussed in Chapter Three. As noted, late nineteenth century 
Christian missionaries at first tended to separate Christianity from Western civilization, 
but later in the early twentieth century these become merged through a modification of 
their values (see Chapter Three: 86-90). The Salvation Army, as an evangelical 
organization, however, still adhered to the distinction between Christianity and 
Westernization.
1 cannot identify the exact process of translation of the name to "Jin Shi Jiin\ However, according to
the Dictionary’ of History o f Christianity in Japan {Nihon Kirisutokyö Rekishi Dai Jiten H 4^ A U X 
b l&JS‘i! Ozaki Yukio (H^nffr£!) wrote an newspaper article on the Salvation Army, and
translated it as ‘Kyii Sei Gun’, Japanese reading using the same Chinese characters, in 1879. When 
Ozaki was the Mayer of Tokyo City from 1903 to 1912, he welcomed William Booth’s visit to 
Tokyo. Considering the fact that it was not until 1918 that The Salvation Army went to China, and
there are so many other English terms translated in Japanese first and spread to China in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the term \Jiu Shi Jiin' might be adopted from Japanese
translation. The Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, also
stated that the term \Jiu Shi Jun' came from Japanese, because before The Salvation Army ‘invaded’
China in 1918, some Japanese members of The Salvation Army visited China. Interview with the
Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, Hong Kong, 16 
December 2005.
11 A similar explanation was given in Jeffries (1918: 304).
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The Army’s strong commitment to Christianity is also clear in the following quote 
from Jeffries:
Wc shall be guided entirely by the question as to whether it will contribute to the 
work of winning the children and their parents to Christ. Education as an end in 
itself, and that does not lead to the acceptance of Christ, has no place in our 
program (1918: 308).
The need to distinguish Westernization from Christianity derived not only from the 
point of view of the Army’s values, grounded as they were in Christianity, but also from 
the intention underpinning the plan to indigenize itself.
The second action in the Army’s effort to indigenize itself was an attempt at self­
funding by the Chinese people. The majority of funding still came from 1HQ in 
London," but the fact that some was generated domestically is worth noting because it 
differs from the situation today, in which no funding is raised from the Chinese public. 
According to Commissioner Jeffries (1918: 305), ‘contrary to all the warnings we had 
received as to the congregations leaving if we asked for money, in no case did this 
happen’. Efforts to self-fund continued into the 1940s. For example, when the Army ran 
a Porridge Kitchen feeding 800 to 900 people daily in Chefoo, over $10,000.00 was 
required, and ‘considerably more than half of this sum was donated by local residents 
(The Chinese Recorder 1941: 619).
When the Communists came to power in 1949, the activity of The Salvation Army 
in China was suspended. When Chinese religious leaders such as Wu Yaozong (UM! 
>7s) began to discuss the Three Self Movement in China, Colonel Ludbrook, the North 
China territorial leader of the Army, suggested that the Army institute its own Three- 
Self Movement. As was feared, however, the international connection had to be broken. 
The Army members regarded separation from the international connection as a crisis. 
The 1HQ wrote, ‘[t]he Army in China is passing through momentous days. Far-reaching 
changes are taking place and full responsibility for the continuance of the Army’s work 
will soon be placed entirely on national officers’ (Brown 1988: 128). Ludbrook realized 
that eviction was imminent, and therefore appointed four Chinese ‘trustees’. In 
December 1951, ‘[a]U Salvation Army operations were officially turned over to the 
Chinese Salvation Army’ (Zhang Hua Jiu Shi Jiin 'l 1^ ^  Iflfif) (Zhonghua Jiu Shi Jiin 
1951; Brown 1988: 132; Yin 1982).
11 Interview with the Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, 
Hong Kong, 16 December 2005.
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The Chinese Salvation Army continued its evangelical work in China without 
international connections until July 1958. By that time, however, all the distinctive 
features of individual groups, such as the military appurtenances of The Salvation 
Army, had to be surrendered (Bush 1970: 232; Jones 1962: 155-57). The property of the 
Chinese Salvation Army was transferred to the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) 
(Yin 1982). Until the Salvation Army in the United States entered China in 1988, the 
Chinese Salvation Army officers who survived the Cultural Revolution had spent a 
great deal of time in isolation from their overseas roots. The Salvation Army Hong 
Kong, however, survived throughout the expulsions from mainland China. It was first 
established in Guangdong 1930 as the South China Command. The Salvation Army was 
requested to meet the needs of the desperate women of Hong Kong.12 The Command 
changed its location to Hong Kong Island in 1939, and later moved to its current 
headquarters in Kowloon (The General of The Salvation Army 2004).
The Salvation Army (California Corps in the United States) returned to mainland 
China in 1988, some decades after having been expelled from China in the 1950s. It 
offered disaster relief to Gengma County (4^C>i|||-), in Yunnan Province after a serious 
earthquake there and used the opportunity to re-establish a good relationship with the 
Chinese government. In 1991, The Salvation Army in Hong Kong took charge of 
operations, and then set up regional offices on the mainland in Kunming in 1996 and in 
Beijing in 2001. Today, Army projects on the mainland are still supervised by its 
Headquarters in Hong Kong.
Values Outside Mainland China Today
The Salvation Army today still supports its founder’s approach to religious and social 
welfare activity. The fundamental values established over one-hundred and fifty years 
ago, which include simplicity, concern for the poor, no sacramental functions, no 
baptism and no alcohol, remain important today. Its slogan, ‘Heart to God, Hand to 
Man’ epitomizes such values. This slogan derives from its international mission 
statement, as follows:
The Salvation Army, an international movement, is an evangelical part of the 
universal Christian church. Its message is based on the Bible. Its ministry is 
motivated by love for God. Its mission is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and
12 This work, pioneered by Majors Dorothy Brazier and Doris Lemon, was initially (until the 
establishment of the South China Command in Guangdong in 1935) directed from Bei jing in order to 
promote broad ranging evangelistic and welfare operations.
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meet human needs in his name without discrimination (The General of The 
Salvation Army 2004).
Although the Army is committed to evangelism, the meeting of human needs, or 
'hand to man’, is also integral to its values. It is essential to note that the mission to 
'meet human needs’ refers to not only physical needs, but also emotional and spiritual 
needs. The two missions, to ‘preach the gospel’ and to ‘meet human needs’, are 
inseparable. Meeting human needs is also regarded as a religious activity from The 
Salvation Army’s point of view.
Clearly, in the current political context in China, the Army is not permitted to 
conduct religious activity. An address by The Salvation Army’s General John Larsson 
in 2005, in which he mentions the Army’s work in China, reveals how The Salvation 
Army deals with this problem.
There are a hundred million Christians already in China and The Salvation Anny 
has been working there, meeting human needs, for nearly 20 years -  running all 
kinds of projects: wells, agricultural, medical and educational projects. We’ve built 
120 schools in China. Three thousand children are sponsored there, and our hope 
and our prayer and our focus is [s/c] that we may be able to go into China in the 
fullness of what The Salvation Army is. In the meantime we are establishing 
ourselves. We 're preaching the gospel with our hands in China (Larsson 2005; my 
emphasis).
How should his expression ‘preaching the gospel with our hands in China’ be 
interpreted? If this expression is understood literally, it refers to activity that would be 
considered illegal in China. Obviously, this expression does not mean that the Army 
preaches the gospel publicly on the open street, as it did in the Republican period. 
According to Larsson, what matters is the fact that the local Chinese feel the ‘presence’ 
of the Army when it helps them. This is called ‘presence evangelism'. He continues:
The Salvation Army has its own way of making its presence felt. For example, in 
many projects we bring in big cloth bags of flour and they’re printed with The 
Salvation Army shield. The people make bread with the flour, then use the white 
bags as curtains in their home. So, as you walk down the street you sec Salvation 
Anny curtains everywhere! (Larsson 2005)
The Salvation Army curtains do not imply that the Army evangelizes and the local 
people come to believe in The Salvation Anny’s values. However, the fact that the 
Army helps the villagers in the name of God and the ‘Spirit’, without hiding its 
Christian identity, is important. ‘Presence evangelism’ is the most important tool it can 
use to promote its religious values.
In fact, promoting its shield mark ‘brand’ is high on the agenda of The Salvation 
Army worldwide (see Illustration 5.2). By doing so, it seeks to raise its profile, and
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spread information on the kinds of services people can obtain from the Army. One of 
the officers of The Salvation Army in Australia said in an interview:
This is just like the effect of the yellow sign ‘M’ on the streets. People immediately 
know it means MacDonald’s. They know exactly what kind of food they can get, 
and how much it will cost. We are thinking of achieving a similar effect by 
promoting the shield mark brand. People know that they can come to us when they 
need help. Also, the shield mark creates opportunities for people to ask what The 
Salvation Army is doing.13
Illustration 5.2: The Salvation Army’s Red Shield (left) and Crest (right)
The officer also said that the Army used its crest to signify many aspects of the 
beliefs of the Army (see Illustration 5.2). For example, the round figure of the sun 
‘represents the light and fire of the Holy Spirit’; and ‘the cross of Jesus stands at the 
centre of the crest, and of the Salvationist’s faith’ (The Salvation Army Australia 
Eastern Territory 2006). The crest is meaningful to people within the Army, and the 
shield to people outside the Army. The use of the shield mark, therefore, is prevalent, 
and is not limited to China. The Salvation Army in mainland China often uses the red 
shield at its project sites (see Photos 5.1 and 5.2). It should be noted that the Army in 
mainland China does not use the crest at its projects sites, arguably because the crest 
connotes religious meaning more directly than the red shield does.
13 Interview with an officer of Overseas Services, The Salvation Army Australian Eastern Territory, 
Sydney, 22 February 2006.
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Photo 5.2: The Salvation Army’s Shield Mark at the Primary School in Fangmaba Village 
(Taken by author)
Photo 5.3: The Sign of Village Vet with The Salvation Army’s Shield Mark 
(Taken by author)
Note: The top line of the sign says, ‘Zhaoyang qu -  Jiushijun Zonghe Fazhan Xiangmu' (Zhaoyang 
District-The Salvation Army Integrated Development Project). The bottom line of the sign says,
‘Fangmaba Cun Shouyi Shi' (Fangmaba Village Vet Room).
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Finally, in this section, it is necessary to consider how The Salvation Army 
promotes its religious values in different religious contexts. In fact, The Salvation Army 
as an organization does not have a declared position on this issue. Therefore, in order to 
understand where the Army might stand on this issue, it is useful to draw on the 
personal perceptions of individual Army members. The views of individual officers in 
Hong Kong, Australia and Japan suggest that they all share a so-called liberal view of 
cross-religious issues. In other words, their attitude towards other religions appears 
relatively open, and individual members seem to believe that the Army shares its belief 
in God with people of other religions. 'When one undertakes any activity, one should 
start from where the people are’, said an officer in the Overseas Service section of The 
Salvation Army in Australia. Referring to a story from the Bible, she said, 'when Saint 
Paul was on his way to Rome, he did not start talking about Christ. He started talking 
about the things that the local people believed in’. When people are in need, The 
Salvation Army tries to help them regardless of their religion. ‘Putting theology aside’, 
she said, ‘what is important is action in the name of Jesus ' . 14
Such openness can be seen also in the Army’s cooperation with people of other 
religions when undertaking its activity. It seems many of the Army’s officers have a 
positive attitude towards employing and working with people of different religions. This 
attitude relates directly to the belief of many Army officers that Christianity can share 
the message of love, and stories of God, with other religions. One officer in Japan 
remarked:
There arc many religions that sincerely take care of others. If, as written in the 
Bible, God is Love, then people of other religions also can be messengers of God’s 
love. There arc different forms of messengers, but the most important thing is that 
the messengers can pass the love of God on to people. 15
This officer emphasized that denial would not create anything. The starting point of 
evangelism should be ‘to live together with others, accept the way they live, and throw 
oneself into the setting, while constantly practising the love of God’. In this sense, 
Christianity is not superior to other religions according to the Army’s understanding.
On the other hand, the Army does believe in the importance of evangelism. 
Working with people of other religions, according to another officer in Hong Kong, 
creates an important opportunity for Salvationists to demonstrate the love o f God; 
people of other religions, or of no particular religion, can come to know this love
14 Ibid.
" Phone interview with an officer of The Salvation Army Japan, 16 January 2006.
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through the attitudes of the Salvationists. In other words, the Army aims at voluntary 
conversion to Christianity by letting people see the very driving force by which the 
Salvationists offer their kindness—the love of Jesus Christ’. Therefore, from the 
Army’s point of view, working with people of other religions could lead to ‘multiplying 
the number of Christians’ . 16
Reformulation of Identity in Mainland China
In mainland China, The Salvation Army enjoys a very peaceful relationship with the 
Chinese government. It maintains a close relationship with the Civil Affairs Bureau, as 
well as with the Central Religious Affairs Bureau. According to the Officer 
Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, some senior 
Chinese government officials have affirmed that The Salvation Army is a law-abiding 
church organization working in China on development projects, and that the 
government cannot find any fault with the Army at all. 17 Such affirmation, which 
amounts to a kind of ‘ethical clearance’ by government officials, is vital to the Army’s 
security in mainland China. In this context, its emphasis on evangelism has to be 
reformulated to enable it to maintain its peaceful relationship with the government. The 
question, of course, is how and to what extent does the Army do so?
On the mainland today, The Salvation Army does not evangelize in the sense it 
did in the Republican period. In fact, today the Army’s project officers in mainland 
China are very cautious about their Christian values. Some officers still wear their 
Army uniform when engaged on projects, but otherwise, their activities appear little 
different from those of secular organizations. Secularization is a very prominent feature 
of the reformulated values underpinning the Army’s activities in China.
Funding and Personnel Relations
The secular characteristic of the Army’s activities in China is not only a consequence of 
the need to conform to Chinese regulations but also a result of conditionality tied to 
funding. Army projects in China receive funds from two main sources. The first and 
more significant of the two main sources is overseas governments and NGOs such as 
AusAID, NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) and the Tear
16 Interview with the Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command. 
Hong Kong, 16 December 2005.
Ibid.17
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Fund.1* Financial support for projects in China is often indirect. For example, funding 
from AusAID goes first to The Salvation Army in Australia, before it is redirected 
through its Flong Kong headquarters to projects in China. 19 When government aid 
agencies fund projects, such funding is usually tied to secular use. For example, 
AusAID requires all the NGOs to distinguish development from evangelization, and to 
limit use of its funds to development. 20 Despite this condition, during an interview with 
a Salvation Army official in Australia, the official indicated that the Army did not have 
a problem with government funding, and generally accepted it. Interestingly, tying 
funds to secular use does not really matter to the Army, as ‘The Salvation Army is big 
enough to work at the margins of such government demands’ . 21
‘Fund matching’ is the second source of funding for projects. This occurs when 
Chinese local governments provide up to half of the overall project funding. On average, 
the Army seeks between one fourth and one third of a project budget from local 
governments, in particular, from the poverty alleviation office (fupin ban of
each local government. 22 The Army’s aim is to involve local governments in projects, 
with the expectation that, by doing so, local governments and people develop a greater 
sense of ownership of, and therefore interest in, the Army’s projects. 23 Chinese local 
governments would dare not invest in religious activity. Therefore, projects in China are 
determined, by both Western and Chinese governments, to be secular. In short, from the 
point of view of financing, the Army has to reformulate its overt evangelical Christian 
values to meet the demands of the Chinese central government—leading to the almost 
complete secularization of those values in order to gain approval to carry out its projects.
On the other hand, the values of The Army’s staff members working in mainland 
China remain Christian to some extent. 24 There are in two project offices some eight
ls Written communication with Liason Officer.China Development Department, The Salvation Army 
Hong Kong and Macau Command, 16 December 2005.
|g In relation to the provision of government funding to NGOs, it should be noted that even though 
NGOs operate at a global or transnational level, some Western government aid agencies (for example 
AusAID) still provide funding on a national level, and it is difficult for NGOs based in other 
countries to receive funding from other western government aid agencies. This could be interpreted 
as their aim to foster their own ‘national interests’ through overseas aid.
20 Interview with Manager of NGO Program, Community Programs Section, AusAID, Canberra, 18 
January 2006.
21 Interview' w ith an officer of Overseas Services, The Salvation Army Australian Eastern Territory, in 
Sydney, 22 February 2006.
22 Interview with the Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, in 
Hong Kong, 16 December 2005.
23 Ibid.
24 It is important to identify a distinction between working for The Salvation Army and being a part of 
The Salvation Army. Chinese people may work for The Salvation Army as secular employees 
throughout their entire career and need never become religious members. However, this differs from
154 CHAPTER FIVE
project officers who implement development projects in China, and on each project site, 
local government officials who work for The Salvation Army. These people fall into 
three categories. The first includes employees in Hong Kong. They are all Christian, 
being either ‘officers’ or ‘soldiers’ of The Salvation Army in Hong Kong. They work as 
senior officers, and receive relatively higher salaries than locally employed officers. 
Some of the Hong Kong officers wear the Army uniform when engaged in their 
projects; as discussed earlier, the wearing of the uniforms creates at least some 
opportunity for locals to ask about Christianity. The second category includes local 
employees in mainland China. These are appointed as assistant project officers. Most of 
them, at least at the time their employment starts, are non-Christian. The third category 
includes local government officials, who actually work on Army projects at particular 
project sites from day to day. Irrespective of whether they work specifically and 
exclusively on a Salvation Army project or do so as merely one part of their job in local 
government, they receive salaries from the relevant local government. An apparent 
unequal relationship between two groups emerges from an analysis of this situation. 
One group is made up of Hong Kong Christians in higher positions and with higher 
salaries. The other group is made up of mainland Chinese non-Christians in lower 
positions, and with lower salaries.
To put Christian workers in higher positions is not necessarily a deliberate policy 
of The Salvation Army. Rather, this distinction derives from China’s social 
circumstances. First of all, in terms of the difference in the amount of salary, the cost of 
living on the mainland differs markedly from that of living in Hong Kong, and therefore 
salary difference based on place of employment is not necessarily derived from any 
intention to discriminate unfavourably. Secondly, NGOs generally are relatively new to 
mainland China, and they lack human resources with adequate training in development 
work. In addition, regardless of the fact that working for international NGOs pre­
supposes high-level skill-sets and a high pre-requisite level of education, officials of 
NGOs enjoy lower status than officials of the government and a less secure welfare 
system than that provided for employees holding down government jobs. This is one 
reason many of NGOs employ relatively young people. Thus, Hong Kong employees 
with a higher education and greater knowledge of community development end up 
obtaining higher positions.
the relationship enjoyed by non-mainland Chinese who may join as religious soldiers undertaking an 
oath to be a soldier for life.
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However, over time, many of the local employees who started working for The 
Salvation Army as secular employees have gradually become Christians. According to 
the Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, the 
Army does not provide them with a religious education; as a result of their interaction 
with senior Christian employees or with visiting officers of The Salvation Army, 
however, many of them have adapted to Christian values.25 This personnel dimension 
provides another picture of the extent to which the Army’s values are reformulated in 
the context of project activity in China.
Design o f the Community Development Project
When the Army designs a community development project, to what extent does it 
reformulate its values? The Salvation Army conducted an integrated development 
project in Fangmaba Administrative Village in Panhe Township, in Zhaoyang District, 
in Zhaotong City (HpjSflfBpffilx from 2000 to 2003. Zhaotong
City is approximately 300 km north-east of Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province. 
Fangmaba Administrative Village, where the Army undertook the project, is less than 
100 km northeast of Zhaotong City. This is very close to the area where Samuel Pollard 
stayed and evangelized the Miao at the beginning of the twentieth century, as discussed 
in chapter three.
When a senior program officer of the Army visited Zhaotong in 1999 to conduct a 
pre-project needs analysis, the area was located in one of the eighteen poorest districts 
(identified at the national level) (Yunnan Sheng Zhaotong Shi Nianjian Bianji 
Weiyuanhui 2001).26 In the community, he found that villagers were suffering from a 
serious lack of food. One reason for this was a high death rate among their pigs, caused 
by a plague. Another reason was a high level of disease among community members, 
resulting from toxins in one of the food staples, potatoes. The area was not suitable for 
rice growing, and potatoes and com were the staple foods. Having identified these 
problems, an integrated development project was designed to address them.
The project had seven major components, including cultivation, animal husbandry, 
animal pens, training, a school/training centre, health, and a satellite television receiver,
2’ Interview with the Officer Commanding The Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau Command, in 
Hong Kong, 16 December 2005.
2(1 In 1995, there were 122 so-called "poor townships’ (out of 173 townships), and 1004 so-called "poor 
administrative villages’ (out of 1221 villages). Out of an agricultural population of 4,160,400, there 
were some 1,620,000 people who did not have enough food and clothing, including 302,000 people 
in extreme poverty, lacking basic survival resources (Yunnan Sheng Zhaotong Shi Nianjian Bianji 
Weiyuanhui 2001).
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(see Table 5.1). The project was of considerable financial scope: 1,520,400 RMB 
(approximately US$190,050) in total. Of this, The Salvation Army contributed 
1,108,400 RMB, and the local district government contributed 412,000 RMB (including 
the cost of the building of a primary school for 200,000 RMB).27
Table 5.1: The Integrated Development Projects conducted by The Salvation Army in Fangmaba 
Administrative Village, Panhe Township, Zhaovang District, Zhaotong City, Yunnan Province
Component Activity
Cultivation To promote the planting of virus-free potatoes To set up a community revolving fund for cultivation
Animal Husbandry
To deliver an epidemic prevention service to the animals (vaccinations 
for pigs and cattle)
To set up a community revolving fund for pig husbandry
Animal Pen To construct or rebuild animal pens
Training
To provide the local villagers with training in agriculture, animal 
husbandry, health care and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(adopted by the United Nations) to the local villagers
School/Training Centre To rebuild the School/Training CenterTo build a Teaching Site at Xingfa Natural Village
Health
To deliver medical services to the local villagers 
To deliver medical services to domestic animals 
To equip the health clinic with basic equipment and medicine 
To set up a community revolving fund for medicine
Satellite Television 
Receiver To install a satellite TV and phone (in the Fangmaba Primary School)
Source: The Salvation Army Hong Kong and Macau Command (2002, 2003).
The Army dealt with the material and educational aspects at the same time. This 
combination is important, because the material aspects served short-term development 
aims, while the educational aspects served long-term development aims. For poor 
villagers, the priority is everyday life and improving their economic conditions, rather 
than receiving an education. However, combining the two aspects together made the 
training more effective, and more convenient, for the villagers. More specifically, The 
Salvation Army designed the project in such a way that villagers were able to receive 
animal husbandry training, health training and even training in the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child at the same time. This was convenient for the villagers because 
they had to walk for hours to get to the village centre. In addition, the health training in 
particular was aimed at women, who are socially marginalized in this particular village.
Who undertook the project in practice? Even though the Army is a Christian 
organization, it was the chief local coordinator of the project who implemented the 
project. The coordinator was actually a local government official in the poverty
2 This figure comes from the project’s budget forecast, but post-project actual expenditure turns out to 
have been a similar figure. Interview with Liason Officer, China Development Department, The 
Salvation Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in Hong Kong, 17 December 2005.
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alleviation office in Zhaoyang District; of course, as a communist member, he is an 
atheist. Also, of the many officers of The Salvation Army who went to Zhaoyang from 
time to time, few were Christian. As explained earlier, senior staff members despatched 
from Hong Kong were Christian, but they usually worked in Beijing, and rarely went to 
Zhaoyang. When they did go to a project site, they were able to talk about Christianity 
if they were asked to by the villagers, but this was quite rare. 28
The Salvation Army took a so-called ‘participatory1 approach to its project. 
According to a Salvation Army staff member in Kunming, the role of The Salvation 
Army in the process of acquiring knowledge of ‘local needs’ was merely to facilitate the 
discussion of the villagers. 29
The reformulation of The Salvation Army’s values in China is significant. Apart 
from the conversion of local personnel to Christianity, project financial arrangements 
and the design of projects both reveal that the Army secularizes its work to a high 
degree. The section that follows will discuss the way ethnic communities responded to 
the Army project, and revisit the issue of ‘presence evangelism* discussed earlier. 
Having seen in this section that the Army significantly reformulates its values on the 
mainland, it is essential to examine how ethnic communities have actually responded to 
the religious expression of the Army—to ‘presence evangelism'. The next section will 




When explaining local interaction between The Salvation Army and ethnic communities 
in the Fangmaba village, it is first necessary to identify which ‘ethnic communities’ are 
under examination. The aims of this section are first, to discuss how the Army 
understood ‘community’ in implementing its project, and second, to explore other 
overlapping communities existing at the project site, based on the understanding of
28 One of the project officers, who works in different projects for the Army, revealed that because of 
The Salvation Army uniform, and its unusual name as ‘The Army of World Salvation (Jin Shi Jiin)\ 
villagers know that it is a Christian organization. In the course of informal conversations between the 
Army officer and villagers, the officer has been asked what Christianity means, and who Jesus is. He 
has staled that this is no problem from the government’s perspective, because this is a friendship and 
no more than a casual conversation, and does not imply evangelizing.
29 Interview with Acting Regional Co-ordinator, Southwest Regional Project Office, The Salvation 
Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in Kunming, 19 November 2004.
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‘community’ discussed in Chapter One of this thesis. Recalling the discussion in 
Chapter One, community is understood as ‘a process of boundary making, affected by 
interaction with “outsiders” ’ (see Chapter One: 36). I have argued that what constitutes 
the social boundary of a ‘community’ is identity, which can be observed by means of 
the examples of social hierarchy and social practice. According to this understanding, at 
least three overlapping communities existed in the Fangmaba village.
The Salvation Army focused on the entire Fangmaba village as a single 
community. This community has a population of about 2,400. This is a politically 
constructed ‘community’ rather than naturally generated ‘community’, established by 
the Provisional Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees (Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa 
(Shixing) ( i^ tx ) )  adopted by the 23rd Session of the Sixth
National People's Congress on 24 November 1987.30 The Fangmaba Administrative 
Village community is organized by its villagers’ committee, the members of which have 
been directly elected by the villagers since 2001.31 The villagers’ committee manages 
public affairs at the village level.
The scale of an administrative village varies from about a thousand households to 
only several households, and the importance of the villagers’ committee in the minds of 
the villagers also varies depending on the scale of the village, according to one of my 
interviewees.32 In a large scale administrative village such as Fangmaba, which contains 
a number of natural villages within its boundary, the villagers’ committee and the 
village head are relatively remote from the day-to-day activities of many of the 
villagers. As one Salvation Army local project coordinator revealed, any sense of 
community identity in this administrative village is weak: put differently, community 
members do not feel that they belong to this administrative village on a day-to-day basis. 
One reason for this is that the administrative village is widely dispersed geographically. 
It contains seventeen natural villages, and it takes many hours for community members 
residing in the south of the administrative village to travel to the north of it. This means 
that there is no regular daily contact among the more remote community members 
within the administrative village. Another reason for this weak sense of community 
identity is that the villagers’ committee does not have a solid financial foundation. This
30 Although the law was established in 1987, it was finally codified by the Ninth National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee in 1998.
Interview with Fangmaba Administrative Village Head, in Zhaotong, 27 November 2004.
32 Interview with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, Kunming, 1 I November 2003.
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results in low quality village management.33 The villagers’ committee does not receive 
funds from the government for administrative costs, even though it advertises and 
implements government policy at the village level. Until the 1980s, the village had a 
'production team’ (sheng chan dui W) that provided the village with a collective 
economic income, which became the financial foundation of the village. In contrast, in 
the current villager committee system, the village has a weaker financial foundation. It 
is difficult for the villagers as community members to come up with ideas about their 
‘community’ without such a financial foundation; rather, their focus is on how 
individual expectations would be realized.34 In other words, community identity in this 
politically constructed community is fragile. Nevertheless, the Army focused on this 
politically-constructed community when it implemented its project.
My investigation of Fangmaba village revealed that the villagers identify 
themselves more strongly with communities within Fangmaba than with the politically 
constructed administrative village. There are in fact seventeen natural villages within 
the overall administrative structure of the Fangmaba village, and each natural village 
can be understood as a community at the natural village level. All seventeen natural 
villages consist of about forty close-knit households, even though the distance from 
natural village to natural village can be great. Each of these seventeen villages is an 
important foundation in the everyday life of its forty or so households. The Salvation 
Army did not acknowledge these individual natural villages as distinct. In an interview 
with one of the staff members of The Salvation Army, I asked whether there existed any 
differences in the ‘local needs’ of these seventeen natural villages. He argued, ‘local 
topographical conditions are very similar, and therefore, the main problems these 
villages face are about the same across all the natural villages. The difference is very 
subtle’. 35 This led to ‘local needs’ being assessed at the administrative village 
community level. However, this does not mean that the natural village communities 
were completely ignored because in reality, the natural village heads played an 
important role in the Army’s project, particularly the role of selecting project 
participants from among the villagers, as will be discussed later.36
Interview with Local Project Coordinator of The Salvation Army (Official of Poverty Alleviation 
Office of Zhaoyang District Government), in Zhaotong, 26 November 2004.
34 Ibid.
Ibid.
36 Even though the natural villages are the community to which villagers feel belonged to, it is difficult 
to depend on the natural village heads. This is partly because the salary of administrative village head 
(z huren i f f )  was 220 yuan per month, and that of natural village head (zuzlwngt\[]x) was twenty 
yuan per month, but according to the village head, such salaries were not enough particularly when
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Another kind of community exists in the Fangmaba village. This community is 
based on religious and ethnic identity. One such community is made up of Miao 
Christians. Another is made up of Han atheists. In Fangmaba village, approximately 
thirty per cent of the population is Miao. The remaining seventy per cent is Han. Today, 
in this village, the Miao still have a different identity from that of the Han. By way of an 
example that illustrates the difference in the minds of the villagers, a Miao woman I 
interviewed in Fangmaba village complained quite specifically that the Han had stolen 
Miao crops.37 That this woman described the alleged theft in this way, rather than more 
neutrally as in ‘someone in this village stole someone’s crops’, illustrates the belief that 
there are distinct ethnic identities in this village.
Christianity is an important marker of the social boundary between Miao and Han. 
The Miao Christians in this village have a strong sense of their own community. In fact, 
they gather very frequently for religious activity such as Bible study, according to one 
interviewee, up to three times a week. Furthermore, the Christian gatherings are 
conducted mainly in the Miao language. Although some educated Miao can speak 
Mandarin, most speak only the indigenous Miao language by choice.3X It seems that this 
sort of religious gathering nurtures a sense of community and plays an important part in 
the everyday life of the Miao.
I interviewed a Miao villager in his thirties, and he confirmed his view that 
Christianity is an important community boundary marker among Miao villagers. I asked 
him about the needs of his village, and his answer was, T cannot think of anything (in 
relation to village needs). I merely think about myself. 1 then asked about the Christian 
gatherings in this village. Had he ever discussed the needs of the Christians in the 
village? Without hesitation he replied that he had: ‘We discussed the importance of 
caring; especially, visiting sick Christian friends, and providing them with spiritual and 
economic help. For example, a seventy year old man did not have coals to heat up his 
house, so we sent coals to him’ (just like in the Chinese proverb, ‘sending coals to a 
poor man’ (xue zhong tew song This interview suggests that to the Miao, a
sense of ‘community’ based on Christianity means more than any sense of community 
based on the administrative village.
they had meetings three to four times a month. Interview with Fangmaba Administrative Village 
Head, in Zhaotong, 27 November 2004.
Interview with a villager o f Fangmaba Village, in Zhaotong, 25 November 2005. 
s For example, one of my Miao interviewees stated she had had some difficulty understanding the 
training provided by The Salvation Army because the training was conducted in Mandarin.
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In addition to religion and language, the identity of the Miao Christians vis-ä-vis 
that of the Han is also based on unique Miao characteristics. Such characteristics—for 
example, in clothing, marriage customs and economic conditions—have been 
constructed also over a lengthy period of history. Chapter Three of this thesis described 
the lower status and poorer economic conditions of the Miao in relation to those of the 
Han and the Nosu (today's Yi) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even 
though the Communist government publicly espouses the equality of the various 
nationalities, the relatively lower status and poorer economic conditions of the Miao 
persist. 39 This is closely related to the language difference, which limits their 
opportunities for useful interaction with nearby towns for the purpose of engaging in 
commercial activity, and therefore limits opportunities to work among the Han.
Ironically, however, the Army seemed unaware of the religious community of this 
village. In response to a question about just what the religion of this community was, 
the Army staff member said, ‘that is a good question. The Miao is an ethnic group that 
has a Christian background'.40 He did not specifically answer my question on the 
religion of the Miao in this village. None of their project proposals mentioned the 
religious characteristics of the Miao either. He added, ‘Christians are usually found 
among the older generation. The younger generation does not believe in Christianity’.41 
Even though the fact that generational change had occurred was apparent, considering 
that the Miao have difficulty understanding Mandarin, and that they are relatively poor, 
it would have been meaningful to them had The Salvation Army focused on or at least 
examined the effect of using their Christian community in implementing its project. 
Nonetheless, and ironically, the local Christian community was largely ignored by this 
international Christian NGO.
Making use of a religious community in the execution of some project or other is 
not necessarily unusual in China. To begin with, the Communist Party has utilized local 
religious communities in the process of establishing a united front since the Party 
fought the Guomindang in the 1940s. In the context of civil society, too, more and more 
NGOs attempt to use local religious networks in undertaking projects. This is
Interview with Local Project Coordinator of The Salvation Army (Official of Poverty Alleviation 
Office of Zhaoyang District Government), in Zhaotong, 26 November 2004.
1(1 Interview with Acting Regional Co-ordinator, Southwest Regional Project Office, The Salvation 
Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in Kunming, 19 November 2004.
11 I could not do any further research on the current situation on Christian beliefs of younger Miao, 
because simply asking questions about religion in general caused The Salvation Army officers and 
local government officials getting nervous about a foreigner asking religious questions of local 
Christians.
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particularly so in Yunnan. For example, the Yunnan Family Planning Association, one 
of China’s government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), actively uses Muslim leaders to 
carry out HIV/AIDS education and encourages the use of condoms (Yunnan Family 
Planning Association 2003). By way of another example, the Amity Foundation, a 
domestic Christian NGO, also undertakes church-based projects and uses local religious 
networks to implement their projects more effectively.42
In answer to a question about why the Army did not deal with the local Christian 
community in Fangmaba village, a staff member of the Army highlighted the problem 
of the Army’s identity as an international Christian organization. He explained that the 
Amity Foundation, for example, is a domestic organization, backed by the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference. Because Amity is a domestic NGO with 
political support, it is able to make use of local religious communities in implementing 
its projects. In contrast, the Army staff member continued, in The Salvation Army’s 
case, being that of an international Christian NGO, the Army would have experienced a 
problem had it undertaken a project with reference to religion or by drawing on 
religious networks. The Chinese government is very sensitive about international 
Christian organizations dealing with local religious communities. It was also apparent 
from the interview that The Salvation Army had achieved a good level of cooperation 
with district and township governments, and the villagers’ committee. ‘As long as they 
were able to mobilize people, we didn’t need to cooperate with churches’.43
In addition, a local coordinator, who works for the Army project, and who is also 
an official of the district government, confirmed that it is because The Salvation Army 
is an international NGO that it cannot cooperate with local religious communities. 1 
asked him whether cooperating with the local churches would be possible if the 
organization was a domestic one. His answer was revealing:
There would be no problem if the NGO was a domestic one, but we would have to 
cooperate with the government sectors. Specifically, we would have to approach 
the religious bureau of the district government, and then approach the churches, 
and finally the Christian people.
This point, on the difference between China’s domestic religious organizations and 
international organizations, refutes conventional understanding of China’s civil society. 
Key studies on transnational civil society in China implicitly assume that domestic 
NGOs have less capacity to place a religious emphasis on their activity than do
42 Amity Foundation is a domestic NGO. because it has its Headquarter in Nanjing.
43 Interview with Acting Regional Co-ordinator, Southwest Regional Project Office, The Salvation 
Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in Kunming, 19 November 2004.
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international NGOs. Considering the Chinese government’s strong suspicion of 
international NGOs, and restriction of their activity, however, such an assumption is 
incorrect. One of China’s domestic religious NGOs, the Amity Foundation, for example, 
has greater capacity to engage with local religious communities, and to place a much 
stronger Christian emphasis on it dealings with them than do international Christian 
organizations.
In sum, The Salvation Army did not focus on the Miao Christian community for 
the following three reasons. The first is the Army’s dependence on the role of the 
villagers’ committee, in particular the role of the administrative village head. This is the 
community politically constructed by the Chinese government, and cooperating with it 
was a way for the Army to maintain a stable relationship with the local government. 
The second reason is the Army’s negligence of the importance of the religious 
community. Ironically, the Christianity of the Miao was considered irrelevant to a 
project conducted by a Christian organization. The third reason is the fact that the 
Army’s identity as an international Christian NGO seriously hindered it from 
recognizing the Miao religious community. Therefore, the Army preferred the 
administrative village community while downplaying natural village communities and 
the Miao Christian community. An important question is, then, to what extent did the 
Army’s preference for and downplaying of these communities affect the way the 
community members responded to the Army's project and its relevant values? The next 
section will explore the local responses to the Army’s training project and to presence 
evangelism.
Local Response to the Project: Training as ‘Local Needs'
The Army undertook the training of community members in such issues as agriculture, 
animal husbandry, health care and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 
by the United Nations). As discussed earlier, according to the Army’s senior project 
officer in Kunming, all project components were determined based on ‘local needs’. It 
is important, however, to examine precisely how such needs were identified by the 
Army, in order to appreciate the way the Army implemented its project.
The Army’s local coordinator was in charge of actually implementing the project. 
In the course of one interview, he revealed that there was a process by which 
community members ‘discovered’ their needs. During the first needs analysis conducted 
by the Army, community members did not make the connection with the idea of
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training as a ‘local need’. According to the local coordinator, when he asked what the 
villagers needed, they replied, ‘Money!’ Money is not what The Salvation Army was 
happy to give, because of its mere short-term impact. When the money is used up, the 
impact of the project also ends. Ideally, the positive impact of the project should persist 
in the community for a long time after the project’s end.
The local coordinator stated that close communication between the Army’s staff 
members (among whom he numbered himself) and community members was essential 
during the needs analysis phase of the project. 44 The local coordinator began his contact 
with the villagers by setting a relaxed scene, identifying with them by saying that he 
was not only the Army’s local coordinator and a government official but also a villager 
from a nearby village. This gave the villagers a friendly impression of him. Then he 
began to ask questions to research the economic conditions and problems of the 
villagers. He emphasized that how the questions were formed was important to 
obtaining relevant answers from the villagers. For example, he did not ask, ‘what is the 
average annual income per capita of this village?’ The questions had to be asked ‘at the 
level of the villagers’ thinking’. Examples of such questions include, ‘how much do you 
eat everyday?’ ‘What did the horses carry to town?’ ‘How many bags of corns can one 
horse carry?’ ‘How many times did you go to town with the horse?’
After researching the economic conditions, the coordinator asked the villagers 
whether their family members were well. When villagers said they were not, he asked 
what kind of sickness afflicted them. When the villagers described some of the 
symptoms, he would say, ‘Ok, s/he will feel alright when s/he gets this injection' or 
‘You will need some knowledge about this in order to prevent the sickness before it 
happens'. Then, he asked questions such as ‘What do you think about having training to 
acquire the knowledge to avoid such sickness?’ In this way, the villagers gradually 
came to appreciate the need for health training, and finally expressed a desire to receive 
health training. The project coordinator admitted that he was ‘guiding their needs’ 
(yindao tarnen dexuqiu rj | if J ifJ j o / ).
This begs the question of just who defines local ‘need’, and how such ‘need’ is 
supposed to be identified in community development. Development agencies often 
argue the importance of ‘needs assessment’, but in this project the ‘needs’ of the 
villagers were defined by what The Salvation Army determined to be important. The 
assumption underpinning this ‘guiding of needs’ is that the villagers were unable to
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discern their own ‘real needs’. It can be argued that ‘guiding needs’ is a sign of an 
asymmetrical understanding of the relationship between the international religious 
agency and ethnic communities; that is, the method of guiding the villagers to identify 
needs is arguably consistent with the idea underpinning the civilizing mission. While 
the Army proclaimed its project used a participatory approach to identify local needs, it 
had particular ideas about the project from an early stage. In this case, ‘participation’ 
amounted to the Army’s ‘consultation’ with ethnic community members, borrowing 
Cornwall’s words: ‘consultation’ refers to the fact that local opinions were sought, ‘but 
outsiders analysed and decided on a course of action’ (1996: 95).
Does the fact that the Army guided the identification of local needs mean that the 
Army was on a ‘civilizing mission’? Put differently, do local ‘needs’ have to be 
identified by local ethnic community members exclusively in order to avoid the 
accusation that an NGO is on a ‘civilizing mission’? I do not believe that this is 
necessarily the case. At this point, it is fundamentally important to learn what the local 
community members’ perceptions of the training project were. The following section 
argues that the way ethnic community members perceived the project was not based on 
the way the needs were identified, but on the way the training was conducted.
Perceptions o f Project Participants
My interviews with the villagers who were participants in the training revealed the 
complex nature of their perceptions. At one level, it seems that the community members 
participated in the training session involuntarily. One villager 1 interviewed, for 
example, said that he participated in the training session, ‘because the village head told 
me to do so’. As explained below, the participants were actually selected by natural 
village heads in the traditional top-down manner.
At another level, however, it seems that the participants appreciated the 
importance of the training. The villager quoted above told me that, in spite of his earlier 
involuntary attitude to participation, he acknowledged that the training was ‘just what 
we [villagers] needed’ and that it was ‘very important’. Another villager I interviewed 
also revealed that the training was effective. Even though the training was conducted a 
couple of years before my visit to the village, this second villager still remembered what 
she had learnt during the training. To my question of whether her life-style has changed 
as a result of her participating in the Army's health training session, she said, ‘before
44 Interview with Local Project Coordinator of The Salvation Army (Official of Poverty Alleviation
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the training, I was using pesticide around the house, and wondering why my chickens 
were dying one after another. As a result of the training, I stopped buying and using 
pesticide and the chickens stopped dying. They even began to produce eggs again’.
The key to such an appreciation of the importance of the training was the way the 
training was conducted. It was conducted using what the local coordinator called ‘a 
participatory approach’, ‘in a discussion style’. This was a new style of ‘training’ from 
the villagers’ point of view, because in the past ‘training’ meant the delivery of 
information by unidirectional lecturing. 45 According to the local coordinator, the two- 
way discussion style of training, together with the use of various kinds of learning tools, 
led not only to a rise in knowledge of the project contents among the participants, but 
also a rise in the confidence of women participants and a willingness to participate in 
the training. In the past, women in this village could not speak their own name. ‘When I 
asked their names, they said their fathers’ or husbands’ names. However after 
experiencing the training in a discussion style and learning to contribute, they gained 
the confidence to be able to use their own name, and also became more willing to 
volunteer, and more willing to participate, in training sessions’ . 46
The local coordinator also created a variety of learning tools. One of the learning 
tools was the ‘community hygiene allegretto’ (shequ weisheng kuaiban ftL* 
a song that sings about hygiene issues with a nice rhythm. This song includes a verse on 
pesticide! The local coordinator not only managed the training program, but was 
himself the instructor in health training. He proudly explained every verse of the 
‘allegretto’ to me, with some jokes and funny stories relating to how it was received by 
the villagers and how they used it to learn about health. His explanation was very easy 
to understand, and it was clear that he played a very important role in the project. He 
was a very effective communicator between the Army and the ethnic community 
members. His in-depth knowledge of issues and problems in area and of the community 
members themselves was essential to the delivery of training content meaningful to the 
community members, and suitable for use in their everyday lives. His creativity in 
developing hygiene songs clearly added to the overall effectiveness of the training 
project, and it would appear that participants’ positive impressions of the training 
project and their memory of the training content derived in no small measure from his
Office o f Zhaoyang District Government), in Zhaotong, 26 November 2004. 
h Interview with Deputy Head of Poverty Alleviation Office of Zhaoyang District Government, in
Zhaotong, 27 November 2004.
46 Interview with Local Project Coordinator of The Salvation Army (Official of Poverty Alleviation
Office o f Zhaoyang District Government), in Zhaotong, 26 November 2004.
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contribution. Even though ‘local needs’ were actually defined by the Army, the in-depth 
dialogue between the Army's local coordinator and the ethnic community members led 
the latter to appreciate the value of the training. This outcome reflects features of the 
adaptation frame, regardless of the fact that training need was defined primarily by the 
Army.
In short, the origins of an idea are not crucial to determining whether the 
subsequent interaction between an international religious agency and an ethnic 
community reflects features of the conflict frame or the adaptation frame. The most 
crucial issue is whether there is enough dialogue between an international religious 
agency and ethnic community members.
Participants and Non-Participants
Although the training participants were happy about the training projects, it is important 
to note that there were many community members who did not participate in them. In 
total, there were 1,522 participants involved in the training projects, which is equal to 
about half of the population (2,400). The number of participants in each project were 
agriculture (358), animal husbandry (859), health (149) and hygiene (156).
Why did some villagers participate while others did not? This question led me to 
investigate the participant selection process. An interview with the Salvation Army’s 
senior staff members back in Kunming revealed that this project took a participatory 
approach.47 Although the interviewee did not discuss the particulars of the selection 
process, the term ‘participatory approach’ led me to expect that the Army was 
attempting to encourage community members to participate in the training voluntarily.
Contrary to expectation, however, my interview with the local coordinator 
revealed that selection was made in the traditional top-down manner. The Army’s local 
coordinator and the Fangmaba administrative village head appointed each of the 
seventeen natural village heads at this project site to select participants. The natural 
village heads had responsibility for advertising the training among the villagers,4X but it 
seems that they did not advertise the importance of the training sessions to the entire 
population of the village in such a way as to encourage community members to 
participate in training sessions voluntarily.
1 Interview with Acting Regional Co-ordinator, Southwest Regional Project Office, The Salvation 
Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in Kunming, 19 November 2004.
4S Interview with Local Project Coordinator of The Salvation Army (Official of Poverty Alleviation 
Office of Zhaoyang District Government), in Zhaotong, 26 November 2004, and interview with 
Fangmaba Administrative Village Head, in Zhaotong, 27 November 2004.
168 CHAPTER FIVE
Instead, according to the local coordinator, the natural village heads tended to 
select villagers with high suzhi (jKM): that is, relatively well-educated, wealthy and 
prestigious villagers, rather than the ‘poorest of the poor’ . 49 The villagers with high 
suzhi were chosen because, according to the local coordinator, ‘their knowledge of 
health, and skill in cultivation and animal husbandry could be called on later within the 
natural village by the other villagers’ . 50 In other words, those ‘high quality’ villagers 
could, act as intermediaries between The Salvation Army and other villagers. The 
villagers assessed as being of ‘high quality’ included both Han and Miao, because not 
that all the Christian Miao were excluded from the project. For example, more than 
twenty percent of the Miao population participated in the farming technique training.
This selection criterion makes sense from two points of view: those of project 
sustainability and of project effectiveness. However, an unfortunate consequence of top- 
down selection was that it led to involuntary’ participation by some villagers, and limited 
the opportunity for other villagers to participate.
Focussing on pre-existing community identity means paying more attention to the 
‘downplayed’ communities mentioned above. Had The Salvation Army intended to 
enable all the villagers to participate in this project, and had it intended to advertise this 
project among all the villagers, it could have utilized other kinds of community to 
which the villagers felt a stronger sense of belonging. As discussed above, in the minds 
of the villagers, their natural village communities and their Christian communities 
carried more weight than their administrative village communities. To mobilize the 
villagers not coercively hut more voluntarily, the use of such communities would have 
been essential. However, participation in these training courses was involuntary and not 
all the villagers knew about the training. The Army’s lack of emphasis on voluntary 
participation is closely related to the fact that the Army concentrated on cooperating 
with and preferring a politically-constructed community based on the administrative 
village, and downplaying other kinds of community, particularly the Miao Christian 
community. If The Salvation Army had been able to focus more on these other 
communities, and cooperate with them in advertising the importance of their training, 
members of these communities might have voluntarily participated in the training.. This 
point is particularly important given the fact that the Miao Christian community is 
generally poorer than the Han, and hence arguably stood to gain more from the training
49 ‘Suzhi’ is a discourse that has appeared in China since the 1990s. See Jacka (2005).
Interview with Local Project Coordinator of The Salvation Army (Official of Poverty Alleviation
Office of Zhaoyang District Government) in Zhaotong, 26 November 2004.
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effort than other communities; the decision to downplay their participation seems at 
odds with the mission’s goals of helping the poorest.
The fact that the Miao Christian community members did not participate in the 
training does not point to features of either the conflict frame or the adaptation frame. 
There was simply no interaction between the Army and the non-participants to assess. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some community members did not interact 
because the international religious agency downplayed a particular community. This 
point will be incorporated when reconsidering the analytical framework in the 
conclusion to this thesis.
Local Reaction to Religious Values: Presence Evangelism
How did community members respond to the religious values of this project? Although 
religious values were not explicitly presented in this particular project, as indicated 
earlier, the fact that the Army leaves its shield mark on the many buildings it constructs, 
such as animal pens, houses, the clinic, and the primary school is, from General 
Larsson’s point of view, an act of ‘preaching the gospel’. Ethnic community members 
knew that an organization called Jiu Shi Jiin came and helped the village. However, it is 
questionable as to how many community members knew why the Army came to help 
them.
The Army’s internal evaluation report on its integrated development program is 
suggestive of the way the villagers remember the Army, even though the program was 
conducted in a different village. The villagers do not particularly remember the Army in 
association with Christianity. In response to a question on the goals of The Salvation 
Army, villagers answered as follows:
We don’t know what it (The Salvation Army) is but it is helping the poor like us 
(Traditional Birth Attendant (TBA)).
The Salvation Anny is an organisation that helps poor areas. It saves people from 
the fire [difficulties] (Hospital Worker).
The Salvation Army is an organisation that serves needy people, to take care of 
their health problems (TBA).
The Salvation Army is a charitable organisation with a loving heart and that works 
with the needy, taking care of their health problems (TBA).
The Salvation Anny is like the Red Cross, they want to help minority groups 
(Hospital Worker).
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Because of The Salvation Army, we have got knowledge, and it is [we] who should 
thank you. I remember from my training (with The Salvation Army), (the goal of 
the Army) is ‘heart to God and hand to man’ (TBA).
These quotes show that the villagers did not consciously identify the Army as a 
Christian evangelical organization. Only the final quote above shows that a villager 
knew that the Army proclaimed its identity as ‘heart to God and hand to man' (which is 
also written on all Salvation Army officer business cards), but there is no indication that 
the villagers thought that the Army ‘preaches the gospel’ as General Larsson claims. 
This is also the case among the Christian Miao. My interview with Christian Miao 
villagers indicated that they did not identify the Army particularly as ‘an organization 
that has the same religion as ours’. The villagers’ general understanding of the Army 
was that its aim is to help people. This leads to the raising of the profile of The 
Salvation Army in China, which is an important part o f ‘presence evangelism’ . 51
Otherwise, several Army officers on this project revealed that they did their best 
to avoid discussing any underlying Christian aspects with government officials and 
villagers. In fact, when I talked to Army officers about the purpose of my research, I 
sensed considerable nervousness and tension among some of the project’s officers. 52 
Although The Salvation Army also conducts a church-based HIV/AIDS prevention 
project in Kunming City, it is extremely difficult to conduct any activity that overtly 
relates to religion in the context of rural development because of a greater sensitivity 
there to religion and to foreigners in general. ‘It is not possible to conduct a church- 
based project in rural areas, because of our identity as an international Christian 
organization’, said a senior officer of the Army. 53
How can one assess the local response to the Army's religious values based on the 
three frames of interaction? The ethnic community members, including both the 
Christian Miao and the non-Christian Han, did not identify the Army’s contribution as 
having anything to do with a biblical message, but they did understand that the Army 
came to their village to help them. In short, the local response to the Army’s value of 
‘Heart to God, Hand to Man' was of two kinds. First, ethnic communities barely
M Interview with the Officer Commanding The Salvation Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in 
Hong Kong, 16 December 2005.
’2 The reason they seemed nervous about my raising the issue of the Christianity of The Salvation 
Army is that they are already worried about their international Christian identity, and it is possible 
that foreign researchers travelling to remote areas to investigate religious issues may give the 
impression that The Salvation Army aids such foreign researchers and helps them to evangelize the 
local people.
Interview with Acting Regional Co-ordinator, Southwest Regional Project Office, The Salvation 
Army Hong Kong and Macau Command, in Kunming, 19 November 2004.
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recognized the ‘Heart to God' dimension of Army activity, and this sort of response 
does not reflect features of any of the three frames. However, they did appreciate the 
‘Hand to Man’ dimension of the Army’s activity. Such appreciation is in a sense 
equivalent to a ‘consensus’ between the Army and the ethnic communities on the kind 
of activity that the Army was conducting in the village, and as such reflects features of 
the adaptation frame.
Conclusion
This chapter has described the values of The Salvation Army in historical and 
contemporary contexts and has emphasized the importance of evangelism and the 
tackling of social injustice. In the Chinese context today, while direct evangelism has 
been secularized to a significant extent, ‘presence evangelism’, based on the use of 
symbolism such as Army shield mark, is an important medium for expressing the 
Army’s religious values. However, in reality, it is difficult for ethnic community 
members to think o f ‘presence evangelism' as ‘evangelism’. Rather, ethnic community 
members perceive the Army to be a helper. Even though the Army case study project 
appeared to be totally secular, and was perceived as secular by government officials and 
even some staff members of The Salvation Army in mainland China, General Larsson 
still views such secularization as the Army’s way of ‘preaching the gospel’ in China. 
This is because The Salvation Army’s shield mark retains a symbolic significance 
despite appearances to the contrary.
There are three other important findings of this chapter that should be underscored 
in this conclusion. First, even though ‘local needs’ were actually ‘guided’ by the 
Army’s local coordinator, ethnic community members’ response to the Army’s training 
project reflected features of the adaptation frame. In-depth dialogue with community 
members and the local knowledge of the Army’s local coordinator were key to the 
interaction between the Army and the ethnic community members, reflecting features of 
the adaptation frame.
Second, even though the participants were eventually happy about the contents of 
the training, their participation was involuntary at least at the initial stage. Also, those of 
‘low quality’ did not have the opportunity to participate in the training project. 
Arguably, this situation could be improved by engaging with communities in which 
members feel a strong sense of identity; in the case of Fangmaba village, these were the 
natural village communities and the Christian Miao community. This chapter reveals,
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however, that The Salvation Army, as an international religious NGO, had difficulty 
engaging with a religiously oriented community; rather, it preferred to engage with a 
politically constructed administrative village community, with which ethnic community 
members did not feel a strong sense of identity.
Finally, this chapter has suggested that the way the Army expresses its religious 
values is so subtle that some ethnic community members may not even recognize them 
as such.
In the next chapter, we will move onto the last case study, that of Oxfam Hong 
Kong. The similarities and differences between The Salvation Army and Oxfam Hong 
Kong will provide a more in-depth understanding of the interaction between 
international religious agencies and ethnic communities.
CHAPTER SIX
A SECULAR USE OF LOCAL RELIGION: OXFAM HONG KONG
Origins, Values and Beliefs
Oxfam Hong Kong, one of twelve independent Oxfams around the world forming a 
confederation of affiliates known as ‘Oxfam International’ (hereafter ‘Oxfam’), is an 
NGO that works on issues of development and advocacy (Oxfam International 2004).1 
Oxfam claims to be ‘a non-religious organisation that works with poor people whatever 
their religion or race’ (Oxfam Great Britain ND). Since its establishment in 1942, 
Oxfam has grown gradually larger. It currently operates in more than a hundred 
countries, and has an annual expenditure of some US$402.33 million (Oxfam 
International 2004).2 This is larger than the GDP of some developing countries; for 
example Timor-Leste has a GDP of some $339 million, and Samoa some $363 million 
(World Bank 2005).
The organization in fact has Christian roots: it was established by Quakers, 
formally called the Religious Society of Friends, significant numbers of whom were in 
Oxfam offices in places such as Great Britain and Australia. This Quaker influence has 
lessened over the years, and now Quakers form only a small minority in Oxfam. 
Oxfam’s projects and mission statements have been completely secular, since its 
beginning.3 This section examines the way Oxfam was established, paying particular 
attention to the Quakers and the process of secularization.
Oxfam, originally called the ‘Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, was set up in 
1942 to provide relief to those devastated by famine in Greece as a result of the German 
occupation of World War II. Its precedent body was the national Committee of Famine 
Relief, which was set up mainly by George Bell, Bishop of Chichester (Anglican) and 
Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University, with the strong 
support of the Friends’ Service Council (FSC), the relief organization of the Quakers 
(Oxfam Great Britain ND). When attempting to establish its local sub-committees, the
1 They exist in America, Belgium, Australia, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Spain, 
Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand and Quebec. This thesis uses ‘Oxfams’ in the plural when 
describing the twelve individual organizations, the confederation of which is described as ‘Oxfam 
International’.
2 This figure does not include Oxfam America totals or management costs, which were not available at 
the time of going to print.
Interview with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 December 2005.
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national Committee of Famine Relief identified Oxford as one of the potential local 
areas. The Honorary Secretary of the Committee, Edith M. Pye, was a member of the 
FSC. Pye contacted the Oxford Preparative Meeting of Quakers, and the Gilletts, a 
prominent Quaker family, made arrangements for the meeting.4 This meeting was the 
beginning of the Oxford Committee of Famine Relief, today’s Oxfam. At the end of the 
war, when most other local committees were wound up, a few continued their work for 
a short while but eventually ceased to exist (Oxfam Great Britain ND). Only Oxfam 
survived and expanded overseas.5
Oxfam has taken a clearly secular approach since its beginning, and Quakers have 
not seen the organization as a vehicle for the spreading of their beliefs.6 This secular 
character of Oxfam, arguably, goes to the very heart of Quakerism. The origin of 
Quakerism dates back to the 1650s, when George Fox founded the Society of Friends in 
England. The Quaker faith centres on Jesus Christ, but many Quakers, particularly in 
the twentieth century, have been very much liberal Christians in the sense that they do 
not follow traditional religious practices. They have no set liturgy, creeds, or ordained 
ministers, and no sacraments. Rather, they focus on ‘Inner (or Inward) Light and the 
direct experience of God’s Spirit’ (Livingstone 2000: 225).
[The Quakers] emphasized the primacy o f  religious experience, treated doctrinal 
statements as sym bolic utterances rather than literal truth, saw the Bible as a 
product o f  history rather than eternal truth, stressed a loving rather than a judging  
God, and emphasized New  Testament ethics. Jesus became a supreme ethical 
exemplar and the Sermon on the Mount a guide for reconstructing the general 
society (Frost 2000).
The Quakers’ liberal understanding of Christianity provides a platform upon 
which to develop relationships with other religions. In his talk entitled ‘Should Quakers 
Receive the Good Samaritan Into Their Membership’, Morgan (2004: 20) answered the 
question ‘[y]es, if his or her life is consistent with the action in the parable. And in 
many cases life is consistent, whether it be the life of Samaritan, Moslem, Buddhist, 
Confucian or “pagan” animist in Africa'. Furthermore, Gilman (2004: 3) points out 
‘what many liberal Friends today may feel is a pervasive secularism’. The inclusive
4 Although there were many Quakers at the meeting, the Anglican Rev. Theodore Richard Milford. 
Vicar o f St. Mary the Virgin (Anglican church, also known as the University Church), eventually 
chaired the meeting.
In spite of the significance of the topic to many influential NGOs whose origins are associated with 
Quakerism, there is scant literature on the relationship between Quakerism and secularism. The 
Quakers were involved in founding and supporting other very well-known large-scale NGOs, 
including Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Shelter and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Care, 
Christian Aid, the Save the Children Federation, and the Women's International League for Peace 
and Freedom. For a more comprehensive list o f such organizations, see Rickerman (2005).
6 Written Correspondence with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, 27 March 2006.
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attitude of the Quakers towards other religions leads to a secular idea of 
humanitarianism. Gilman (2004: 4) suggests that ‘for many people “universalism,” and 
even Quakerism itself, became equated with a rather arid, humanistic approach to 
worship and with “walking one's talk” and doing good in the world, but not with 
listening for inner leadings’. Therefore, one of the features of Quakerism today is its 
commitment to pacifism and social justice, rather than putting a strong emphasis on 
religious dogma.
This liberalization of Quakerism occurred at the beginning of the twentieth 
century; however the earliest Quakers conducted missions based on their evangelical 
beliefs.7 Here it is necessary to touch on the issue of Quaker missionaries in China in 
the Republican period, considering the Quaker origins of Oxfam. The Quaker missions 
differed from Oxfam mainly in terms of their emphasis on a Christian evangelical ethos 
and on plans for universities in China {The Chinese Recorder 1908: 636). Their work in 
Western China began in 1886, and, by 1908, twenty-seven missionaries had worked in 
Sichuan Province {The Chinese Recorder 1908: 636). Within Christian circles in China, 
however, Quaker missionaries were often indistinguishable from other Protestant 
denominations because they did not have a particular Christian dogma. Unlike the 
Quaker missionaries of the seventeenth century, they did not believe that Quakerism 
was the only true Church. Quaker missionaries in China made ‘evangelistic and 
educational efforts’ {The Chinese Recorder 1934: 668). With regard to the evangelistic 
effort, Quaker missionaries conducted ‘what one of them terms “old fashioned 
evangelical work,” holding meetings, preaching, teaching, distributing literature, 
forming personal contacts with men and women in the towns and villages’ in the 
Tungchwan and Suining Districts in Sichuan Province {The Chinese Recorder 1934: 
668). With regard to educational effort, the main work was the establishment of the 
University of Chengdu {The Chinese Recorder 1934: 668). In the 1950s, Quaker 
missionaries were expelled from China; however, ‘some Quaker churches were still 
functioning, but with Chinese personnel’ (Peterson 2002: 3).
The ‘mission movement' of Quakerism came to an end at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when a liberal understanding of Christianity and its secular 
expression of Christian ethics attracted the attention of many Quakers. Trueblood 
explains the end of the Quaker mission movement:
In describing the earliest Quakers as a ‘missionary movement’, Trueblood (1966: 247) comments 
‘[t]o ask, when did the Religious Society of Friends adopt a missionary program, is to state the 
question wrongly. Quakerism was a missionary movement before it was an organized religious 
society. The Quaker mission is older than the Quaker Church’.
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One reason is the doubt, in some minds, of whether it is right to disturb people of 
the other world religions by the introduction of Christian ideas. Sometimes this is 
merely the result of the superficial judgment that one religion is as good as another, 
but, in other minds, it arises from a more profound understanding of the way in 
which the Living Christ has, all along, been reaching out to all men, whether 
Buddhists, Moslems, or whatever. In India some Quakers have rejected wholly the 
idea of converting Hindus to Christ, and have sought to develop a new expression 
which is neither Christian nor Hindu. Even those who do not go this far find 
something of their missionary enthusiasm dampened by the recognition o f obvious 
value in other religions. Very few contemporary Quakers believe that a devout 
non-Christian will be consigned to eternal punishment, simply because he is not a 
Christian. Another cause of the decline in missionary zeal is the way in which so 
much of the idealist urge of young Quakers has found expression in service 
projects and in new' developments such as that of the Peace Corps (1966: 254; my 
emphasis).
Trueblood does not explain the theological relationship between ‘the recognition of 
obvious value in other religions’, and secularism. There is not enough space in this 
thesis to explore this relationship further, but recognition by the Quakers of the values 
of other religions is arguably related to the secularization of Quaker activities. Oxfam is 
clearly one example of secular ‘expression in service projects and in new developments’. 
Today, secularism is one of the basic values espoused by Oxfam.
The twelve Oxfams basically share their values and beliefs, in accordance with 
the global strategic plan of Oxfam International (Oxfam International 2001 ).x Those 
values and beliefs are, for example, a ‘rights-based approach to 
development’, ’participation’ and ‘gender equality’. The following section explores 
these values and beliefs that Oxfam espouses today in more detail.
Values and Beliefs Outside Mainland China Today
According to its global strategic plan, Oxfam espouses a number of values (Oxfam 
International 2001). Among its more fundamental beliefs is the importance of a rights- 
based approach to development. This is the foundation of Oxfam's other values and 
beliefs, and therefore this section first reviews what Oxfam means by a rights-based 
approach to development. It then investigates two of the main values and beliefs Oxfam 
espouses, which are embedded in the China-based project described later. The first is 
the importance of participation to self-mobilization. The second is gender equality.
A rights-based approach to development is the basis of Oxfam’s poverty 
alleviation activity. Oxfam considers poverty, lack of rights and inequality to be 
inseparable. Its mission statement claims, ‘Oxfams understand that poverty is a state of 
powerlessness in which people are unable to exercise their basic human rights or control
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virtually any aspect of their lives’ (Oxfam International 2005). According to Oxfam 
International’s Strategic Plan, five rights form the foundation of their activity:
1. The right to a sustainable livelihood (with the objective of achieving food and 
income security as well as greater protection of, and control over, the natural 
resources on which they depend; achieving access to secure paid employment, 
dignified working conditions, and labour rights; and participating in, and 
benefiting from, markets);
2. The right to basic social services (with the objective of improving adequate 
basic health services, clean water, sanitation, public health services, and 
education for children and adults);
3. The right to life and security (with the objective of reducing the number of 
people who die, fall sick, or suffer deprivation as a direct result of armed 
conflict or natural disasters);
4. The right to be heard -  social and political citizenship (with the objective of 
achieving civil and political rights for marginalised people, and capacity 
building for the empowerment of poor and excluded people); and
5. The right to an identity -  gender and diversity (with the objective of enabling 
women, ethnic and cultural minorities, and other groups oppressed or 
marginalised because of their identity to enjoy equal rights and status)
(Oxfam International 2001; modified by author).
A rights-based approach is ‘Oxfam’s response to the real causes of poverty’, which is, 
according to Oxfam HK’s former China Programme Manager, ‘structural’. 9 To 
understand the real causes of poverty, a rights-based approach ‘forces an analysis, 
which may well change the programme priorities’ (Oxfam International 2004).
A rights-based approach is intricately related to the belief of Oxfam in the 
importance of participation in self-mobilization. The global strategic plan of Oxfam 
International (2001) states:
In all our actions our ultimate goal is to enable people to exercise their rights and
manage their own lives.
For people to be able to exercise their rights:
a. opportunities must be created so people can participate in governing all aspects 
of their lives, and
b. they must have the genuine capacity to organize and take advantage of those 
opportunities (Oxfam International 2001; my emphasis).
The ‘capacity to organize’ is often described as ‘self-mobilization’ in development 
literature (Pretty 1995). In order to fully understand Oxfam’s belief in the importance of 
participation in self-mobilization, it is useful to draw on some development literature on 
participation, in which self-mobilization is identified as the ultimate way to support the 
local people.
Interview with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 December 2005.
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The concept of participation arose from the view that ‘development’ has to value 
local people and conditions. Perhaps one of the studies of participation most frequently 
referred to is that of Robert Chambers (1983, 1994). He initiated the Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) in the context of rural development, defining it as ‘a family of 
approaches and methods to enable local people to share, enhance, and analyse their 
knowledge of life and conditions to plan and to act’ (1994: 953). It evolved from the 
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA). The most fundamental difference between the two lies in 
their objectives. As Chambers (1994: 957, 958) mentions, ‘[a]n RRA is intended for 
learning by outsiders’, enabling ‘outsiders to gain information and insight from local 
people and about local conditions, and to do this in a more cost-effective and timely 
manner’. In contrast, ‘a PRA is intended to enable local people to conduct their own 
analysis, and often to plan and take action’ (Chambers 1994: 958).
Participation discourse has flourished in the development literature, but the 
definition of participation varies significantly. In understanding the various kinds of 
participation, discussion of the typology of participation is helpful (Amstein 1969; 
Jiggins 1993; Pretty 1995; Cornwall 1996).4 *10 Table 6.1 shows some representative 
studies on the typology of participation (Kelly 2001)."
The upper part of this table represents a high level of participation. The lower part 
represents a low level of participation. In Amstein’s (1969: 217) model, for example, 
the three categories at the top are levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of 
decision-making clout. Delegated Power and Citizen Control enable ‘have-not citizens 
(to) obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power’. 
Partnership ‘enables citizens to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional 
powerholders’. Placation, consultation, and Informing, describe levels of ‘tokenism’ in 
which
4 Interview with a former China Programme Manager and a current Policy Advisor-Gender Equity, in 
Hong Kong, 16 December 2006.
11 However, some scholars discuss other criteria to clarify the different kinds of participation. The
criteria include; (1) number of people involved (Farrington and Bebbington 1993; Gujit and Shah 
1998), (2) role of the people involved (Jiggins 1993: Cornwall 1996) and (3) goal of participation
(Landre and Knuth 1993). Gujit and Shah (1998: 10) identify other problems with participation
typologies.
" 1 removed Jiggins’ (1993) model from Kelly’s table to fit the context of this thesis. Jiggins focuses
on technology transfer and resource management, which is not relevant to this thesis.
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Table 6.1: Ladder of Participation
Arnstein’s (1969) model Pretty’s (1995) model Cornwall’s (1996) model
Citizen Control Self-mobilization
Collective action (local people 
set their own agenda and 
mobilize to carry it out, in the 





Co-learning (local people and 
outsiders share their knowledge, 
to create new understanding)
Functional Participation (to 
achieve goals of external 
agency)
Cooperation (local people work 
together with outsiders to 
determine priorities, 
responsibility remains with 
outsiders for directing the 
process)
Placation (representative on a 
board or committee)






Consultation (local opinions 
asked, outsiders analyse and 
decide on a course of action)
Informing Compliance (outsiders decide agenda and direct the process)
Therapy
Manipulation Manipulative participation
Cooption (representatives are 
chosen)
Source: Kelly (2001: 22), Arnstein (1969), Pretty (1995: 1252), and Cornwall (1996).
powerholders allow have-nots to hear and to have a voice, but retain the right to decide 
whether they provide such opportunities. Therapy and manipulation describe levels of 
‘non-participation’. The real objective of powerholders ‘is not to enable people to 
participate in planing or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to “educate” 
or “cure” the participants’ (Amstein 1969: 217).
Pretty’s (1995) typology is similar to Amstein’s, but the terms are more relevant 
to rural agricultural development. He states that ‘these range from manipulative and 
passive participation, where people are told what is to happen and act out predetermined 
roles, to self-mobilization, where people take initiatives largely independent of external 
institutions (1995: 1253). He also suggests that the sustainability of the project also 
relates to this range, for ‘the problem with participation as used in types one to four 
[note: from manipulative participation to functional participation in Table 6.1] is that 
any achievements are likely to have no positive lasting effect on people's lives’ (1995: 
1253). Cornwall (1996) has a typology similar to that of Pretty, and he also claims that 
‘much of what currently passes as ‘participatory’ involves local people taking part in 
other people’s project, according to agendas set by external interests’ (1996: 95).
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Sustainability and agenda-setting by outsiders are important factors when examining the 
implementation of the projects and local perception of the projects.
What Oxfam ultimately aims to achieve is a high level of participation by local 
people, in line with the concepts o f ‘citizen control’ (Arnstein 1969), ‘self-mobilization’ 
(Pretty 1995), and ‘collective action’ (Cornwall 1996). Oxfam International regards its 
job as ‘enabling people to control ... their own development -  to support their self- 
determination’ (Oxfam International 2004).
Another of Oxfam’s values that should be explored here is gender equality, which 
resides within one of the five rights mentioned earlier: ‘the right to an identity’. Oxfam 
International addresses the rights of ‘people who are excluded or oppressed because of 
their gender, ethnic, cultural or other identity’ (Oxfam International 2001). Based on 
Oxfam International’s belief in these rights, gender equality is an important part of the 
values that Oxfam International attempts to promote in its development activity. 
However, as the literature on women’s human rights in an intercultural context suggests, 
not all cultures appreciate the equal status of women (Hilsdon et. al. 2000). How does 
Oxfam apply equal rights in gender relations to its projects? More broadly, how does 
Oxfam understand the debate over universalism and cultural relativism?
To this question, the East Asia regional director of Oxfam HK. responded in the 
following way:
It is important to talk to different social groups within a community. Community is 
never homogeneous.... it is important to identify which social groups are 
marginalized and listen to their views. From this we will have some understanding 
of the reasons for marginalization, which point to a possible direction of work. 
Gender inequality can usually be found to be an important underlying cause of the 
marginalization of poor women. Needless to say, we listen more to the 
marginalized as our mandate is fighting poverty and related injustice.'2
Because Oxfam deals with marginalized people, it attempts to raise the social status of 
women within a community. One can imagine, however, a variety of reactions from 
those who sit in ‘higher’ positions in the community hierarchy, such as men. The East 
Asia Regional Director of Oxfam Australia said, ‘we recognise that there will be very 
differing local understandings and practices, and that they will rarely fully align with 
Oxfam analysis. What we ask for is a preparedness to have dialogue on this, and 
willingness to be open to change’.13
12 Written correspondence with a former China Programme Manager and a current Policy Advisor- 
Gender Equity, 28 March 2006.
13 Written correspondence with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, 27 March 2006.
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The East Asia Regional Director of Oxfam Australia went on to suggest that the 
dialogue also aims to identify the needs of the community. In particular, dialogue with 
different social groups is important, as stated by the East Asia Regional Director:
Often, the more powerful people in the community will represent what is in their 
own interests as embodying the only authentic culture, accepted by all the 
community, whereas in fact others, who do not have as much voice, might take a 
completely different stance.14
Oxfam’s focus on the importance of dialogue should be highlighted in comparison 
with what Kipling (1899) and Said (1994) describe as the idea of the ‘civilizing 
mission’: that is, the idea embedded in an asymmetrical image of the relationship 
between so-called ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ people; and a self-proclaimed sense of 
duty of the ‘civilized’ to help the ‘uncivilized’. On the one hand, Oxfam ‘has a clear 
commitment to values’ and it believes that those values are ‘universal’, as the East Asia 
Regional Director of Oxfam Australia made clear.15 On the one hand, Oxfam is well 
aware of the importance of dialogue with ethnic communities. The fact that these dual 
understandings coexist in Oxfam's perception of its own values and beliefs provides an 
interesting perspective when considering the relevance of the idea of the ‘civilizing 
mission’ to international NGOs in the contemporary period. A belief in ‘universal 
values’ is apparent, which may be resonant with the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’, in 
the sense that an alleged ‘civilizer’ brings something better to others (Said 1994). 
However, Oxfam does not have any apparent perception of the asymmetrical 
relationship between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ as embedded in the idea of the 
‘civilizing mission’. Oxfam’s attention to the importance of dialogue is indicative that 
the relevance of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ to Oxfam is more marginal.
Reformulation of Identity in Mainland China?
As a secular organization, Oxfam HK is less sensitive about its identity than an 
international religious NGO might be. However, it is by no means free from political 
control by the Chinese government. In a Chinese context, its core values, which relate 
to rights and participation as self-mobilization, are a highly sensitive issue. To what 
extent does Oxfam HK need to reformulate an identity that consists of its values and 
beliefs to avoid conflict with the Chinese Communist system? Does Oxfam HK permit 




Interview with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 December 2005.
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Oxfam HK finds a need to reformulate its identity to enable it to act in mainland China, 
to what extent does it have the decision-making autonomy to do so?
In order to address these questions, it is first important to explore the extent to 
which Oxfam HK can act autonomously in relation to Oxfam International. Oxfam 
International has its global strategic plan, which is shared by the twelve Oxfams, 
including Oxfam HK. According to the Regional Manager of Oxfam Australia, ‘the 
global strategic plan is deliberately broad, partly because it is well aware of the 
difference in cultural understanding of rights’. 16 However, the fact that all twelve 
Oxfams are located in the so-called West (if Hong Kong is understood as a part of the 
West) raises an interesting question about how relevant the values and beliefs of Oxfam 
are to non-Western countries. To explore this question, it is essential to examine the 
actual practices of Oxfam HK in the management of projects in mainland China. This 
section firstly examines just how independent Oxfam HK really is from Oxfam 
International in relation to the finance and personnel decisions it makes from time to 
time. Secondly, it examines the way Oxfam HK designs the community development 
projects it conducts in mainland China and analyzes whether it reformulates its identity 
when designing such projects.17
Finance and Personnel Relations
With regard to finance, the majority of Oxfam HK's income derives from its own 
fundraising efforts in Hong Kong. Oxfam HK’s total income for Financial Year 2004- 
OS was HK$ 137,000,000 (US$17,563,400).18 According to its Annual Review 2004- 
2005 (Oxfam HK 2005: 28), ‘[m]ost of Oxfam HK’s income -  93.2% of its total income 
for the Year 2004-05 -  came from (massive campaigns for) donations from the Hong 
Kong public’. Oxfam HK also receives funds from ‘project funding’ accounts in Oxfam 
offices in other countries. In the same financial year it received HK$5,130,000 
(US$657,666) from various other Oxfam offices, only 3.7 per cent of its total income. 
This 3.7 per cent is reciprocal; that is, Oxfam HK cross-funds projects conducted by 
other Oxfams.19 It is unusual for NGOs to be so independent from government funding.
16 Ibid.
1 One of the members who has worked for Oxfam HK since a few years after its establishment noted 
that she was unaware of Quakerism and its influence on Oxfam HK. Written correspondence with a 
former China Programme Manager and a current Policy Advisor-Gender Equity, 28 March 2006.
18 The currency exchange rate was HKS1 to USS0.1282 as of 31 March 2005, the end of the financial 
_ year.
19 Cross-funding occurs when two Oxfam offices bilaterally fund each other. For example, Oxfam HK 
agreed to fund Oxfam Australia's projects in Africa for approximately the same amount of funding 
that Oxfam Australia provides Oxfam HK for projects in mainland China and in Vietnam. The
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Such independence is made possible by the highly positive response that Oxfam HK’s 
fundraising efforts receive in Hong Kong.
Oxfam HK’s mainland China projects draw on approximately 31 percent of its 
overall budget (Oxfam HK 2005: 29). In addition, a local project on the mainland 
usually receives matching funds from local governments. This means Oxfam HK is 
independent of other Oxfams, and of Western government funding for its China 
operations.
With regard to personnel, Oxfam HK is also independent from Oxfam 
International. It employs its own personnel, and applicants for positions with Oxfam 
HK are, in the main, selected on the basis of relevant development knowledge and 
experience. For example, Oxfam HK’s job advertisements indicate that one of the 
requirements for development work on the mainland is a ‘belief in participatory 
development and with a gender perspective' (Oxfam HK 2006).
Design o f the Community> Development Project20
The Oxfam HK case study project was an integrated community development project in 
Muga Township, Lancang Lahu Nationality Autonomous County in the Simao District 
of Yunnan Province ^  Since 1993, Oxfam
HK has carried out several community development projects in each of eleven poor 
ethnic natural villages in this township (Oxfam Lancang 2002). Every two to three 
years, new projects have been undertaken, and each project has been designed based on 
what was achieved in the previous project. Project content among the eleven villages 
has differed slightly from village to village. For example, in one of the villages, known 
as Dalaba Natural Village (Dalaba Ziran Cun (hereafter Dalaba NV),
amount of so-called cross funding is not necessarily always equal. By way of a particular example, 
Novib (Oxfam Netherlands) receives a high level of grant funding direct from the Netherlands 
government that needs to be disbursed in relatively large tranches, so the amount of funding from 
this Oxfam affiliate to other offices is usually more than it receives from them in return. This 
happens for two reasons. The first is that each Oxfam has a rather different program profile, and 
different kinds of partnership arrangements. Some have a much stronger established presence and 
partnership network in some sectors, or regions, than others. Some fund through large, established 
partner organisations; others implement a lot of programs directly themselves; others focus on small, 
emerging NGOs or Community Based Organisations. The second reason is that funds from 
governments and other institutional donors are usually tied to a variety of conditions, such as limits 
on the how much of the funding can be used to cover administrative costs. When there is a lower 
ceiling on administration funds, it is not possible to set up a local office. Each Oxfam thus cooperates 
with others in a series of bilateral or multilateral relationships for project funds so that funds can be 
used in the most effective way. Interview and written correspondence with Regional Manager, East 
Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 December 2005, 27 March 2006.
2(1 The proposal and report of this project are not available. Most of the data in this section are mainly 
based on my interviews with Oxfam officials.
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where one of the project sites I visited in 2003 was located, Oxfam HK had been 
engaged on several projects over time, as shown in the Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Oxfam Projects in the Dalaba NV
Year Project Content
1996
assisted Laba villagers in the purchase of a 20 mu herbal medicine farm 
(caoyaodi 71' J lii)21
1997
built a medical room based on a cooperative medical scheme (hezuo vi/iao ff
imm
planted a 63 mu area with tea leaves -  villagers then sold the mature tea and 
deposited the funds in a village medical fund
provided five village doctors with three months’ training and practical 
experience
1997-1999 assisted fanners to plant 1012 mu with a mixed variety of corn and rice
1998 extended micro credit to enable farmers to engage in porcine animal husbandry
1998-2000
provided fifty villagers with training in family health, village health, women’s 
health, and disease prevention
provided one hundred villagers with training in practical farming skills
1998 planted 400 mu with pine trees as part of an environmental protection program
1999
trained and assisted the members of the community to decide village affairs, 
and established a community general and financial affairs information display 
erected a hall for community use
2000
provided training for a thirteen-member community management committee 
(sheqii guanli weiyuanhui w £ )
provided training in cultivation and animal husbandry
2001-2004 provided the community management committee with a community development fund
Source: Oxfam Lancang (2002); translated by author.
According to Oxfam HK (2003a: 19), when it started its projects in Lancang 
County in 1993 the annual income of a villager was less than 200 RMB (about 
US$24.20), and the annual food intake per capita was less than 200 kilograms. By 2003, 
the annual income of a villager had more than doubled, but was still only 420 RMB 
(about US$50.80), far below the Chinese national poverty line of 625 RMB (about 
US$75.60). Meanwhile, the food intake per capita was up to 280 kilograms.
From 2001 to 2004, Oxfam HK committed itself to an integrated community 
development project. This project had a number of aspects, one of which was to allow a 
community management committee (Oxfam HK abbreviates this to ‘CO’ (stemming 
from ‘community organization’)) in each of the eleven villages to manage a community 
development fund (CDF) in the amount of 200,000 RMB (US$24,200) given to each 
CO as a loan from Oxfam HK.22 The idea of the CO is embedded in the rights-based
21 A mu ( hi ) is a Chinese unit of land equivalent to 66.5 square meters.
22 The project required finance in the amount of 1,379,400 RMB (approximately USS 172,425) for a 
project in Dalaba NV, and 1,556,000 RMB (approximately US$194,500) in total. Of this, Oxfam HK 
contributed 1,080,400 RMB for the project in Dalaba NV, and 930,000 RMB for the project in 
Dabanli Village. The local government contributed 299,000 RMB for Dalaba NV and 626,000 RMB 
for Dabanli Village. Written correspondence with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, 19 April
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approach to development, which is an approach shared by both Oxfam International and 
Oxfam HK. It relates to the right to a sustainable livelihood, and the right to be heard, 
with special emphasis on ‘empowering poor and excluded people to gain access to and 
control over the assets that help them to sustain their livelihood’ (Oxfam International 
2001 ) .
In order to explain the characteristics of the CO project, it is useful to compare 
them with the characteristics of the Village Committee (VC). Recall the explanation of 
the role of the VC in Chapter Five (p. 159). The VC is a Chinese mass organization at 
the grassroots level, established under the Provisional Organic Law of Villager 
Committees Law. The members of the VC are directly elected by the villagers, and the 
VC is conventionally in charge of discussing village affairs. These VC characteristics, 
therefore, appear to be very similar to those of the CO. What is the rationale of the CO 
project? What are the differences between the CO and the VC? What kind of benefit did 
Oxfam FIK envisage the CO project provided the villagers? Discussing how Oxfam HK 
differentiates the CO from the VC is helpful in gaining an insight into the question of 
this section; whether Oxfam HK reformulates its identity when designing the projects it 
plans to conduct in mainland China.
My interviews with Oxfam HK’s Programme Officer revealed that there are five 
main differences of the CO from the VC. The first is the CO's financial foundation, 
which is the CDF, compared to the VC’s lack of financial resources. The CO can make 
practical decisions about community affairs because it controls the finances; such 
control is supposed to give the CO greater independence from other institutions, such as 
local governments and the VC.23
The second difference of the CO from the VC is the CO’s aim to encourage 
participation as self-mobilization. In the terms of the participation literature, Oxfam 
HK’s objective in having the CO manage its own projects in the community can be 
understood as being consistent with what Pretty (1995) calls the ‘self-mobilization’ of 
villagers. ‘Self-mobilization’ is the highest level of participation, a level that could lead 
people to ‘take initiatives largely independent of external institutions’ (1995: 1253). In 
the CO in Lancang, ‘external institutions’ means not only Oxfam HK but also such 
political institutions as the VC and the central and local governments. The CO system
2005. Oxfam initially expected that the community would make a profit by using the CDF, for 
example, by raising interest from micro-credit, so that the project is owned by the locals. However, 
by the end of 2005, this looked less promising. Interview with China Programme Manager, Oxfam 
HK, in Hong Kong, 16 December 2005.
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is, according to Oxfam HK staff, very effective in such circumstances because the 
decision-making process in the CO enables the villagers first to retrieve their sense of 
community by democratic decision-making and participation as self-mobilization, 
second to become more self-reliant through undertaking community development by 
themselves, and third to create a sense of equality among themselves. The CO 
represents the interests of the natural village, and by managing the CDF, the villagers 
strengthen their sense of community, which leads them to ask themselves ‘how can we 
improve our village?’ In contrast, the VC does not pay as much attention as the CO 
does to participation as ‘self-mobilization’. According to Oxfam HK’s Programme 
Officer, communication between the VC members and the villagers is not as smooth as 
that between the CO and the villagers. The VC holds so-called ‘villagers’ representative 
assemblies’ (cunmin daibiao huiyi once or twice a year, but the extent
to which the VC system provides democracy for individual villagers is the subject of 
scholarly discussion (Kelliher 1997; Wang 2003; Chan 2003). What is commonly 
suggested by a number of scholars, however, is that such villagers’ representative 
assemblies might encourage some degree of participation, but they do not lead to 
participation as ‘self-mobilization’. According to Chan (2003: 199) for example, the 
reason for this is that villagers’ representative assemblies are mostly ‘subservient to 
village Party branches and Villager Committees’. In this respect, the CO differs insofar 
as it provides the villagers with opportunities to discuss community affairs.
The third difference of the CO from the VC is the attention to the marginalized 
people in the CO project; in particular, the emphasis on gender equality. Decisions 
taken by the CO supposedly have a better chance of reflecting the interests of those of 
low status in natural villages, which is to say in particular the women. The CO is 
comprised of five village representatives elected by all the villagers, including not only 
wealthier or higher status people but also poorer and lower status people such as 
women.24 The CO system was designed also for the purpose of raising the social status 
of women: at least one in five CO members has to be a woman.25 In contrast, the VC 
members rarely include women. Oxfam HK envisaged that the CO provides an 
opportunity for the villagers to develop their ability to make decisions as a
23 Written correspondence with a former China Programme Manager and a current Policy Advisor- 
Gender Equity, 28 March 2006.
Interview with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, in Kunming, 1 1 November 2003.




community.26 In the past, in the planned economy of the Communist regime, 
government and/or traditional leaders intervened in the political, economic and social 
lives of the villagers to a significant extent. As a result, the villagers to a large degree 
grew dependent on the government, both materially and psychologically, because they 
did not have an opportunity to express their opinion as a community.
The fourth difference of the CO from the VC is that while the VC is based in 
‘administrative villages’, the CO is based in ‘natural villages’. Recall the explanation of 
China’s village system in Chapter Four. There exist two kinds of village: the 
administrative village and the natural village. Reportedly, the villagers seldom listen to 
their village head, or to local government, because the village head is the head of the 
administrative village, not the natural village. Some villagers expressed scepticism 
about the directions their VCs take. My interviews with officials from a number of 
NGOs revealed that despite the VC’s direction in a village, villagers often decline 
indirectly to contribute their labour to the building of the village infrastructure. They 
did so because they believed it may have served the interests of the (administrative) VC 
and the local government, rather than those of their own natural village. As will be 
explained later, this difference between the administrative village and the natural village 
is the key to understanding the different outcomes in two natural villages I visited.
The fifth important difference of the CO from the VC is the CO’s characteristics 
as non-political organization. The VC has its relationships with superior political 
institutions, such as the township and county governments. As Wang (2003) suggests, 
villagers’ committees are dual natured, serving as the state’s administrative units at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, and as grassroots self-government social organizations. 
Through the system of villagers’ committees, the CCP leadership aims to achieve social 
stability and the efficient implementation of policies such as family planning and tax 
collection at the local level, rather than achieve the democratisation of the Chinese 
countryside (Wang 2003). In contrast, the CO, at least in theory, is not driven by 
hierarchical concerns. Rather, it can be described as an organization that makes 
decisions about the public affairs of the community.
These five differences lead to a critical question that determines the nature of the 
CO: how independent can the CO be of the political system in China? At the outset of 
the CO project in Lancang, Oxfam HK did not define or limit the extent to which the 
CO could be independent of external political institutions, and Oxfam HK left the issue
26 Ibid.
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of the CO’s independence to the circumstances of each village. 27 However, Oxfam HK 
did intend for the CO ‘to be a local NGO’ in the sense that it could maintain some kind 
of independence from the VC. 28 The next section, therefore, explores the way in which 
Oxfam HK has dealt with the political constraints posed by the Chinese authoritarian 
system.
Strategic Calculation
According to the East Asia Regional Director of Oxfam Australia, ‘ten years ago, it 
would not have been possible to carry out the CO project directly at the grassroots, 
because local officials were more suspicious of outsider projects that aimed to empower 
villagers’ . 29 To accommodate the Chinese government, Oxfam HK had to finely 
calculate the political risk of conducting the CO project in mainland China. To do so 
required Oxfam HK’s strong network of contacts in Chinese central and local 
government agencies, as well as experience gathered during the course of carrying out 
numerous development projects in various places across China over more than a 
decade. 30
It seems the Chinese government and Oxfam HK perceive the meaning of projects 
conducted by Oxfam HK from different points of view. From the local government’s 
point of view, as a local government official emphasized, the CO was useful in 
encouraging the villagers to participate in community affairs and that therefore the 
villagers had become increasingly willing to participate in discussion. 31 In addition, the 
CO had a non-political nature. It did not conflict with the existing VC system, because 
it did not usurp the political role of the VC, or aim to contradict the VC’s decision. 32 
Nor was the CO designed as an institution that would promote the civil and political 
rights of villagers. The fact that the CO is apolitical makes it possible to view it as a tool 
to encourage villagers to participate in public affairs in a way that does not usurp the 
political role of the VC.
: Interview with Programme Officer. Oxfam Hong Kong, in Kunming, 11 November 2003.
28 Ibid.
20 Oxfam Australia funded a project in this area in the middle of the 1990s. Interview with Regional 
Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 December 2005.
30 Interview with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 December 2005.
31 Interview with a Muga Township government official in Muga Township, 19 November 2003.
32 My field research did not identify any cases in which the CO’s decision-making contradicted that the 
VC. However, there is no mechanism for avoiding conflict between the CO and the VC. Overall, the 
relationship between the CO and the VC is ambiguously defined by Oxfam. Therefore, it is, in 
theory, possible for the CO's decisions to conflict with those of the VC. The reality of the 
relationship will be discussed further later.
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From Oxfam HK’s point of view, however, the CO project is the result of fine 
political calculation, and the CO is something that Western development literature 
discusses as being on the highest level of the ladder of participation (Pretty 1995). Put 
differently, Oxfam HK is attempting to get away from the political constraint in 
mainland China, while the local government thinks Oxfam HK is simply helping 
alleviate poverty by encouraging villagers to participate in community affairs.
Such strategic calculations of the extent to which it might need to accommodate 
its values to suit Chinese political constraints can also be found in Oxfam HK’s other 
projects in China. For example, the organization has dealt with a number of advocacy 
projects the Chinese government deems sensitive, occupying about thirty percent of 
total projects in China (Wong 2004: 29). One of the advocacy projects dealt with labour 
rights, in  1996, Oxfam started to work on labour issues, particularly in urban areas and 
with migrant workers, who were more vulnerable than mainstream workers’ (Wong 
2004: 29). In general, the Chinese government was sensitive about ‘rights’ discourse, 
but Oxfam HK supported ‘many local groups across China to provide workers with 
legal aid, training, and an awareness of their rights’. For example, it helped set up 
China’s first trade union for informal workers in Xi'an (Oxfam HK 2005: 16). It also 
established legal services and training for migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta 
Region in Guangdong Province (Oxfam HK 2005: 22).
By way of another example, Oxfam HK provided a variety of support to a local 
group in Lijiang, called the Green Watershed, which included local academics and 
community members.33 This group has undertaken some research on the impact of 
major dams on local communities. ‘Results were fed back to the communities, dam 
project leaders and local government' (Oxfam Australia 2003). Oxfam HK’s intention 
was ‘to support the right of local people to have their voices heard in decisions that 
affect their lives’ (Oxfam Australia 2003).
This project on researching the impact of damming and another to help sex 
workers in Guangxi in relation to H1V/A1DS started as pilot initiatives, but eventually 
these kinds of projects became mainstream.34 The change from pilot initiatives to 
mainstream projects shows Oxfam HK’s efforts to take an incremental approach and to 
gradually circumvent the political constraints in mainland China. In doing so, diversity 
within China with regard to geography and political sensitivity has been an important 
factor. The sensitivity of topics differs depending on the geographic area in question.
33 This project was also funded by Oxfam Australia (Oxfam Australia 2003).
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When a project was initiated by Oxfam HK, it was carried out in areas where the 
political and social atmosphere was relatively open. When projects proved successful, 
Oxfam HK tried to undertake similar projects in other relatively closed areas, and to 
make Oxfam HK’s impact greater on the mainland. For example, in the mid 1990s, 
labour rights advocacy was do-able in China’s coastal areas. However, local 
governments in western China exercised tighter control over their own regions, and 
were more sensitive about dealing with rights issues than were local governments in the 
coastal areas. Therefore, the labour rights advocacy project began in Guangdong in 
1996; now, however, labour rights projects are conducted in not only Guangdong, 
Beijing and Shanghai, but also in western China, including in Xi’an, Hunan, and 
Chongqing (Oxfam HK 2005: 16, 22).35 Oxfam HK’s broad network of information and 
research has allowed it to take into account the diversity in political openness and 
sensitivity within China. This makes it possible for Oxfam HK to initiate a project most 
likely to succeed in China and then to gradually enlarge the geographic and thematic 
spaces that Oxfam HK enjoys.
Local Interactions
The case study Oxfam integrated development project was undertaken in four natural 
villages in the Muga Township. This thesis investigates two of them: the Dalaba NV; 
and the Dabanli Natural Village (Dabanli Ziran Cun (hereafter Dabanli
NV). The former is one of the four natural villages in the Laba Administrative Village 
(Laba Xingzheng Cun E2 fTfl&t't). Dalaba NV has 271 households and a total
population of 1,125.36 Dabanli NV is one of the five natural villages in Banli 
Administrative Village (Banli Xingzheng Cun This section begins by
identifying the multiple communities existing within these two natural villages. On the 
basis of my analysis of the multiple communities in each, this section then examines 
how each of the multiple communities responded to Oxfam’s project and values. As 
will be explained later, difference in how each of the communities in these two villages 
was formed resulted in a remarkable difference in the outcomes of the project. 




Interview with Regional Manager, East Asia, Oxfam Australia, in Melbourne, 19 Deeember 2005. 
Ibid.
Written eorrespondenee with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, 19 April 2006.
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Multiple Communities
There are at least two communities in each of the two natural villages being examined 
(Dalaba and Dabanli): one based on the administrative village hierarchy (hereafter AV 
community), and one based on the natural village hierarchy (hereafter NV community). 
The AV community, as mentioned earlier, has a villagers’ committee (VC) at the top of 
its hierarchy. However, the sense the villagers in the Dalaba and Dabanli NV 
communities have of belonging to each of their respective multiple communities 
varies.37
In the case of the Dalaba NV, according to the Oxfam Programme Coordinator, 
the villagers have a stronger sense of belonging to their NV community, than to their 
AV community. There are two apparent reasons for this. First, the Laba AV is large, 
and the villagers of the Dalaba NV community do not have daily contact with others in 
the neighbouring natural villages within the Laba administrative village. Even though 
the Dalaba NV community members directly elect the members of the VC, they do not 
have a close relationship with those elected members.38
The second reason for the strong sense of belonging to their NV community 
among the Dalaba villagers relates to their belief in Christianity. All the villagers in the 
Dalaba NV hold Christian beliefs. According to the local church minister, in 1907, 
British missionaries came to this village and converted the villagers from animism to 
Christianity. Today, all of the villagers go to church on Sundays, and the old minister 
has an excellent reputation, having earned and maintained the trust of the villagers. 
When the ethnic community members disagree among themselves, they go to the 
minister and ask him for help in resolving their problems.39 In fact, he plays a very 
important role in this village, in the sense that he binds all the community members 
together. Before each Sunday service starts, he talks about village development, 
farming, some notices from the local government, and the implications of any new 
government policy relating to the village. When he finishes, people start praying. This 
minister has worked as a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) at the county level for fifteen years and as a supervisory 
committee member of the VC for two years.
This section uses ‘villagers’ to refer to the ‘community members’ used throughout this thesis in order 
to avoid complication in the explanation.
38 Interview with Programme Officer. Oxfam Hong Kong, in Kunming, 11 November 2003.
Interview with Church Minister, in Dalaba NV, 18 November 2003..
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in the main, the Dalaba NV community is based on the Christian belief of its 
villagers. Based on their belief in Christianity and on the respect they have for their 
minister, the villagers are quite strongly united, and have an equally strong sense of 
community. When their minister advertises something during the Sunday service, 
people listen to him with great respect, so the relationship between the local government 
and villagers seems very good.
In relation to the Dabanli NV, the sense its villagers have of belonging to their
*
respective communities contrasts to that discussed above in relation to the Dalaba NV. 
The sense the villagers in the Dabanli NV community have of belonging to the Banli 
AV community is stronger than the sense they have of belonging to their NV 
community. Again, there are two apparent reasons for this. The first is that the 
relationship between the VC and the villagers is much closer in the Dabanli NV than in 
the Dalaba NV. In fact, coincidentally, the administrative village head came from the 
Dabanli NV, and the villagers there knew him fairly well. Therefore, the villagers in the 
Dabanli NV have a strong sense of belonging to the Banli AV community, and they are 
to a greater extent dependent on the VC in the Banli AV. Meanwhile, the villagers in 
the Dabanli NV community do not meet informally, such as at church gatherings. 
According to Oxfam Programme Coordinator, this might be one of the reasons for their 
weaker sense of community, and why it is difficult to operate the CO system in the 
Dabanli NV. 40
Local Reponses to Project: Villagers ' Committee and Community Organization
The existence of these multiple communities had an important impact on the CO project 
undertaken by Oxfam HK. While Oxfam HK set up the CO in the NV communities, the 
VC lay at the top of the social and political hierarchies in the AV communities. In 
theory, the CO was supposed to be independent of the VC’s influence. 41 One of the 
important differences of the CO from the VC was to encourage villagers’ participation 
as ‘self-mobilization’. The ‘self in this case naturally did not mean the local 
government or the VC, but all the villagers on the ground. Therefore, as the Programme 
Officer mentioned, separation of the CO from the VC was something Oxfam aspired to. 
Oxfam was afraid the CO would eventually be absorbed into the VC because of the 
VC’s relative authority and its political background. If this were to happen, naturally,
40 Interview with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, in Kunming, 1 1 November 2003.
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the Community Development Fund (CDF) that Oxfam provided the CO would be 
redundant. 42
The Programme Officer stressed, however, that Oxfam did not force the villagers 
to separate the CO from the VC. The decision to separate was based on the villagers’ 
wishes, and was ‘only natural’.4' Before directly electing the members of the CO in each 
of the NV communities, the Programme Officer asked the villagers in Dalaba NV and 
Dabanli NV to discuss whether the VC members should be included in the CO. As a 
result of this discussion, the villagers in both Dalaba and Dabanli NVs agreed that the 
VC members should not be included in the CO.
In reality, however, the villagers in those NV communities responded very 
differently during discussion of the extent to which the CO should maintain its 
independence from the VC. What follows is a discussion of the difference between the 
two NV communities, and the reason such difference occurred.
Dalaba NV
After the decision to separate the CO from the VC in Dalaba NV, the CO members had 
the capacity to take decisions as a community and to manage the CDF. After the project 
had been underway for a w'hile, the Programme Officers discussed with the villagers of 
the Dalaba NV whether the VC members could be included in the CO. The villagers in 
Dalaba NV decided that the CO would remain separate from the VC, because they did 
not want to end up reverting to a hierarchical power relationship under the VC. An 
analysis of this process using the frames of interaction suggests that the response of the 
members of the Dalaba NV community, who were generally happy with the values of 
the CO project, reflected the features of the adaptation frame.
However, it is important to note how Oxfam HK’s local Programme Officer and 
villagers actually interacted. When Oxfam staff members and the author visited the 
villages under investigation, one of the tasks of the Oxfam staff members was to discuss 
in greater detail the role of the CO, and how the villagers resolved conflicts among 
themselves. In the Dalaba NV, Oxfam HK’s local coordinator, some local Oxfam staff 
members, and about ten villagers, decided to hold a meeting in the open under a tree, 
not indoors in a concrete building. Oxfam HK is locally sensitive enough to appreciate 
that holding meetings in a building is far too formal and may actually discourage 
villagers from expressing opinions and otherwise participating in meetings. Oxfam HK
42 Ibid.
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actively tried to avoid a formal teacher-student, lecture style set up when conducting 
meetings. At the meeting under the tree, the Oxfam Programme Officer, who came from 
Kunming, asked the villagers questions such as: ‘what does participation mean?’ and ‘if 
you are discussing how the CDF should be used, and there is disagreement among the 
participants, how would you deal with that?’ No one replied. ‘Do you have any ideas?’ 
she asked. There was still silence. After a few awkward moments, she said, ‘those are 
the sorts of questions that Oxfam wants you to think about’.
The villagers at the meeting did not appear uncomfortable about the meeting, or 
about what the Programme Officer was saying. An Oxfam staff member admitted that 
‘as a funding agency, one has to be aware of the unequal power relations amongst our 
stakeholders, including our primary stakeholders. We have to be reflective that 
sometimes in order to ensure funding support, partners might feel uneasy about 
disagreement’.44
Discussion at the meeting described above was basically led by the Programme 
Officer, partly because of the level of discussion. This leads to the important question of 
whether villagers perceive Oxfam’s project as an imposition of values. The villagers’ 
perception depended on how exactly the Programme Officer and other Oxfam staff 
members interacted with the villagers, not only at the meeting but also in normal 
circumstances. Of importance was that Oxfam had local staff members and local 
government officials who could speak both the Lahu language and Mandarin. Even 
though the Programme Officer from Kunming, who speaks Mandarin, cannot 
communicate with the local villagers in the Lahu language, Oxfam’s local staff 
members and government officials, who were also trained in the value of participation, 
talk to villagers, and maintain close communication. Oxfam’s local officers and 
government officials progress the project day to day, and therefore it was extremely 
important that they nurture good communication with the villagers.
Furthermore, the villagers’ silence at the meeting leads one to question the way in 
which the villagers participated at this level of discussion. Again, this leads to 
examining the project according to the ladder of participation. Oxfam’s aim in this 
project was ‘self-mobilization’ (Pretty 1995) or ‘collective action’ (Cornwall 1996), the 
highest degree of participation on the ladder. In reality, however, the extent to which all 
the villagers ‘set their own agenda and mobilize to carry it out, in the absence of outside
44
Ibid.
Written correspondence with a former China Programme Manager and a current Policy Advisor- 
Gender Equity, 28 March 2006.
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initiators and facilitators' is highly questionable (Cornwall 1996: 96). The villagers join 
the CO, but that does not necessarily mean that they are expressing opinions at the 
meeting, or contributing to discussion. It is essential to critically assess the reality of 
participation by the villagers, when considering the impact of this project on this 
village.
However, Oxfam did not pay much attention to relations with the community 
centred on the administrative village (VC). Even though the church minister had 
influence over the VC, the VC members did not understand the role of the CO. Oxfam’s 
lack of attention to the community centred on the administrative village can be 
understood as fitting within the conflict frame.
Dabanli NV
In Dabanli NV, the CO did not work very well because the capacity of the CO members 
to manage their own affairs was lower than among the CO members in the Dalaba NV. 
The Banli administrative village head, who was originally from the Dabanli NV, was 
the only person with the management skill necessary to operate the CO in the Dabanli 
NV, according to Oxfam HK’s local coordinator. Faced with this lower capacity, the 
villagers in the Dabanli NV decided that the CO would include the administrative 
village head because he displayed exceptional leadership, not only in the Banli 
administrative village but also in the Dabanli NV.45
However, the members of the Dabanli NV community were not in accord over the 
values of the CO project. Their response reflects the features of the conflict frame. 
Arguably, there are two factors that resulted in the different outcomes in the two NV 
communities. One is an obvious lack of capacity to manage the fund on the part of the 
members of the Dabanli NV community. The other, more important, factor was the 
different senses the villagers had of belonging to their communities.
In the Dabanli NV community, Oxfam did not comprehend pre-existing social 
relationships, in which the role of the administrative village head was particularly 
important. The members of the Dabanli NV community did not have as strong a sense 
of community as those of the Dalaba NV community. The members of the Dabanli NV 
community felt attached to the administrative village, and not necessarily to the natural 
village. Oxfam’s failure to comprehend the social relations in the Dabanli NV 
community reflects the features of the conflict frame.
45 Interview with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, in Kunming, I 1 November 2003.
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The efforts of Oxfam HK in Dalaba NV and Dabanli NV produced contrasting 
results. In Dalaba NV, in spite of Oxfam HK’s non-religious principle, the Christian 
church and the influential local minister facilitated Oxfam HK’s CO project. This 
provided the project with legitimacy, and everyone in the community cooperated in the 
project. Also, the fact that the church system related to economic matters and to 
people’s lives (because they would miss the opportunity to get information on the 
Dalaba NV affairs if they did not go to church) encouraged the Dalaba NV 
community’s youths to go to church, in spite of their general tendency to not go to 
church as often as their elders. In contrast, the Dabanli NV CO project was not as 
successful as the one in the Dalaba NV because there was no Dabanli community to 
bind the villagers together and strengthen their sense of community. It is ironic that a 
secular NGO can work with a religious local community more effectively than a 
religious NGO can.
The situations in the Dalaba and Dabanli NV communities raise the question of 
how, once Oxfam leaves these villages, the CO—which is not based on any legal 
framework in China—can maintain its independence from the VC, which is a legal 
entity in the Chinese polity at the bottom end of the vertical system of government. 
Prima facie, there are two possible reasons why the CO might be subordinate to the VC. 
First, because the CO is a natural village level entity, it needs access to an overarching 
administrative village level entity when it wants to deal with other natural village level 
entities, in relation to an enterprise, such as constructing a road that extends to other 
villages, or that affects other natural villages in the administrative village in some other 
way. This makes the CO vulnerable to overruling by the VC. Second, VC members do 
not appreciate the importance of the CO to the natural village, or/and they might not 
want to relinquish power to the CO. In fact, one interview with VC members in the 
Laba administrative village revealed that the members did not fully understand the 
importance of the CO the way Oxfam expected them to. The VC members stated that 
the strength of the CO lay in its ownership of the CDF, but that the VC was helping the 
CO by means of funding, supervision and planning. 46 It seems that the VC members 
thought that the CO was an organization under the supervision of the VC. Without the 
VC’s full understanding, it may be that the CO is likely to be integrated into the VC 
once Oxfam leaves the village.
4 6 Interview with VC members in Dalaba NV, 18 November 2003.
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In this regard, the Dalaba and Dabanli NV communities experienced very 
different project impacts. In the Dalaba NV community, in spite of Oxfam’s non­
religious principle, the Christian church and the influential local minister facilitated 
Oxfam’s project. In other words, because of the binding role of the church minister, and 
Oxfam’s informal cooperation with him, Oxfam successfully utilized the social relations 
existing in communities centred on the natural village and on religious belief. On the 
contrary, the Dabanli NV community project was not as successful as that in the Dalaba 
NV community, because of the weaker sense of community in the Dabanli NV. The 
weaker sense of community was also relevant to the fact that the Dabanli NV 
community did not have a religious leader to bind all the villagers together.
Local Reaction to Values: Gender Equality
Oxfam attempted to spread the idea of gender equality to the villagers through such 
practices as direct election of the CO members and ‘participation’ in general meetings 
called by the CO. However, local reaction to such ideas differed from the Dalaba NV to 
the Dabanli NV. In fact, the two NV communities provided contrasting images with 
respect to social relationships among the villagers. In interviews with some members of 
the Dalaba NV community, for example, the atmosphere was quite open and relaxed, 
and many men talked about their understanding of the CO. Women in the Dalaba NV 
community initially looked very shy, and hesitated to stand up and introduce themselves 
to me and other visitors. Nevertheless, after some encouragement from others, they 
started to introduce themselves in turn. According to the local Programme Officer, this 
process led the women to realize that they could make a speech in public, eventually 
increasing their confidence.47 It cannot be asserted that the values Oxfam sought to 
spread in this village have firmly taken root, but my impression is that the notion of 
gender equality has the potential to spread to the members of the Dalaba NV 
community. The responses of the ethnic community members reflect the features of the 
adaptation frame.
However, gender equality does not lie simply in being able to introduce oneself. 
The ultimate goal, according to the Oxfam International’s Strategic Plan (Oxfam 
International 2001), is the realization by marginalised people that they ‘will have an 
effective voice in influencing decisions affecting their lives; and will gain the moral 
support and skills they need to exercise these rights’; in particular, women ‘will enjoy
47 Interview with Programme Officer, Oxfam Hong Kong, in Kunming, 1 1 November 2003.
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equal rights and status’. It is therefore important to note that, while there is potential for 
the spread of gender equality to Dalaba NV, it seems there is a long way to go to reach 
such a lofty realization. In the adaptation frame, the pre-existing social relations in the 
village should not be overlooked. Before the value of gender equality takes root in this 
community, it seems that there is still a great journey ahead of the community.
In the Dabanli NV community, spreading the value of equality appears to be even 
more difficult than in the Dalaba NV community, and the responses of the members in 
the Dabanli NV community reflect the features of the conflict frame. To begin with, 
when the author visited the village, members of the Dabanli NV community did not 
introduce themselves. The administrative village head, who came from the Dabanli NV, 
was one of the CO members elected after the discussion on the relationship between the 
VC and the CO, mentioned earlier. He introduced everybody. When I asked a few 
questions, it was he who replied to all of them. Even when 1 directed my questions away 
from him to someone else, it was the village head who imposed himself and replied. 
When the village head was politely asked to not speak, and the other villagers were 
encouraged to contribute to the discussion, the villagers seemed unable or reluctant to 
do so, either persistently glancing in the direction of the village head as if inviting him 
to speak on their behalf, or averting their eyes groundward. According to Oxfam staff, 
the members of the Dabanli NV community have limited capacity to lead, or to manage 
finance or other important village matters, instead preferring to follow, deferring in all 
things to the village head, who is a decisive leader. Without the village head, the 
villagers could not manage the CDF and had failed to operate the CO system. Because 
of the villagers’ dependence on the village head, and their lack of management ability, it 
was extremely difficult for Oxfam to spread the value of equality. Rather, the value of 
gender equality seems almost irrelevant in these circumstances. The effectiveness of the 
CO project in each of the villages varies, as does the relevance to the villagers of the 
value of gender equality. This difference is a reflection of the different characters found 
in the inhabitants of the two villages.
The interaction between Oxfam and ethnic community members in relation to the 
value of gender equality was very different in the Dalaba and Dabanli NV communities. 
In the Dalaba NV community, because of the opportunity that the CO provided to 
women, the attitudes and the status of the women changed somewhat. The changes were 
subtle, and Oxfam HK did not expect gender equality to be achieved in a couple of 
years. The fact that Oxfam provided the villagers with the basis on which gender 
equality could gradually develop was already relevant and meaningful, and amounted to
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a success from Oxfam HK’s point of view. Therefore, the interaction between Oxfam 
HK and the ethnic community members in the Dalaba NV community, again, reflected 
the features of the adaptation frame.
However, to the members of the Dabanli NV community, this chapter has argued, 
gender equality did not seem to have much relevance because of a pre-existing social 
hierarchy. Therefore, gender equality in the Dabanli NV community reflected the 
features of the conflict frame.
Conclusion
This chapter has first demonstrated that even though the Oxfams are committed to their 
values and beliefs and even though they believe that their values and beliefs are 
universal, they are also emphatic about the importance of local diversity. The 
coexistence, within Oxfams’ set of values and beliefs, of the idea of the universality of 
their values and beliefs and their emphasis on local diversity contributes an important 
insight into our understanding of the relevance of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ 
today. ‘Universality’ and ‘local diversity’ are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
This chapter has also demonstrated that Oxfam HK attempts to take an 
incremental approach and to push the edge of the envelope of what it can do under the 
Chinese authoritarian system, even though there are limits on the extent to which 
Oxfam can practise its own values and beliefs. It has argued that Oxfam HK did not 
reformulate its identity in mainland China. Indeed, its CO project is not a result of 
political compromise with the Chinese government. Rather, it represents a direct 
realization of its values and beliefs.
There have been three important findings in relation to local interactions. First, 
what is most important to the religious-secular comparison of this thesis is that Oxfam 
utilized the religiously-oriented community when implementing its project. Even 
though Oxfam is a secular NGO, its emphasis on local diversity led it to cooperate 
cautiously with the religiously oriented community. The solidarity within the religiously 
oriented community generated social capital, and raised the level of cooperation 
between Oxfam HK and the villagers in the ethnic community. The religious 
community was, 1 have argued, the key to the adaptation frame of interaction. By 
contrast, the conflict frame in Dabanli NV was due to the lack of a sense of community 
and local capacity.
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The second point is that the way the Programme Officer communicated with 
villagers in ethnic community was the key to distinguishing the conflict frame from the 
adaptation frame. This fact underscores the point that sometimes the line between the 
conflict frame and the adaptation frame is a fine one.
The third point is that it was difficult for Oxfam HK to convey such values as 
‘gender equality' and belief in ‘participation' as self-mobilization to both villages 
because the pre-existing local values and practices mitigated against a local adaptation 
of those values. Even though, for example, in Dalaba NV, the status of women slightly 
improved, gender relations in this village were far from Oxfam’s ultimate aim of 
‘gender equality’. The reality of villager ‘participation' was also questioned.
Chapters Four to Six have investigated various interactions between the three case 
study NGOs and ethnic communities. The conclusion of this thesis will present a 
comparative analysis of the three case studies in the contemporary period, and bring the 
contemporary and historical findings of my empirical investigation together.
CONCLUSION
This thesis began with Kipling and Said’s description of the idea of the ‘civilizing 
mission’ as being based on the asymmetrical image of the relationship between the 
‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’. One of the more important objectives of this thesis has 
been to explore historical change and continuity in the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’. 
Having empirically investigated across time the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ 
undertaken by the Chinese centre and several international religious agencies, what 
follows brings together the historical and contemporary findings of this thesis. By 
analyzing how the interactions between international religious agencies and ethnic 
communities have transformed over time, this thesis supports the enduring relevance of 
the idea of the ‘civilizing mission'. It does not, however, advocate the simplistic view 
that today’s international religious NGO is yesteryear’s Christian missionary. Instead, it 
argues that the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’ based on the unidirectional imposition of 
values and beliefs is too simplistic.
The purpose of the conclusion is two-fold. The first purpose is to point out two 
important and enduring key dimensions that need attention in order to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the Christian ‘civilizing mission’ in China: first, the 
possibility of dialogue and exchange of ideas between international religious agencies 
and local people; and second, the fact that interaction can lead to positive consequences 
such as the self-realization of ethnic communities and the raising of the level of literacy. 
The second purpose of the conclusion is to discuss the implications these two important 
insights have for our broader understanding of the changing nature of the Christian 
‘civilizing mission’.
The conclusion is divided into four sections. The first section revisits my 
discussion in Part One of this thesis and analyzes the entangled relationship between 
civilizational identity and religion from the points of view of the Chinese centre, and of 
Christians. The second section focuses on change and continuity in the international 
religious agencies, with regard to two of the three broad themes: the origins and nature 
of values, and the reformulation of identity in mainland China. The third section 
discusses the third theme of my empirical investigation, that is, the interactions with 
ethnic communities. After analyzing the empirical findings, this section revisits the 
three frames of interaction that have been used throughout this thesis.
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Entangled Relationship between Civilizational Identity and Religion
Part One of this thesis discussed how the concepts of civilizational identity and religion 
have been entangled over time. At the theoretical level, Chapter One has argued that the 
identity of those who undertake the ‘civilizing mission’ is a self-proclaimed one 
constructed as a result of interaction with others. Accordingly, interaction with others 
transforms and constructs civilizational identity and the way religious values are located 
within the civilizational identity. Conceptualizing the relationship between civilizational 
identity and religion in such a way proved to be appropriate in the course of 
investigating the two kinds o f ‘civilizing missions’ in Chapters Two and Three, those of 
China's centre and those of the Christian missionaries. Chapter Two demonstrated that 
the Chinese centre’s understanding of the relationship between civilizational identity 
and religion has undergone significant change over time as a result of its interaction 
with the West. While the Qing Dynasty understood religion as occupying a position 
beneath the superior notion of civilization, from the perspective of the Chinese centre in 
the Republican period, religion had to be separated from Chinese civilizational identity. 
The separation of religion from Chinese civilizational identity further evolved in the 
Communist period, and the two concepts ultimately opposed each other. The 
civilizational identity of the Christian missionaries, as Chapter Three demonstrated, 
consisted of mere Christianity in the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, 
however, more and more missionaries began to merge ‘Western civilization’, 
understood as modernization, with Christianity, and attempted to spread the values and 
beliefs featured in the merging of the two.1 This occurred as a result of the increasing 
exposure of the missionaries to local communities in non-Western areas. These two 
kinds of ‘civilizing mission’ commonly attempted to include ‘Western civilization’, 
mainly understood by both Chinese and Christian missionaries as modernization, as 
either the core or at least a part of their respective ‘civilizing missions’. On the other 
hand, the shift in the conceptual relationship between civilizational identity and 
Christianity led to a differentiation between the Chinese centre and Christian 
missionaries.
While China’s centre separated Christianity from Western civilization, the 
Christian missionaries merged Christianity with Western civilization. Such a 
differentiation observable in the early twentieth century, continues today. The 
investigation in Part Two focuses more on the way Christian NGOs have perceived their
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civilizational identity; that is, the kind of values and beliefs they have promoted among 
China’s ethnic communities from the nineteenth century to date. What is observable is a 
thread that connects the various ways international religious agencies have perceived 
their civilizational identity over time.
Change and Continuity: International Religious Agencies
Values and Beliefs o f International Religious Agencies
The emphasis by ‘missionaries’ on Western civilization, as represented by 
modernization, strengthened in the early twentieth century, and by the 1920s, the 
secularization of Christian missions had begun. Technology, medicine, and science 
actually helped to reinforce the superior status of the Christian missionaries with respect 
to the ethnic communities they sought to evangelize. Christian missionaries sought 
involvement with the mission of ‘modernity’ to varying degrees. The increasing 
involvement of Christian missionaries in educational and medical work further 
encouraged secularization. One example of this was clearly seen in the discussion of the 
transformation in Oxfam’s case study: from a group of Quaker missionaries in the early 
twentieth century to the secular NGO of 1943.
While the secularization of the Christian mission is identifiable from a broader 
historical perspective, this does not mean that evangelization is no longer taking place. 
Even today JHF and The Salvation Army still place a strong emphasis on evangelism. 
At the same time, their emphasis on educational and medical works in the actual 
projects they conduct on mainland China are in some ways similar to those of the early 
twentieth century Christian missionaries. It is important to stress that even within the 
context of Communist China, Christianity is a very important belief among international 
Christian NGOs. The empirical chapters on JHF and The Salvation Army demonstrated 
that both NGOs have placed quite a strong emphasis on Christian evangelism since their 
establishment. Today, members of both NGOs outside mainland China draw on that 
emphasis, and attempt to influence the lives of Chinese people through ‘compassion’ 
based on their biblical understanding (JHF), and by meeting human physical and 
spiritual needs (the Army). These attempts to influence people’s lives are closely related 
to the purpose of informing poor people about the love of Jesus Christ.
I As Chapter Five discussed, there were fundamentalist minorities, such as The Salvation Army in the 
early twentieth century.
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At the same time, those projects that merged Western civilization as 
modernization with Christianity, by way of an example, can be seen in the fields of 
agriculture, sanitation, or Western medicine. The international Christian NGOs 
surveyed tend to believe that their values, beliefs and activities, thus composed of a 
mixture of Christianity and modernity, help ethnic communities achieve higher levels of 
economic and human development as well as attain a higher level of spirituality.
In short, two international Christian NGOs undertook projects that introduced 
advanced technology and sought to weave Christianity into their projects, as discussed 
in Part Two. I argue, therefore, that the roots of the values and beliefs that contemporary 
international religious NGOs are attempting to promote lie in what we observed in the 
early twentieth century context: ‘Western civilization merged with Christianity’. From 
this analysis, the values and beliefs of the international religious agencies in the early 
twentieth century and those in the twenty-first century tend to reflect a degree of 
continuity.
Irrespective of whether their values are religious or secular, it is important to 
recognize that all three international NGOs believe they can bring something better to 
people of other religions, and to people living in poverty, by spreading their values 
among them. In other words, all the international agencies examined have undertaken 
their activity in China with a firm belief in their own values, or even a sense of the 
confident ‘universality’ or ‘absoluteness’ of their values. In this sense, religious and 
secular organizations both presuppose their values to be superior to those of 
‘economically or spiritually poor people’. Secular development practitioners and 
scholars, as well as government aid agencies, argue that only religious organizations 
tend to ‘proselytize’ or promote their own religious values by using development as a 
tool (Crehan 2005). However, the findings of my investigation reveal that such an 
argument is inappropriate, because it assumes a clear distinction between religious 
proselytization as unethical and secular proselytization (for example promoting the 
concept of gender equality) as ethical. This argument overlooks the fact that secular 
NGOs also attempt to promote their own values. Thus the idea of ‘evangelism’ can not 
be understood only in a religious context. The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary defined 
evangelism as ‘the preaching or promulgation of the gospel' (Brown 1993: 863), but a 
secular organization also has its own ‘gospel’—in the sense that it believes its values 
are ‘universal’, and need to be spread throughout the world.
However, the degree to which each NGO respects difference in relation to local 
community values, in other words, the degree to which it supports a pluralism of values
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varies considerably. An appreciation of this is helpful in identifying the nuanced 
understanding of the ‘civilizing mission’. For example, JHF and the Army perceived the 
relationship between Christianity and other religions differently. JFIF’s evangelism is 
more a fundamental one. Its sense of the superiority of Christianity over other religions 
was observable. As a result, JHF completely failed to recognize the importance of 
Tibetan Buddhism. In contrast, the Army had a more liberal understanding of the 
importance of inter-religious dialogue, and the superiority of Christianity over other 
religions does not feature prominently in its discourse or activities. The case studies 
have provided an in-depth understanding of the differences between the two approaches 
to Christian evangelism, within an inter-religious context. At the other extreme, Oxfam 
secularized its values at the time of its establishment, and today its values are linked 
directly to a rights-based approach to development, which in turn is related to its 
emphasis on the importance of participation and gender equality. Oxfam was emphatic 
about local diversity as one of its values.
However, in reflecting on the above finding, it becomes apparent that simply 
examining the degree to which NGOs are committed to evangelism as a means of 
assessing the ‘civilizing’ tendency of NGO activities in China is not sufficient. While 
all three NGOs believe in the superiority of their values, in the sense that their values 
and activities can bring something better to people of other religions and to poor people, 
the degree to which each organization respects the different values of the local 
communities and is therefore more tolerant of pluralism is a more important marker of 
‘civilizing’ intent.
It is, however, important that a degree of respect for difference between the values 
of the secular NGO and the local communities are not taken as given. Oxfam happens to 
be a secular NGO that focuses on local diversity, but this does not mean that all secular 
NGOs profess or display a high degree of respect for differences in values. Testing this 
kind of generalization would require an in-depth comparative analysis of various 
secular NGOs working in China, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is very 
important in relation to the case studies presented in this thesis is that there is variation 
in the degree to which the international NGOs respect difference both between religious 
NGOs and between religious and secular NGOs.
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The Reformulation o f Identity in Mainland China?
An expectation set out at the beginning of this thesis was that it would be necessary for 
today’s international religious agencies conducting project activity in Communist China 
to alter their religious values and beliefs, or to disguise their values and beliefs in 
implementing their ‘development’ projects. My investigations, however, have revealed 
that this is not the case in practice. As Part Two of this thesis made clear, JHF and 
Oxfam did not reformulate their identity in China. They have maintained their identity, 
and attempted to promote this identity in practice when designing their projects in 
mainland China.
The personnel and financial relations of JHF revealed a limited change in identity. 
JHF’s identity in mainland China was very much related to its Christian evangelical 
nature. Its development project was designed in a manner that appeared similar to 
secular projects, but the emphasis on an ‘holistic approach’, which stresses the 
combination of spiritual and physical aspects in health, was important. JHF attempted to 
share Biblical values with the local people and to introduce them to Jesus Christ.
Oxfam tries to make political calculations in relation to what it can do in mainland 
China. However it still places a strong emphasis on its rights-based approach to 
development, something the Chinese government is not necessarily keen on. Oxfam has 
to adjust its expression and adopt a softer approach to development because of China’s 
authoritarian system. However, this does not really represent a reformulation of identity. 
It may be a superficial accommodating adjustment, but its fundamental identity remains 
the same.
In contrast, The Salvation Army openly proclaims that it is a Christian 
organization, and some of its staff members in mainland China wear the Army uniform 
when they undertake projects. Yet, the Army has also reformulated its identity in 
mainland China in significant ways. This is evident from the point of view of personnel 
and financial relations as well as that of the design of actual projects. ‘Presence 
evangelism’ was emphasized outside mainland China, but was expressed in the design 
of the projects undertaken in mainland China in extremely subtle ways. The Salvation 
Army reformulated its identity in mainland China, but those who work for the Army 
outside mainland China still see the religious values in leaving the Army shield mark on 
project sites.
What these three NGOs have in common is that they translate their values into 
more subtle contexts. However, this does not contradict their identity. Nor does it mean
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that they disguise their evangelical identity to suit the situation in China. On the 
contrary, they are very much open about what they do in China. What makes 
maintaining their identity possible is the acute difference in perceptions between NGOs 
and the Chinese government in relation to how the projects undertaken by the NGOs 
relate to their own values.
In sum, it is important to acknowledge the important historical change in the 
presentation of religious values. Today’s international religious agencies present their 
religious values in more subtle ways than did their historical counterparts. In the past, 
the Christian missionaries espoused their particular religious values in the ethnic 
communities more directly, whereas today’s Christian NGOs do so in more subtle ways. 
This finding is not particularly surprising given the Communist government’s strict 
control over the conduct of international religious NGOs. It is, however, important to 
acknowledge that these organizations still attempt to promote their religious and secular 
values among ethnic communities; but they do so in such ways as to bring their activity 
into close conformity with Chinese government regulations.
To promote their values, international religious agencies depend increasingly on 
the use of religious symbolism, on demonstrations of the Tove of God' by way of 
helping ethnic communities, and on modelling themselves on the practices and 
philosophies of Jesus Christ. Christian missionaries did so too, but the dependency on 
these as a means of promoting religious values has increased over time.
Interactions with Ethnic Communities
Chapters Three to Six have analyzed the responses of ethnic community members to 
externally generated values, belief and activities by means of the three frames of 
interaction. This section firstly undertakes a comparative analysis of the contemporary 
NGOs. Specifically, it discusses the responses of the ethnic community member to 
religious values and then explores the responses to secular values and project content in 
general. This section secondly undertakes an historical comparison.
Contemporary Interactions
As mentioned above, the fact that international religious NGOs are able to express their 
religious values only in subtle ways leads to some difficulty in their promotion. Most 
ethnic community members do not even realize that the NGOs are attempting to 
evangelize them. Contrary to any expectation that the Christian beliefs of the
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international religious NGOs are a significant issue for the ethnic communities they 
engage with, the case studies in this thesis revealed that the extent to which ethnic 
community members even comprehend the religious nature of the Christian NGOs 
working in their communities is negligible at best. Therefore, the frames of interaction 
could not be used to discuss the response of ethnic community members to NGOs’ 
religious values. What was presupposed in the frames of interaction was that ethnic 
communities recognized externally generated values and activities. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the expression of religious values was so subtle that ethnic 
community members were not aware of them, nor were they able to appreciate them as 
religious values.
For this reason, the three frames of interaction have been revealed to be less than 
adequate to the task of assessing the responses of ethnic community members to 
religious values in the contemporary context. The three frames of interaction 
presupposed that ethnic communities recognized externally generated values and 
activity. However, in the contemporary context, ethnic community members were not 
able to recognize the specific religious values embedded in the activity of the 
international religious NGOs.
Nevertheless, there are important exceptions to this. The story of the widow in 
JHF’s project indicates that religious actors can make a significant difference for 
individuals, based on such Biblical values as compassion and care. The widow might 
not recognize that the way in which the JHF project coordinator interacted with her was 
based on Biblical values. However, she did appreciate the compassion and care shown 
by the JHF coordinator. Also, one of the components of The Salvation Army’s 
‘presence evangelism’—‘Hand to Man’—was much appreciated by ethnic community 
members. Although it is questionable whether these community members appreciated it 
as a part of the Army’s ‘presence evangelism’, they appreciated it as ‘kindness’, which 
is not irrelevant to the practice of their religious belief, or the practice of the teachings 
of Jesus Christ.
Other types of interaction were observed by use of the three frames of interaction. 
The following four interactions reflected the features of the conflict frame. The first was 
the interaction between JHF and the ‘local young men’ who could not participate in 
JHF’s health training project. The second was the interaction between The Salvation 
Army and ethnic community members who did not participate in the Army’s health 
training project. The third was the interaction between Oxfam HK and the Laba VC 
members. The fourth was the interaction between Oxfam HK and the Dabanli NV
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community members. Common to all four was the fact that the international NGOs did 
not attempt to engage with those ethnic community members.
The following three interactions reflected the features o f the adaptation frame. 
The first was the interaction between JHF and participants in JHF’s health training 
project. The second was the interaction between The Salvation Army and participants of 
the health training project. The third was the interaction between Oxfam HK and Dalaba 
NV community members. Common to all three was the fact that the international NGOs 
did attempt to engage with the members o f those ethnic communities.
However, even in the adaptation frame, it should be underscored that pre-existing 
values and social practices in the ethnic communities hampered penetration by 
externally generated project content and NGO values. Whether such values and 
practices eventually take root in the community is an interesting question. For example, 
the attitude o f the women in Dalaba NV changed measurably, but the change did not 
mean that the concept o f gender equality was transferred completely. The existing 
gender relations in Dalaba NV proved able to resist the ideal value o f gender equality. 
By way o f another example, the health training projects o f JHF and the Army were both 
well received by those who participated in them but it w ill take some time for the good 
health practices inculcated to become habitual.
To gain a more nuanced understanding o f the conflict frame, it is important to 
discuss how the conflict frame and the adaptation frame overlap. There is in fact a fine 
line distinguishing one from the other. The fine line was noted in all three chapters, 
specifically in relation to in-depth dialogue that took place between the international 
agencies and their preferred communities. The dialogue enabled the members o f the 
preferred community to choose to respond to the external ideology relatively voluntarily, 
rather than as a consequence o f coercion. The key to the in-depth dialogue was the role 
o f an intermediary such as the local project coordinator. Although The Salvation 
Army’s senior officers are also Christians, in actual fact its projects have been run by 
the local coordinator who is also a local government official, and who is, by definition, 
an atheist. In the Arm y’s case, it was the local project coordinator who closely 
communicated with the local villagers, and who guided local need. In contrast to the 
way the Army allowed a local government official to implement its projects, JHF 
prevented Chinese local government officials from taking sole leadership in the absence 
o f JHF staff members. Adhering to religious values at the local level is preventing JHF 
from interacting with ethnic communities in the adaptation frame. Oxfam used local 
Programme Officers, and they communicated to a large extent with the villagers.
210 CONCLUSION
In short, dialogue is what distinguished the adaptation frame from the conflict 
frame. Dialogue affected local perceptions of a project, especially in relation to whether 
local villagers perceived a project as deriving from ‘local needs’ (even though the 
international NGOs may have generated the idea of what ultimately constituted ‘local 
need’), or as having been imposed on them by the international NGOs. As shown in the 
chapters on JHF and the Army, the originator of an idea was not a key determinant of 
the conflict frame and adaptation frame. As long as the international NGOs and the 
ethnic community members engaged in dialogue, and the needs of villagers were 
‘guided’ in the course of the dialogue, the response of the ethnic community members 
reflected the features of the adaptation frame. Villagers at the Army’s project site did 
not perceive the project as an imposition of values. However, in JHF’s case, insufficient 
communication between JHF staff members, and the villagers, village leaders and 
government officials, led to a situation in which the villagers and the village leaders did 
not understand why JHF did something that was not wanted by the villagers.
Dialogue takes place between international religious agencies and the members of 
a preferred community. In contrast, dialogue does not take place between international 
agencies and members of a downplayed community. It was often difficult for an agency 
to promote its values and project contents in an overlooked community. All of the case 
study NGOs commonly overlooked the multiplicity of communities. They preferred a 
particular community, while downplaying other communities, and regarded the 
preferred community as the community. However, the preferred communities were only 
one among the multiple communities that existed in the villages. Other communities 
were downplayed or overlooked by the NGOs. Specifically, JHF preferred a community 
centred on an administrative natural village, while it downplayed a community centred 
on Tibetan religious beliefs. The Army preferred a community centred on an 
administrative village, while it downplayed a community centred on Christian religious 
beliefs. Oxfam preferred a community centred on a natural village practising its 
Christian religious beliefs, while downplaying a community centred on an 
administrative village.
Dialogue was possible when the international religious NGOs engaged with each 
of the multiple communities. The international NGOs did so in relation to some 
communities, but not in relation to others. It is particularly important to engage with the 
communities with which community members identify most strongly. Such 
communities are often religiously-oriented ones. In a nutshell, all the case study NGOs 
prefer communities that, in particular, (1) suit the values of the agency and (2) favour
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the political status of the agency in China. In the course of preferring one community 
over another, international agencies downplay the importance of other communities 
(whether intentionally or not), particularly communities based on the religious beliefs of 
local people. Such downplayed communities often make it difficult for international 
NGOs to achieve their objective; that is, the spreading of their values among the 
villagers. It should be noted that the selective engagement of the international religious 
agencies in ethnic communities is also highly relevant to the work undertaken by the 
case-study secular agency.
Finally, interaction reflecting the features of the middle ground frame was 
observed only in the case of Oxfam. The interaction of Oxfam and the member of the 
Dalaba NV community not only reflected the features of the adaptation frame, but also 
developed further and came to reflect the features of the middle ground frame. The 
interaction led to unintended consequences for both Oxfam HK and the ethnic 
community members. From Oxfam's point of view, Oxfam engaged with the pre­
existing social relationships in the community, based on the community’s Christianity. 
Oxfam is a secular agency but its values changed in the process of interaction. From the 
point of view of the ethnic community, the interaction led to the reinforcing of the 
religious identity of the ethnic community members, by utilizing their religious network 
to implement the CO project.
An important question to be asked is why interactions between the Army and JHF 
and the ethnic communities did not reflect the features of the middle ground frame. This 
relates to the common fact that both NGOs preferred politically created communities, 
namely the administrative villages. They both downplayed local pre-existing 
community identity. This suggests the difference between the two types of agency lies 
in the way the international secular NGO and ethnic communities interact. The 
international secular NGO made more of an effort to engage with religiously oriented 
ethnic communities when necessary, even though such engagement may be inconsistent 
with their own secular values. This contrasts with the fact that the case-study 
international religious NGOs, both due to sensitivities about religious work in China 
and because of lack of alignment of religious beliefs, did not engage with religiously- 
oriented ethnic communities.
Now that I have analyzed the interactions between international NGOs and ethnic 
communities in the contemporary context, what follows is an analysis of the historical 
change and continuity in local interactions. By identifying the common features in the 
past and the present, this thesis seeks to refine the frames of interaction. These frames,
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as presented in Chapter One, represent the different kinds of responses of ethnic 
community members to the values, beliefs and activities of international religious 
agencies, and the different kinds of interaction have on ethnic communities. In setting 
up the frames of interaction, Chapter One deliberately left open the responses of the 
international religious agencies to the ethnic communities. What follows identifies 
patterns in the way international religious agencies have responded to ethnic 
communities in each frame, and adds these patterns to the definitive features of the 
relevant frame of interaction.
Continuity in the Interactions: ‘Frames o f Interaction' Revisited
The first continuity relates to the way international religious agencies selectively engage 
with ethnic communities. Zeroing in on a particular village in China, each of the 
empirical chapters identified the coexistence of multiple and overlapping communities. 
Yet all historical and contemporary international religious agencies examined in this 
thesis preferred communities that, in particular, suited the values of the agency in China. 
A consequence of this is that the international religious agencies tended to downplay the 
importance of other communities in any given village. The interaction between an 
international religious agency and a ‘preferred community' is likely to reflect the 
features of the adaptation frame. On the contrary, the interaction between an 
international religious agency and a ‘downplayed community’ is likely to reflect the 
features of the conflict frame. This suggests the argument that the key to avoiding the 
conflict frame of interaction is to engage with multiple communities within a village.
In Chapter One, the definitive features of the conflict and adaptation frames 
included the way ethnic community members responded to the values, beliefs and 
activities of international religious agencies. The features of the conflict frame included 
a response by the members of an ethnic community in conscious disagreement with the 
values and activities of the international religious agencies, or with the very existence of 
the mission itself. The features of the adaptation frame included reaching a consensus 
over such values and activities. In reconsidering the definitive features of these frames 
from the responses of international religious agencies, engagement with ethnic 
communities is the key to distinguishing the conflict frame from the adaptation frame.
Ultimately there was little more than a fine line between the conflict frame and the 
adaptation frame, a line drawn as a result of an attempt by an international religious 
agency to engage with an ethnic community. When international religious agencies do
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not have close dialogue with ethnic communities, the features of the interaction between 
the two tend to fit into the conflict frame. Much of the literature on international 
relations assumes a lack of dialogue in relation to the ‘civilizing mission’. On the 
contrary, when international religious agencies do have close dialogue with ethnic 
communities, in the interaction between the two there tend to emerge the features of the 
adaptation frame. The possibility of dialogue is the first key dimension that has been 
neglected in the simplistic idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ as the imposition of values 
and beliefs.
The second continuity relates to the middle ground frame. The interaction of an 
international religious agency and an ethnic community in the adaptation frame can 
develop into a more mature relationship, which can be understood through the middle 
ground frame. In this relationship, the impact of the interaction is not limited to what 
the international religious agency expects at the outset. Rather, interaction leads to 
unintended consequences, for example to a greater awareness among the members of 
the ethnic community of themselves as a community. The spreading of its values by an 
international religious agency leads not necessarily to the weakening of identity in an 
ethnic community, but to the strengthening thereof. In this frame, an international 
religious agency tends to indigenize, in the sense that it changes its values and activities 
to suit local contexts. This thesis provided two examples of indigenization. The first, in 
Chapter Three, discussed the missionary Samuel Pollard, who indigenized his values 
and activity in the local Miao context. This process involved a shift from the mere 
evangelizing of local people to not only creating the Miao written script that led to the 
strengthening of Miao ethnic identity but also to helping the Miao to seek recognition of 
their ethnic identity by the Republic of China. The second example of indigenization, as 
Chapter Six demonstrated, was when Oxfam HK, a secular organization, utilized a local 
religious network, which does not necessarily accord with Oxfam HK’s secular identity. 
The indigenization of international religious agencies is the key to a much more mature 
relationship between the agencies and the ethnic communities. This is helpful in gaining 
a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the civilizing mission. Only the middle 
ground frame can enable us to understand fully the impact of such an encounter on 
community identity.
Such patterns of international religious agencies’ response in each frame, 
historically and contemporarily, lead to the main argument of this thesis: the extent to 
which an international religious agency engages with ethnic communities is the key to 
gaining a more nuanced understanding of the idea of the ‘civilizing mission' over time.
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Contrary to an underlying assumption in the literature, which argues for an 
understanding of the imposition of values as a way of assessing the nature of the 
‘civilizing mission’, this thesis argues that one needs to look at the other side of the coin. 
In other words, we need to assess the ‘civilizing mission’ from the perspective of 
‘engagement’.
In sum, two issues are particularly important. First, even in the case where an 
international religious agency has ‘imposed' its values and activities, these can be well 
received by ethnic communities. Second, and interrelated, a positive response from 
ethnic communities generated through a process of engagement can lead, in tum, tu 
positive unintended consequences such as the self-realization of the ethnic community. 
It is important to stress that the encounter with religion does not necessarily lead to a 
weakening of ethnic identity.
Implications of This Thesis
The above understanding of the ‘civilizing mission’ has important implications for the 
relevant literature in the following three ways. First, identifying the fine line between 
conflict and adaptation from a local perspective may add an interesting perspective to 
the encounter between China and the West. This thesis provides a practical perspective 
on the theoretical discussion of universalism and relativism in China’s international 
relations. The debate about actual interactions does not necessarily have to be cast in 
relation to the dichotomized and fixed understanding of the two "isms'. An international 
agency may believe in the universal nature of its own values, but this does not 
necessarily comply with a completely dichotomized idea of universalism and relativism. 
To discuss the way in which the universal nature of values can transcend space, a focus 
on engagement through dialogue with overlapping multiple communities is extremely 
important, because a dialogue can lead to a change in the perceptions of a local 
community.
The second implication of this thesis is for our understanding of the civilizational 
encounter. Civilizational encounters include those between religion and secularism. 
Secularism can be understood as one among a number of civilizational identities 
(Madsen and Strong 2002). Several studies deal with the question of how religion and 
secularism can coexist in the contemporary world (Madsen and Strong 2002; Anheim 
1999; AnNa’im 2002; Keane 2002).
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Anheim (1999) and AnNa'im (2002) attempt to discover the path to avoid the 
clash between global civil society and religion and seek coexistence between the two. 
Anheim (1999: 97) argues that 'the conditions under which religious communities can 
become a positive, productive factor are that they keep their ability to discover the 
dialogue with other religious communities and the world, through the lay involvement’. 
AnNa’im (2002) attempts to construct the view that global civil society and religion can 
be mutually supportive, and emphasizes that both religious communities and global 
civil society have responsibility for reaching an ‘overlapping consensus’ between the 
two. This overlapping consensus, he argues, is reached through concrete dialogue. He 
(2002: 58-59) suggests that it is necessary:
to mediate the tension between the presumed exclusivity of religious communities 
and their tendency to strictly enforce narrowly defined moral codes, on the one 
hand, and the requirements of inclusion, civility, and freedom of choice of civil 
society, on the other hand.... The mediation of this tension can happen through an 
internal discourse within religious communities and simultaneous dialogue with 
other constituencies.
My thesis resonates with the emphasis of Anheim (1999) and AnNa’im (2002) on 
the importance of dialogue, and identifies particular ways international religious 
agencies are able to maintain dialogue with ethnic communities in China. It is my 
contention that both secular and religious agencies can significantly contribute to 
development in China. However, to do so requires an in-depth understanding of local 
communities on the basis of anthropological knowledge, and an open-minded attitude to 
different values and religions. The activities of international agencies, both religious 
and secular, need to move beyond the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ insofar as it causes 
‘conflict’, by engaging in dialogue with a variety of local communities. This thesis also 
attempts to move away from the dichotomy of religion and secularism, by suggesting 
that both religious and secular agencies can share in the belief that their values can 
bring something better to others.
An analysis of civilizational encounters from a local perspective is essential, 
because different civilizational identities are not necessarily incompatible in practice. 
The key to attaining the greatest degree of compatibility lies in a two-way learning 
process. Explicitly, international agencies that espouse universal values can learn from 
diverse local contexts. At the same time, ethnic communities can learn and indeed adapt 
to the values promoted by international agencies. This argument has its twin in what 
John Keane (2003: 205) has referred to as ‘the art of learning through exposure to 
others -  imparative reasoning’. ‘Imparative’ comes, he suggests, from imparare in Latin,
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meaning ‘learning through interaction with others who are different’ to take place. 
Engagement through dialogue creates an opportunity for two-way learning; that is, for 
the art of learning through interaction with others who are different. It is in this way that 
both international religious agencies and ethnic communities are able to exert a positive 
influence on each other. The future of international religious agencies, and the potential 
positive impact they may have on local communities, really lies in the extent to which 
they can engage overlapping communities in a meaningful dialogue.
The third implication of this thesis is for increasing our empirical knowledge of 
ethnic communities in China and their encounter with the ‘West’. This thesis has 
brought to bear in-depth empirical evidence that religion is often one of the more 
important factors in transforming ethnic communities in the investigated areas. The 
encounters of these communities with international religious agencies have not 
necessarily led to the weakening of ethnic identity. This study, therefore, reinforces the 
arguments of some historical anthropologists in relation to the historical interaction 
between ethnic communities and outsiders (Harrell 1995; Cheung 1995; Tapp 1989). 
The implication of this thesis is that their argument is applicable to the contemporary 
setting as well. Community identity based on local religion has endured even when it 
has encountered the ‘West’.
The history of the encounter between China and the West is extremely complex. 
The extent to which the encounter has changed China’s ethnic communities is not 
properly explained in the literature. However, this thesis has focused a spotlight on one 
of the enduring aspects of the encounter with international religious agencies, an aspect 
that has been neglected in the literature. The fact that such encounters can throw up 
features of any of the three frames of interaction—conflict, adaptation and middle 
ground—in both the historical and the contemporary periods implies that ethnic 
communities in China have had the ability to endure exposure to universal values.
The scope of activities conducted by international religious agencies has been 
expanding. Their attempts to promote so-called ‘universal values’ also provides a 
potential opportunity to engage in in-depth dialogue with local communities. At present, 
it is difficult for international religious agencies to engage with Chinese religious 
communities, because of the political sensitivity surrounding religion in China. A 
second constraining factor is the lack of respect for different religions. The hope is that 
religious tolerance in China will strengthen over time. In the meantime, it is vitally 
important that international agencies are able to demonstrate the importance of religious 
tolerance and pluralism through their engagement with local communities. This can be
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best achieved by engaging in a dialogue which stresses the importance of learning 
through interaction with those who have different values and beliefs.
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